BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股東:
Our per-share book value increased 14.3% during 1993. Over
the last 29 years (that is, since present management took over)
book value has grown from $19 to $8,854, or at a rate of 23.3%
compounded annually.
1993年本公司的淨值成長了14.3%，總計過去29年以來，也就是自從現有經
營階層接手之後，每股淨值由當初的19元成長到現在的8,854美元，年複合成
長率約為23.3%。
During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.5
billion, a figure affected by two negative and two positive non-
operating items. For the sake of completeness, I'll explain them
here. If you aren't thrilled by accounting, however, feel free
to fast-forward through this discussion:
回顧過去一年，Berkshire的淨值增加了15億美元，主要受到兩項負面以及兩
項正面非營業的因素所影響，為了做完整的表達，我將它們條列如下，若是大家
對於會計有點感冒，大可直接跳過本段不看。
1. The first negative was produced by a change in
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
having to do with the taxes we accrue against
unrealized appreciation in the securities we
carry at market value. The old rule said that
the tax rate used should be the one in effect
when the appreciation took place. Therefore,
at the end of 1992, we were using a rate of 34%
on the $6.4 billion of gains generated after
1986 and 28% on the $1.2 billion of gains
generated before that. The new rule stipulates
that the current tax rate should be applied to
all gains. The rate in the first quarter of
1993, when this rule went into effect, was 34%.
Applying that rate to our pre-1987 gains
reduced net worth by $70 million.
第一個負面因素是由於一般公認會計原則變動所造成，主要與
帳上依照市價計算的未實現增值利益所估列的所得稅有關，原來規
定稅率必須按照漲價所發生時點來計算，因此在1992年底，我們
的未實現利益也64億美元係按照34%計算，其餘12億則按28%
計算；而新的規定則改成全部依照現行稅率計算，故1993年第一
季所適用的稅率則為34%，包含1987年以前的未實現利得在內全
部適用，此舉將使得我們的淨值因此減少7,000萬美元。
2. The second negative, related to the first, came
about because the corporate tax rate was raised
in the third quarter of 1993 to 35%. This
change required us to make an additional charge
of 1% against all of our unrealized gains, and
that charge penalized net worth by $75 million.
Oddly, GAAP required both this charge and the
one described above to be deducted from the
earnings we report, even though the unrealized
appreciation that gave rise to the charges was
never included in earnings, but rather was
credited directly to net worth.
2.第二個負面因素與第一個也有關，因為從1993年開始企業稅率提
高為35%，此舉又使得我們必須為帳上未實現利得多提1%的稅負，
導致我們的淨值又減少7,500萬美元，奇怪的是一般公認會計原則要
求這兩項變動皆須列入損益表，卻不顧當初這些未實現利得根本就從
未列入盈餘之內，而是直接當作是淨值的增加。
3. Another 1993 change in GAAP affects the value
at which we carry the securities that we own.
In recent years, both the common stocks and
certain common-equivalent securities held by
our insurance companies have been valued at
market, whereas equities held by our non-
insurance subsidiaries or by the parent company
were carried at their aggregate cost or market,
whichever was lower. Now GAAP says that all
common stocks should be carried at market, a
rule we began following in the fourth quarter
of 1993. This change produced a gain in
Berkshire's reported net worth of about $172
million.
3.1993年另外一個會計原則的變動影響的則是我們帳上持有的這些
有價證券的價值，近幾年來，我們保險公司所持有的不管是普通股或
是約當普通股，都是按市價計算，至於母公司或是其他非保險業子公
司所持有的的股票則以成本與市價孰低法計算，現在一般公認會計原
則則改成全部都按市價計算，這個規定將從1993年的第四季開始實
施，此舉將使得Berkshire的淨值增加1.72億美元。
4. Finally, we issued some stock last year. In a
transaction described in last year's Annual
Report, we issued 3,944 shares in early
January, 1993 upon the conversion of $46
million convertible debentures that we had
called for redemption. Additionally, we issued
25,203 shares when we acquired Dexter Shoe, a
purchase discussed later in this report. The
overall result was that our shares outstanding
increased by 29,147 and our net worth by about
$478 million. Per-share book value also grew,
because the shares issued in these transactions
carried a price above their book value.
4.最後去年我們又發行的一些股份，在一項去年曾提過的購併交易
中，我們在1993年一月將4,600萬美元的可轉換債券贖回，而發行
了3,944股，此外在買下Dexter鞋業時，(後面報告還會詳加敘述)
我們又發行了25,203股，總計一共新發行了29,147股，增加4.78
億美元的淨值，每股帳面淨值也因發行價格高於原先帳面每股淨值而
提升。
Of course, it's per-share intrinsic value, not book value,
that counts. Book value is an accounting term that measures the
capital, including retained earnings, that has been put into a
business. Intrinsic value is a present-value estimate of the
cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining
life. At most companies, the two values are unrelated.
Berkshire, however, is an exception: Our book value, though
significantly below our intrinsic value, serves as a useful
device for tracking that key figure. In 1993, each measure grew
by roughly 14%, advances that I would call satisfactory but
unexciting.
當然真正重要的是每股實質價值而非帳面淨值，帳面淨值是一個會計名詞，用來
衡量一家公司所投入的資本，也包含未分配的盈餘在內，實質價值則是對於一家
企業終其一生所能產生現金流量的估計折現值，對大部分的公司來說，這兩個數
字大多不相關，不過Berkshire算是一個例外，我們的帳面淨值，雖然遠低於實
質價值，但卻是追蹤實質價值相當好的一項指標，在1993年兩項數值大約皆以
14%左右的比率增加，這種成績雖讓人滿意卻不令人驚喜。
These gains, however, were outstripped by a much larger gain
- 39% - in Berkshire's market price. Over time, of course,
market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same
destination. But in the short run the two often diverge in a
major way, a phenomenon I've discussed in the past. Two years
ago, Coca-Cola and Gillette, both large holdings of ours, enjoyed
market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings
gains. In the 1991 Annual Report, I said that the stocks of
these companies could not continuously overperform their
businesses.
這些利得比起Berkshire本身股價39%的漲幅來說還是略微遜色，當然就長期
而言，Berkshire的市價與實質價值將會到達相同的水平，但短期而言，兩者的
變化可能會有很大的差異，這種現象稍後我們會再詳細討論，兩年前我們兩項主
要的投資可口可樂與吉列刮鬍刀的股價表現遠超過本身的盈餘成長，在1991年
的年報中，我便說過這些公司的股票市價不可能永遠持續超越其本業。
From 1991 to 1993, Coke and Gillette increased their annual
operating earnings per share by 38% and 37% respectively, but
their market prices moved up only 11% and 6%. In other words,
the companies overperformed their stocks, a result that no doubt
partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand names.
Whatever the reason, what will count over time is the earnings
performance of these companies. If they prosper, Berkshire will
also prosper, though not in a lock-step manner.
從1991年到1993年，可口可樂與吉列刮鬍刀每股獲利的增加幅度分別為38%
與37%，但是同期間股票市價的漲幅卻只有11%與6%，換句話說，這些公司的
表現超越股票市場，主要的原因還在於華爾街對於品牌有很深的疑慮，但是不管
怎樣，真正重要的還是這些公司本身的獲利情況，如果他們經營順利，Berkshire
也就跟著水漲船高，雖然不是依照一步步穩定的方式前進。
Let me add a lesson from history: Coke went public in 1919
at $40 per share. By the end of 1920 the market, coldly
reevaluating Coke's future prospects, had battered the stock down
by more than 50%, to $19.50. At yearend 1993, that single share,
with dividends reinvested, was worth more than $2.1 million. As
Ben Graham said: "In the short-run, the market is a voting
machine - reflecting a voter-registration test that requires only
money, not intelligence or emotional stability - but in the long-
run, the market is a weighing machine."
接著讓我為各位上一次歷史課，1919年可口可樂股票以每股40美元公開上
市，到了1920年由於市場對於可口可樂的前景看法相當冷淡，而將股價下修一
半至19.5美元，然而時至今日，1993年底，若是將收到的股利再重複投資下
去，則當初股票的價值將變成210萬美元，就像葛拉罕所說：「短期而言，市
場是投票機器，投資人不須靠智慧或情緒控制，只要有錢都可以登記參加投票，
但就長期而言，股票市場卻是一個體重機。」
So how should Berkshire's over-performance in the market
last year be viewed? Clearly, Berkshire was selling at a higher
percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the
case at the beginning of the year. On the other hand, in a world
of 6% or 7% long-term interest rates, Berkshire's market price
was not inappropriate if - and you should understand that this is
a huge if - Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I can
attain our long-standing goal of increasing Berkshire's per-share
intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15%. We have not
retreated from this goal. But we again emphasize, as we have for
many years, that the growth in our capital base makes 15% an
ever-more difficult target to hit.
所以我們應該如何看待Berkshire去年的股價超越本質的表現呢? 很明顯的在
1993年底Berkshire的股價佔實質價值比重較年初為高，另外一方面，在長期
利率只有6%到7%的投資環境下，同時若是你了解查理孟格跟本人只能讓
Berkshire的實質價值每年達到15%的成長的話，你就知道Berkshire去年這樣
的股價表現實在是有點反常，雖然對於這樣的目標我們從不妥協，但我們必須再
一次強調，隨著資本規模的日益擴大，想要達到這個目標的困難度也與日俱增。
What we have going for us is a growing collection of good-
sized operating businesses that possess economic characteristics
ranging from good to terrific, run by managers whose performance
ranges from terrific to terrific. You need have no worries about
this group.
不過另一方面，伴隨我們的是由一些相當規模且擁有競爭優勢的企業，並且由傑
出的經理人所經營，對於這樣的夢幻組合大家大可以放心。
The capital-allocation work that Charlie and I do at the
parent company, using the funds that our managers deliver to us,
has a less certain outcome: It is not easy to find new
businesses and managers comparable to those we have. Despite
that difficulty, Charlie and I relish the search, and we are
happy to report an important success in 1993.
倒是查理跟我在母公司利用子公司所貢獻資金所作的資金分配工作，所面臨的不
確定性就比較高，要找到像我們現在擁有一樣好的企業並不容易，但是雖然難度
高，查理跟我卻絕對不會放棄追尋，而很高興在1993年我們能有相當成功的斬
獲。
Dexter Shoe
Detxter 鞋業
What we did last year was build on our 1991 purchase of H.
H. Brown, a superbly-run manufacturer of work shoes, boots and
other footwear. Brown has been a real winner: Though we had
high hopes to begin with, these expectations have been
considerably exceeded thanks to Frank Rooney, Jim Issler and the
talented managers who work with them. Because of our confidence
in Frank's team, we next acquired Lowell Shoe, at the end of
1992. Lowell was a long-established manufacturer of women's and
nurses' shoes, but its business needed some fixing. Again,
results have surpassed our expectations. So we promptly jumped
at the chance last year to acquire Dexter Shoe of Dexter, Maine,
which manufactures popular-priced men's and women's shoes.
Dexter, I can assure you, needs no fixing: It is one of the
best-managed companies Charlie and I have seen in our business
lifetimes.
去年我們所做的乃是基於1991年買進HH布朗鞋業-一家管理良善的鞋子、靴
子製造公司的續曲，布朗鞋業成為一家真正成功的贏家，雖然一開始我們就對他
就有相當高的標準，但是在Frank與其他經理人的努力之下，這家公司的表現
甚至還超過我們的預期，基於我們對Frank團隊的信心，接著在1992年年底
我們又買下Lowell鞋業，Lowell是一家女鞋與護士鞋的老牌製造公司，不過他
的管理還需要改進，再一次他的表現又超乎我們的預期，所以我們立刻又再接再
厲在去年又趁機買下緬因州的Dexter鞋業，一家專門製造高級男女鞋的品牌，
這次我可以向大家保證Dexter並不需要改造，Dexter是查理跟我在職業生涯
中，所見過最好的公司之一。
Harold Alfond, who started working in a shoe factory at 25
cents an hour when he was 20, founded Dexter in 1956 with $10,000
of capital. He was joined in 1958 by Peter Lunder, his nephew.
The two of them have since built a business that now produces over
7.5 million pairs of shoes annually, most of them made in Maine
and the balance in Puerto Rico. As you probably know, the
domestic shoe industry is generally thought to be unable to
compete with imports from low-wage countries. But someone forgot
to tell this to the ingenious managements of Dexter and H. H.
Brown and to their skilled labor forces, which together make the
U.S. plants of both companies highly competitive against all
comers.
話說Harold Alfond從20歲以時薪25美分開始到製鞋工廠做工，並在1956
年靠著一萬美元的資本創立Dexter，1958年他的侄子Peter加入，從此兩人
建立起年產750萬雙鞋子的企業，大部分的鞋子都在緬因州生產，其餘的則在
波多黎各，就像大家都知道的，國內的製鞋業，一般被認為無法與國外進口低價
產品競爭，但是大家似乎忘記提醒布朗鞋業與Dexter經營團隊有這麼一回事，
是他們讓兩家公司位於美國的工廠擁有高度的競爭力以對抗外來的入侵者。
Dexter's business includes 77 retail outlets, located
primarily in the Northeast. The company is also a major
manufacturer of golf shoes, producing about 15% of U.S. output.
Its bread and butter, though, is the manufacture of traditional
shoes for traditional retailers, a job at which it excels: Last
year both Nordstrom and J.C. Penney bestowed special awards upon
Dexter for its performance as a supplier during 1992.
Dexter還包含77家的零售門市，主要集中在西北地區，該公司同時也是高爾
夫球鞋的主要製造商，全美的市場佔有率約為15%，不過他的主要業務還是傳
統通路商的傳統鞋類，這也是它最擅長的領域，去年Dexter還獲得Nordstrom
與JC Penny所頒發的年度最佳供應商獎項。
Our 1993 results include Dexter only from our date of
merger, November 7th. In 1994, we expect Berkshire's shoe
operations to have more than $550 million in sales, and we would
not be surprised if the combined pre-tax earnings of these
businesses topped $85 million. Five years ago we had no thought
of getting into shoes. Now we have 7,200 employees in that
industry, and I sing "There's No Business Like Shoe Business" as
I drive to work. So much for strategic plans.
Berkshire只能從1993年11月7號購併日後開始計入Dexter的業績，在1994
年我們預計Berkshire光是在鞋類方面的銷售額就達到5.5億美元，而總計稅前
獲利極有可能超過8,500萬，記得在五年前我們根本就沒想到會跨進鞋類這一
行，現在光是在這個產業所雇用的員工就超過7,200人，現在我每天上班，都
會邊開車邊唱，沒有一個行業會像賣鞋這一行，策略計畫還有很多發揮的空間。
At Berkshire, we have no view of the future that dictates
what businesses or industries we will enter. Indeed, we think
it's usually poison for a corporate giant's shareholders if it
embarks upon new ventures pursuant to some grand vision. We
prefer instead to focus on the economic characteristics of
businesses that we wish to own and the personal characteristics
of managers with whom we wish to associate - and then to hope we
get lucky in finding the two in combination. At Dexter, we did.
在Berkshire，對於將來會進入那個產業，我們並沒有特定的看法，事實上，我
們常在想對於一家大型企業的股東來說，與其追求具有遠景的新創事業有時反而
有害，所以我們比較偏愛專注於那些我們想要擁有的經濟型態以及我們喜愛一起
共事的經理人，剩下的就只看我們有沒有足夠的運氣，找到同時擁有這兩項特點
的組合了，在Dexter我們確實找到了。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now we pause for a short commercial: Though they owned
a business jewel, we believe that Harold and Peter (who were not
interested in cash) made a sound decision in exchanging their
Dexter stock for shares of Berkshire. What they did, in effect,
was trade a 100% interest in a single terrific business for a
smaller interest in a large group of terrific businesses. They
incurred no tax on this exchange and now own a security that can
be easily used for charitable or personal gifts, or that can be
converted to cash in amounts, and at times, of their own
choosing. Should members of their families desire to, they can
pursue varying financial paths without running into the
complications that often arise when assets are concentrated in a
private business.
接下來讓我們休息一下，進段小廣告，雖然他們擁有商業界的寶石，但我們也相
信Harold與Peter(他們對於現金都不感興趣)做了一個正確的決定，將Dexter
的股份轉為Berkshire的股份，他們所做的，實際上等於將一家規模小的好公司
的全部權益轉成一家大規模好公司的一部份權益，這樣的轉換並不會產生租稅負
擔，同時還可享有依個人意願隨時進行贈與或變現的好處，如果他們的家族成員
有意願，他們可以依照自己的想法追求不同的目標，而不必像過去那樣所有的資
產全部綁在一家私人的企業。
For tax and other reasons, private companies also often find
it difficult to diversify outside their industries. Berkshire,
in contrast, can diversify with ease. So in shifting their
ownership to Berkshire, Dexter's shareholders solved a
reinvestment problem. Moreover, though Harold and Peter now have
non-controlling shares in Berkshire, rather than controlling
shares in Dexter, they know they will be treated as partners and
that we will follow owner-oriented practices. If they elect to
retain their Berkshire shares, their investment result from the
merger date forward will exactly parallel my own result. Since I
have a huge percentage of my net worth committed for life to
Berkshire shares - and since the company will issue me neither
restricted shares nor stock options - my gain-loss equation will
always match that of all other owners.
基於租稅規劃以及其他理由，私人企業通常很難透過延伸本業以外的投資達到分
散風險的目的，相對的，在Berkshire我們可以很輕易地就多角化，因此藉由經
營權移轉至Berkshire，Dexter的股東可以很輕易地就解決轉投資的問題，更
重要的是，雖然Harold與Peter現在持有的是Berkshire無控制權的股份，而
不是原先Dexter具控制權的股份，但他們很清楚自己將被視為真正的合夥人，
同時我們也會以經營者的心態參與，所以一旦他們決定將自己的投資轉為
Berkshire的股份，那麼從合併那天開始，他們就可以確定本身的投資成果將會
與我個人的投資成果相當，而因為我個人絕大部份的身家都擺在Berkshire，也
因為我個人從不會自公司身上取得特殊的股份或員工認股權，所以我個人的成敗
得失也將與其他所有公司股權持有人一致。
Additionally, Harold and Peter know that at Berkshire we can
keep our promises: There will be no changes of control or
culture at Berkshire for many decades to come. Finally, and of
paramount importance, Harold and Peter can be sure that they will
get to run their business - an activity they dearly love -
exactly as they did before the merger. At Berkshire, we do not
tell .400 hitters how to swing.
此外，Harold與Peter也相當了解，在Berkshire我們言出必行，在可見的未
來幾十年內，Berkshire的控制權與文化將不會有所改變，最後同時也是最重要
的一點，Harold與Peter可以確定將能夠繼續經營原來的企業，這是他們最喜
愛的工作，這點不會因為合併案完成而有任何的改變，在Berkshire，我們不會
雞婆地去提醒打擊率高達四成的強打者應該要如何揮棒。
What made sense for Harold and Peter probably makes sense
for a few other owners of large private businesses. So, if you
have a business that might fit, let me hear from you. Our
acquisition criteria are set forth in the appendix on page 22.
我想這些的道理同樣也適合其他大型私人企業的所有者，所以如果你有公司的情
況符合我們的標準的，請務必讓我知道，在年報的後段有我們擬購併企業的標
準。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帳列盈餘的來源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's
reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of
Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments
are not charged against the specific businesses to which they
apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This
procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they
would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've
explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to
us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing
GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a
business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in
the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our
audited financial statements.
下表顯示Berkshire帳列盈餘的主要來源，在這張表中商譽的攤銷數與購買法會
計調整數會從個別被投資公司分離出來，單獨加總列示，之所以這樣做是為了讓
旗下各事業的盈餘狀況，不因我們的投資而有所影響，過去我一再地強調我們認
為這樣的表達方式，較之一般公認會計原則要求以個別企業基礎做調整，不管是
對投資者或是管理者來說，更有幫助，當然最後損益加總的數字仍然會與經會計
師查核的數字一致。
(000s omitted)
------------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
-------------------- ------------------
1993 1992 1993 1992
---------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............... $ 30,876 $(108,961) $ 20,156 $(71,141)
Net Investment Income ...... 375,946 355,067 321,321 305,763
H. H. Brown, Lowell,
and Dexter ............... 44,025* 27,883 28,829 17,340
Buffalo News ................. 50,962 47,863 29,696 28,163
Commercial & Consumer Finance 22,695 19,836 14,161 12,664
Fechheimer ................... 13,442 13,698 6,931 7,267
Kirby ........................ 39,147 35,653 25,056 22,795
Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 21,540 17,110 10,398 8,072
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 38,196 31,954 23,809 19,883
See's Candies ................ 41,150 42,357 24,367 25,501
World Book ................... 19,915 29,044 13,537 19,503
Purchase-Price Accounting &
Goodwill Charges ......... (17,033) (12,087) (13,996) (13,070)
Interest Expense** ........... (56,545) (98,643) (35,614) (62,899)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions ............ (9,448) (7,634) (5,994) (4,913)
Other ........................ 28,428 67,540 15,094 32,798
---------- ---------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings ............. 643,296 460,680 477,751 347,726
Sales of Securities ............ 546,422 89,937 356,702 59,559
Tax Accruals Caused by
New Accounting Rules ........ --- --- (146,332) ---
---------- ---------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - All Entities .. $1,189,718 $ 550,617 $688,121 $407,285
* Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired,
November 7, 1993.
*Dexter的盈餘僅含購併日1993年11月7日以後的盈餘
**Excludes interest expense of Commercial and Consumer Finance
businesses. In 1992 includes $22.5 million of premiums paid on
the early redemption of debt.
**不含商業與消費金融公司的利息費用，另外1992年部份還包含2,250萬提前贖回債券的溢
價。
A large amount of information about these businesses is given
on pages 38-49, where you will also find our segment earnings
reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 52-59, we have
rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-
GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and
I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the
financial information that we would wish you to give us if our
positions were reversed.
在年報中你可以找到依照一般公認會計原則編製，詳細的部門別資訊，至於我們
的目的是希望給你所有查理跟我認為在評估Berkshire價值時，應該必要的資
訊。
"Look-Through" Earnings
透視盈餘
We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which we
believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does
our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings
consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous
section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major
investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our
profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by
Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been
distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here
exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major
restructuring charges.
之前我們曾經討論過透視盈餘，其主要的組成份子有(1)前段所提到的帳列盈
餘，加上(2)主要被投資公司的保留盈餘，按一般公認會計原則未反應在我們公
司帳上的盈餘，扣除(3)若這些未反應的盈餘分配給我們時，估計可能要繳的所
得稅。在這裡我們所謂的營業盈餘係扣除資本利得、特別會計調整與企業調整的
主要支出。
Over time, our look-through earnings need to increase at about
15% annually if our intrinsic value is to grow at that rate. Last
year, I explained that we had to increase these earnings to about
$1.8 billion in the year 2000, were we to meet the 15% goal.
Because we issued additional shares in 1993, the amount needed has
risen to about $1.85 billion.
長期而言，如果我們的實質價值想要以每年15%的幅度來成長的話，那麼透視
盈餘每年也必須增加以這個幅度來成長，去年我曾經提到，到西元2000年為
止，Berkshire若要以15%的目標，透視盈餘必須成長到18億美元，而由於1993
年我們又發行了一些新股，所以現在的門檻提高到18.5億美元。
That is a tough goal, but one that we expect you to hold us
to. In the past, we've criticized the managerial practice of
shooting the arrow of performance and then painting the target,
centering it on whatever point the arrow happened to hit. We will
instead risk embarrassment by painting first and shooting later.
這是一個高難度的目標，不過也希望大家能夠繼續支持我們，在過去我們常常批
評有些管理階層總是先把箭射出去後再劃上準心，不管這箭射得有多歪，因此關
於這點我們寧願先標出準心，然後再瞄準目標射箭。
If we are to hit the bull's-eye, we will need markets that
allow the purchase of businesses and securities on sensible terms.
Right now, markets are difficult, but they can - and will - change
in unexpected ways and at unexpected times. In the meantime, we'll
try to resist the temptation to do something marginal simply
because we are long on cash. There's no use running if you're on
the wrong road.
如果我們想要命中靶心，那麼我們絕對需要有能以合理價格買到好的公司與股份
的市場，不過對我們來說，現在市場上的情況並不理想，當然這種情況隨時都有
可能會改變，在此同時，我們也會盡量避免手上閒錢太多而去做那些浪費工夫的
蠢事，若方向不對，再怎麼努力衝刺也是白費力氣。
The following table shows how we calculate look-through
earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very
rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been
included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly
under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
各位可以從下表看出我們是如何計算透視盈餘的，不過我還是要提醒各位這些數
字有點粗糙，(被投資公司所分配的股利收入已經包含在保險事業的淨投資收益
項下)。
Berkshire's Share
of Undistributed
Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)
------------------------ --------------------- --------------------
1993 1992 1993 1992
------ ------ ------ ------
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ..... 13.0% 18.2% $ 83(2) $ 70
The Coca-Cola Company ........ 7.2% 7.1% 94 82
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 6.8%(1) 8.2%(1) 41(2) 29(2)
GEICO Corp. .................. 48.4% 48.1% 76(3) 34(3)
General Dynamics Corp. ....... 13.9% 14.1% 25 11(2)
The Gillette Company ......... 10.9% 10.9% 44 38
Guinness PLC ................. 1.9% 2.0% 8 7
The Washington Post Company .. 14.8% 14.6% 15 11
Wells Fargo & Company ........ 12.2% 11.5% 53(2) 16(2)
Berkshire's share of undistributed
earnings of major investees $439 $298
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed
investee earnings(4) (61) (42)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 478 348
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $856 $604
(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest
at Wesco
不包含Wesco的少數股權
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
以年平均持有股權比例計算
(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both
recurring and significant
扣除重複發生且金額大的已實現資本利得，
(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays
on the dividends it receives
適用的稅率為14%，這是Berkshire收到現金股利時的平均稅率。
We have told you that we expect the undistributed,
hypothetically-taxed earnings of our investees to produce at least
equivalent gains in Berkshire's intrinsic value. To date, we have
far exceeded that expectation. For example, in 1986 we bought
three million shares of Capital Cities/ABC for $172.50 per share
and late last year sold one-third of that holding for $630 per
share. After paying 35% capital gains taxes, we realized a $297
million profit from the sale. In contrast, during the eight years
we held these shares, the retained earnings of Cap Cities
attributable to them - hypothetically taxed at a lower 14% in
accordance with our look-through method - were only $152 million.
In other words, we paid a much larger tax bill than our look-
through presentations to you have assumed and nonetheless realized
a gain that far exceeded the undistributed earnings allocable to
these shares.
我曾告訴過各位，我們預估這些已依估計稅率調整過的未分配盈餘至少可以為
Berkshire創造出同等的實質價值，而到目前為止，其真正的結果甚至超乎我們
的預期，舉例來說，我們在1986年以每股172.5美元的價格買進300萬股資
本城/ABC公司的股份，去年我們以每股630美元的價格處分了其中的三分之
一，在支付35%的資本利得稅後，我們實現2.97億美元的稅後盈餘，相對地，
在我們持有這些股份的八年期間，經由這些股份資本城公司分配給我們的透視盈
餘在扣除估計14%的所得稅之後，只有1.52億美元，換句話說，透過出售這些
股份，所獲取的利益，即便在扣除較高的所得稅負之後，還是比原先透過持股所
分配到的盈餘還要高出許多。
We expect such pleasant outcomes to recur often in the future
and therefore believe our look-through earnings to be a
conservative representation of Berkshire's true economic earnings.
而我們也預期這樣的情況在未來還會持續發生，因此我們相信Berkshire所計算
的透視盈餘，算是相當保守的表達方式。
Taxes
稅負
As our Cap Cities sale emphasizes, Berkshire is a substantial
payer of federal income taxes. In aggregate, we will pay 1993
federal income taxes of $390 million, about $200 million of that
attributable to operating earnings and $190 million to realized
capital gains. Furthermore, our share of the 1993 federal and
foreign income taxes paid by our investees is well over $400
million, a figure you don't see on our financial statements but
that is nonetheless real. Directly and indirectly, Berkshire's
1993 federal income tax payments will be about 1/2 of 1% of the total
paid last year by all American corporations.
就像是剛剛提到的資本城股份出售案，Berkshire可以說是聯邦政府的繳稅大
戶，總計在1993年，我們總共繳了3.9億美元的所得稅，其中2億屬於本業
獲利，另外1.9億則源自於資本利得，此外我們的被投資公司另外向聯邦政府與
國外政府又繳交了超過4億美元的所得稅，這是你在本公司的財務報表上看不
到，但卻又確實存在的，直接再加上間接合計，Berkshire佔去年所有美國企業
繳給聯邦政府所得稅總額的1.5%。
Speaking for our own shares, Charlie and I have absolutely no
complaint about these taxes. We know we work in a market-based
economy that rewards our efforts far more bountifully than it does
the efforts of others whose output is of equal or greater benefit
to society. Taxation should, and does, partially redress this
inequity. But we still remain extraordinarily well-treated.
對於這個比例，查理跟我本人一點怨言也沒有，我們知道我們是在一個市場導向
的經濟社會，我們努力所收到的報酬，其比例甚至比一些對這個社會有更多貢獻
的人還要多，透過租稅政策，多多少少可以降低這種不合理性，不過即便是如此，
我們還是認為自己受到特別優厚的待遇。
Berkshire and its shareholders, in combination, would pay a
much smaller tax if Berkshire operated as a partnership or "S"
corporation, two structures often used for business activities.
For a variety of reasons, that's not feasible for Berkshire to do.
However, the penalty our corporate form imposes is mitigated -
though far from eliminated - by our strategy of investing for the
long term. Charlie and I would follow a buy-and-hold policy even
if we ran a tax-exempt institution. We think it the soundest way
to invest, and it also goes down the grain of our personalities. A
third reason to favor this policy, however, is the fact that taxes
are due only when gains are realized.
雖然Berkshire若是以合夥或S型企業的形式來經營，(在美國許多商業活動確
實是以這兩種形態在運作)，Berkshire跟其所有的股東，總的來說可以大大減少
所需負擔的稅負，但基於許多理由，那樣的做法並不適合Berkshire的運作，所
幸我們以企業形態運作的模式所受到的租稅懲罰，因為我們採取長期投資的策略
而稍稍減輕，雖然就算是證交所得免稅，查理跟我還是會堅持遵照買進並持有的
策略，這是我們認為最好的投資方式，同時也最符合我們的個人特質，當然第三
個好處就是因為這樣做可以使我們只有在實現資本利得時才需要繳稅。
Through my favorite comic strip, Li'l Abner, I got a chance
during my youth to see the benefits of delayed taxes, though I
missed the lesson at the time. Making his readers feel superior,
Li'l Abner bungled happily, but moronically, through life in
Dogpatch. At one point he became infatuated with a New York
temptress, Appassionatta Van Climax, but despaired of marrying her
because he had only a single silver dollar and she was interested
solely in millionaires. Dejected, Abner took his problem to Old
Man Mose, the font of all knowledge in Dogpatch. Said the sage:
Double your money 20 times and Appassionatta will be yours (1, 2,
4, 8 . . . . 1,048,576).
經由我個人最喜愛的漫畫短片，Li'l Abner，我有機會可以體會到延遲支付所得
稅的好處，雖然當時我沒有好好地利用那次機會，為了讓他的讀者覺得自己很優
越，Li'l Abner一直快樂地維持單身，直到他為紐約一位女演員Appassionatta
深深地著迷，但由於她只對百萬富翁有興趣，因此一貧如洗的Abner可以說是
一點希望都沒有，在遭到拒絕之後，Abner跑去智慧老人Mose那裡請他指點
迷津，結果這位聖賢對Abner說，很簡單你只要能夠將身上僅有的一塊錢，複
製20次，Appassionatta自然就會投入到你的懷抱(1,2,4,8,….,1,048,576)。
My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a roadhouse,
dropping his dollar into a slot machine, and hitting a jackpot that
spilled money all over the floor. Meticulously following Mose's
advice, Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find his next
double. Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben Graham.
我記得這段漫畫的最後一段是Abner跑到一家旅館，將他僅有的一塊錢投入吃
角子老虎中，結果竟然中了七星，一時之間獎金掉滿地，沒想到他老兄一絲不苟
遵照Mose老人的旨意，只撿起了其中的兩塊錢之後，就出發去尋找下一次複製
的機會，看到這裡我便捨棄了Abner，並開始研讀葛拉漢的理論。
Mose clearly was overrated as a guru: Besides failing to
anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to instructions, he also
forgot about taxes. Had Abner been subject, say, to the 35%
federal tax rate that Berkshire pays, and had he managed one double
annually, he would after 20 years only have accumulated $22,370.
Indeed, had he kept on both getting his annual doubles and paying a
35% tax on each, he would have needed 7 1/2 years more to reach the
$1 million required to win Appassionatta.
Mose很顯然地不配當他人的精神導師，除了低估Abner對於他的指示過於盲
從的程度，他也忘了考慮到可能的稅負，假設今天Abner也像Berkshire一樣
必須負擔高達35%的聯邦所得稅的話，而且他每年只能成功地複製一次的話，
就算連續20年都如他所願，他也只能累積到22,370元，當然若是他能持之以
恆地保持這樣的記錄的話，他則還須多等上七年半，才能累積到所需的100萬
以贏得Appassionatta的芳心。
But what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single
investment and held it until it doubled the same 27 1/2 times? In
that case, he would have realized about $200 million pre-tax or,
after paying a $70 million tax in the final year, about $130
million after-tax. For that, Appassionatta would have crawled to
Dogpatch. Of course, with 27 1/2 years having passed, how
Appassionatta would have looked to a fellow sitting on $130 million
is another question.
然而要是Abner只將資金放在單一不變的投資之上，同時連續27年半都能保
持每年倍數成長的記錄的話，這樣到最後，他在稅前可以累積高達二億美元的獲
利，或是在扣除7,000萬美元的所得稅之後，得到稅後1億3,000萬美元的利
益，屆時可能會換做是Appassionatta爬著來求他了，當然等到27年後，一
個坐擁1億多美元的富翁會怎麼看待年華老去的Appassionatta，則又是另外
一回事了。
What this little tale tells us is that tax-paying investors
will realize a far, far greater sum from a single investment that
compounds internally at a given rate than from a succession of
investments compounding at the same rate. But I suspect many
Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago.
這宗小故事告訴我們必須負擔稅負的投資人從每年固定以一個比率成長的單一
投資上，可以獲得比每年更換投資對象所得的多的多，即便是兩者成長的幅度一
樣也是如此，不過我懷疑許多Berkshire的股東老早就已經知道這個道理了。
Insurance Operations
保險事業營運
At this point in the report we've customarily provided you
with a table showing the annual "combined ratio" of the insurance
industry for the preceding decade. This ratio compares total
insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) to revenue from
premiums. For many years, the ratio has been above 100, a level
indicating an underwriting loss. That is, the industry has taken
in less money each year from its policyholders than it has had to
pay for operating expenses and for loss events that occurred during
the year.
接下來到這裡我們通常會準備一張表來說明保險業過去十多年來的綜合比率，綜
合比率代表保險的總成本(理賠損失加上費用)佔保費收入的比例，多年以來，比
率在100以下代表有承保的損失，也就是說，保險業者當年度從客戶那裡收到
的保費，不足以支應必須支付給保戶的理賠款以及營運所需的費用開支。
Offsetting this grim equation is a happier fact: Insurers get
to hold on to their policyholders' money for a time before paying
it out. This happens because most policies require that premiums
be prepaid and, more importantly, because it often takes time to
resolve loss claims. Indeed, in the case of certain lines of
insurance, such as product liability or professional malpractice,
many years may elapse between the loss event and payment.
當然若是兩者能夠相等，將會是一個很令人高興的結局，因為保險業者在真正支
付給客戶理賠金之前，通常有一段時間可以將這筆錢好好地運用，因為大部分的
保單都是先向客戶收取保費，更重要的是，通常得花上一段時間才會將損失理賠
款給付出去，尤其是像產品責任險或是專門職業執行業務不當等保險，通常要花
上好幾年的時間，才能將理賠損失定案。
To oversimplify the matter somewhat, the total of the funds
prepaid by policyholders and the funds earmarked for incurred-but-
not-yet-paid claims is called "the float." In the past, the
industry was able to suffer a combined ratio of 107 to 111 and
still break even from its insurance writings because of the
earnings derived from investing this float.
再講白一點，這些保戶預付的保險費加上那些已經發生但還未理賠的資金統稱為
保險浮存金，在過去，利用這些浮存金創造投資收益，使得整個保險業即使面臨
高達107到111的綜合比率，卻依然可以維持損益兩平。
As interest rates have fallen, however, the value of float has
substantially declined. Therefore, the data that we have provided
in the past are no longer useful for year-to-year comparisons of
industry profitability. A company writing at the same combined
ratio now as in the 1980's today has a far less attractive business
than it did then.
不過隨著利率下滑，保險浮存金的價值大幅滑落，因此過去我們提供的比率已經
無法用來衡量保險業者每年的獲利狀況比較，今天一家擁有相同綜合比率的保險
公司比起1980年代來說，已無法同日而語。
Only by making an analysis that incorporates both underwriting
results and the current risk-free earnings obtainable from float
can one evaluate the true economics of the business that a
property-casualty insurer writes. Of course, the actual investment
results that an insurer achieves from the use of both float and
stockholders' funds is also of major importance and should be
carefully examined when an investor is assessing managerial
performance. But that should be a separate analysis from the one
we are discussing here. The value of float funds - in effect,
their transfer price as they move from the insurance operation to
the investment operation - should be determined simply by the risk-
free, long-term rate of interest.
我們認為只有將保險業的承保結果與保險浮存金可以獲得的無風險盈餘做分
析，才有辦法正確地評估一家產物意外險公司真正的價值，當然一家保險公司利
用其浮存金與股東資金所能創造的投資收益也相當重要，這點也是投資人在該公
司的經營表現時，必須特別注意的，只不過那需要分開另外分析，而不是我們現
在要討論的主題。事實上，保險浮存金的價值，關鍵在於其從保險營運移轉至投
資營運的轉撥價格，這點可以簡單的以長期無風險的資金利率作為標準。
On the next page we show the numbers that count in an
evaluation of Berkshire's insurance business. We calculate our
float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our
premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves
and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agent's
balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable
to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our
underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an
underwriting profit, which includes 1993, our cost of float has
been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by
adding underwriting profit to float income.
下一頁我們將會列出如何計算出Berkshire保險事業價值，首先先計算浮存金總
額-相對於我們的保費收入總額，我們的浮存金部位算是相當大的，將所有的損
失準備、損失費用調整準備與未賺取保費加總後，再扣除應付佣金、預付購併成
本及相關再保遞延費用，至於浮存金的成本則決定於所發生的承保損失或利益而
定，在某些年度由於我們有承保利益，所以換句話說，我們的資金成本甚至是負
的，此時我們的保險事業盈餘等於是由原先從浮存金獲取的利益再加上承保利
益。
(1) (2) Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term
Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds
------------ ----------- -------------- -------------
(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)
1967 profit $ 17.3 less than zero 5.50%
1968 profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%
1969 profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%
1970 $ 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%
1971 profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%
1972 profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%
1973 profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%
1974 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%
1975 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%
1976 profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%
1977 profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%
1978 profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%
1979 profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%
1980 profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%
1981 profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%
1982 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%
1983 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%
1984 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%
1985 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%
1986 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%
1987 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%
1988 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%
1989 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%
1990 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%
1991 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%
1992 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%
1993 profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%
As you can see, in our insurance operation last year we had
the use of $2.6 billion at no cost; in fact we were paid $31
million, our underwriting profit, to hold these funds. This sounds
good - is good - but is far from as good as it sounds.
大家應該看得出，去年我們保險事業的營運結果，等於是讓我們可以免費利用
26億美元的浮存金，而事實上，應該還要再加上3,100萬美元的承保利益，這
看起來相當不錯，不過實際上並沒有想像中的那麼好。
We temper our enthusiasm because we write a large volume of
"super-cat" policies (which other insurance and reinsurance
companies buy to recover part of the losses they suffer from mega-
catastrophes) and because last year we had no losses of consequence
from this activity. As that suggests, the truly catastrophic
Midwestern floods of 1993 did not trigger super-cat losses, the
reason being that very few flood policies are purchased from
private insurers.
我們試著大家冷靜一下，因為我們接下的生意其中有一大部分屬於霹靂貓保單
(這是其他保險公司或再保公司專門買來分擔他們在發生重大意外災害時，所可
能造成的損失)，同時去年這類的業務並沒有出現重大的損失，意思是說，就連
發生在1993年真正嚴重的中西部水災也沒有觸及霹靂貓損失理賠的門檻，原因
在於很少有私人保險公司會去購買水災險。
It would be fallacious, however, to conclude from this single-
year result that the super-cat business is a wonderful one, or even
a satisfactory one. A simple example will illustrate the fallacy:
Suppose there is an event that occurs 25 times in every century.
If you annually give 5-for-1 odds against its occurrence that year,
you will have many more winning years than losers. Indeed, you may
go a straight six, seven or more years without loss. You also will
eventually go broke.
這樣很容易會產生錯覺，並做出單一年度霹靂貓的成績是相當不錯且令人滿意的
一年，一個簡單的例子足以說明一切，假設每個世紀平均都會發生25次重大的
意外事件，而你每年都以以一賠五的比率賭它今年不會發生，則你賭對的年份可
能遠比賭錯的年份多出許多，甚至你有可能連續賭對六年、七年，甚至是更多年，
但我必須說，不管怎樣，到最後你一定會以破產作為結局。
At Berkshire, we naturally believe we are obtaining adequate
premiums and giving more like 3 1/2-for-1 odds. But there is no way
for us - or anyone else - to calculate the true odds on super-cat
coverages. In fact, it will take decades for us to find out
whether our underwriting judgment has been sound.
在Berkshire，我們直覺地相信我們已經收到合理的保費，以類似以一賠三又二
分之一的賭率接受賭注，當然沒有人可以真正正確地算出霹靂貓保險真正的賠
率，事實上，可能要等到幾十年後，我們才能知道當初的判斷是否正確。
What we do know is that when a loss comes, it's likely to be a
lulu. There may well be years when Berkshire will suffer losses
from the super-cat business equal to three or four times what we
earned from it in 1993. When Hurricane Andrew blew in 1992, we
paid out about $125 million. Because we've since expanded our
super-cat business, a similar storm today could cost us $600
million.
不過我們確實知道，當損失真正降臨時，鐵定是件轟動的事，以後可能會發生三
倍或四倍於我們在1993年所賺到的盈餘那樣大的意外事件，1992年Andrew
颶風發生的那次，我們總共賠了1.25億美元，時至今日由於我們已大幅擴大在
霹靂貓保險的業務量，所以同樣規模的颶風可能會造成我們六億美元左右的理賠
損失。
So far, we have been lucky in 1994. As I write this letter,
we are estimating that our losses from the Los Angeles earthquake
will be nominal. But if the quake had been a 7.5 instead of a 6.8,
it would have been a different story.
1994年到目前為止，我們還算是幸運，在我寫這封信時，我們因為洛杉磯大地
震所造成的損失還算在正常範圍之內，不過要是當時地震發生的規模不是6.8
而是7.5的話，那麼最後的結果就完全不是那麼一回事了。
Berkshire is ideally positioned to write super-cat policies.
In Ajit Jain, we have by far the best manager in this business.
Additionally, companies writing these policies need enormous
capital, and our net worth is ten to twenty times larger than that
of our main competitors. In most lines of insurance, huge
resources aren't that important: An insurer can diversify the
risks it writes and, if necessary, can lay off risks to reduce
concentration in its portfolio. That isn't possible in the super-
cat business. So these competitors are forced into offering far
smaller limits than those we can provide. Were they bolder, they
would run the risk that a mega-catastrophe - or a confluence of
smaller catastrophes - would wipe them out.
Berkshire本身很適合從事霹靂貓保險的業務，我們有業界最優秀的經理人Ajit
Jain，此外從事這行需要相當雄厚的資金實力，在這點我們公司的淨值大概是其
他主要競爭對手的10到20倍，對大部分的保險業務而言，背後所擁有的資源
還不是那麼地重要，一家保險公司可以很輕易地就把它所承擔的風險分散出去，
若有必要，也可以降低險種集中度以減低風險，但是對霹靂貓保險這種特殊的保
險就沒有辦法這樣子做，所以其他的競爭同業只能被迫降低理賠的上限來因應，
而要是他們膽敢承擔更高的風險，則一個超大型的意外災害或是連續發生幾個較
小型的災害，就有可能讓他們粉身碎骨。
One indication of our premier strength and reputation is that
each of the four largest reinsurance companies in the world buys
very significant reinsurance coverage from Berkshire. Better than
anyone else, these giants understand that the test of a reinsurer
is its ability and willingness to pay losses under trying
circumstances, not its readiness to accept premiums when things
look rosy.
有一件事情可以顯示我們超強的競爭力與卓越的聲譽，那就是全世界前四大再保
公司全部都向Berkshire投保鉅額的霹靂貓保險，這些大公司比誰都清楚，對於
再保公司來說，真正要考驗的是他們在困難的狀況下，願意且能夠支付理賠金的
能力與意願，而絕對不是在太平時期勇於接受保費收入的意願。
One caution: There has recently been a substantial increase
in reinsurance capacity. Close to $5 billion of equity capital has
been raised by reinsurers, almost all of them newly-formed
entities. Naturally these new entrants are hungry to write
business so that they can justify the projections they utilized in
attracting capital. This new competition won't affect our 1994
operations; we're filled up there, primarily with business written
in 1993. But we are now seeing signs of price deterioration. If
this trend continues, we will resign ourselves to much-reduced
volume, keeping ourselves available, though, for the large,
sophisticated buyer who requires a super-cat insurer with large
capacity and a sure ability to pay losses.
值得注意的是，近年來願意接受再保業務的供給量大幅增加，再保業者總共募集
了近50億美元的資金來進軍這類業務，且大部分都是新成立的公司，很自然的
這些新進的業者急欲承接業務以證明當初他們吸收資金時所作的預估，這些新加
入的競爭並不會影響我們1994年的營運，因為我們早已經接滿了生意，主要是
在1993年簽下的，不過我們已經看到保費價格有惡化的趨勢，如果這種情況持
續下去，我們將會大幅降低承接的業務量，但隨時準備好接下大型且複雜的保險
業者所欲尋找確定能夠理賠損失的保證。
In other areas of our insurance business, our homestate
operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business,
headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit-card operation, managed by the
Kizer family; and National Indemnity's traditional auto and general
liability business, led by Don Wurster, all achieved excellent
results. In combination, these four units produced a significant
underwriting profit and substantial float.
在我們其他保險業務方面，我們由Rod領導的住宅保險、Brad帶領的員工退休
保險以及由Kizer家族經營的信用卡保險業務，以及由Don所領導的國家產險
所從事的傳統汽車保險與一般責任險方面，總的來說，這四類業務都表現的相當
不錯，不但有承保獲利，還貢獻了相當大金額的保險浮存金。
All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though
its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an
intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount -
larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.
總而言之，我們擁有第一流的保險事業，雖然他們的經營成果變化相當的大，但
是其實質價值卻遠超過其帳面的價值，而事實上，在Berkshire其他事業的身上
也有類似的情況。
Common Stock Investments
股票投資
Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over
$250 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to
subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下表是我們超過二億五千萬美元以上的普通股投資，一部份的投資係屬於
Berkshire關係企業所持有)。
12/31/93
Shares Company Cost Market
------ ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
2,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............. $ 345,000 $1,239,000
93,400,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............... 1,023,920 4,167,975
13,654,600 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
("Freddie Mac") ................... 307,505 681,023
34,250,000 GEICO Corp. .......................... 45,713 1,759,594
4,350,000 General Dynamics Corp. ............... 94,938 401,287
24,000,000 The Gillette Company ................. 600,000 1,431,000
38,335,000 Guinness PLC ......................... 333,019 270,822
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company. ......... 9,731 440,148
6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company ................ 423,680 878,614
Considering the similarity of this year's list and the last,
you may decide your management is hopelessly comatose. But we
continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with an
interest in a business that is both understandable and durably
wonderful. Business interests of that kind are simply too hard to
replace.
看到今年所列的投資與去年竟如此的相似，你可能會認為本公司的管理階層實在
是昏庸到無可救藥的地步，不過我們還是堅持相信離開原本就熟悉且表現優異穩
定的公司，實在是非常不智之舉，這類的公司實在是還難找到更好的替代。
Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble
understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they
operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb long-
term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of
price. "Why," the CEO would ask, "should I part with my crown
jewel?" Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal
investment portfolio, will offhandedly - and even impetuously -
move from business to business when presented with no more than
superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst of
these is perhaps, "You can't go broke taking a profit." Can you
imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star
subsidiary? In our view, what makes sense in business also makes
sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece
of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner
would exhibit if he owned all of that business.
有趣的是企業經理人在認定何者才是自己本業時，從來就不會搞不清楚情況，母
公司是不會單純因為價格因素就將自己旗下最優秀的子公司給賣掉，公司總裁一
定會問，為什麼要把我皇冠上的珠寶給變賣掉，不過當場景轉換到其個人的投資
組合時，他卻又會毫不猶豫地，甚至是情急地從這家公司換到另一家公司，靠的
不過是股票經紀人膚淺的幾句話語，其中最爛的一句當屬，你不會因為獲利而破
產，你能想像要是一家公司的總裁用類似的方式建議董事會將最有潛力的子公司
給賣掉時，就我個人的觀點，適用於企業經營的原則也同樣適用於股票投資，投
資人在持有一家公司的股票所展現的韌性應當與一家公司的老闆持有公司全部
的股權一樣。
Earlier I mentioned the financial results that could have been
achieved by investing $40 in The Coca-Cola Co. in 1919. In 1938,
more than 50 years after the introduction of Coke, and long after
the drink was firmly established as an American icon, Fortune did
an excellent story on the company. In the second paragraph the
writer reported: "Several times every year a weighty and serious
investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca-Cola's
record, but comes regretfully to the conclusion that he is looking
too late. The specters of saturation and competition rise before
him."
先前我曾經提到若是在1919年以40美元投資可口可樂會獲得怎樣的成果，
1938年在可樂問世達50年且早已成為代表美國的產品之後，財富雜誌對該公
司做了一次詳盡的專訪，在文章的第二段作者寫到：每年都會有許多重量型的投
資人看好可口可樂，並對於其過去的輝煌記錄表示敬意，但也都做下自己太晚發
現的結論，認為該公司已達巔峰，前方的道路充滿了競爭與挑戰。
Yes, competition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well. But
it's worth noting that in 1938 The Coca-Cola Co. sold 207 million
cases of soft drinks (if its gallonage then is converted into the
192-ounce cases used for measurement today) and in 1993 it sold
about 10.7 billion cases, a 50-fold increase in physical volume
from a company that in 1938 was already dominant in its very major
industry. Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor: Though
the $40 invested in 1919 in one share had (with dividends
reinvested) turned into $3,277 by the end of 1938, a fresh $40 then
invested in Coca-Cola stock would have grown to $25,000 by yearend
1993.
沒錯，1938年確實充滿了競爭，而1993年也是，不過值得注意的是1938年
可口可樂一年總共賣出二億箱的飲料(若是將當時加侖裝改成現在192盎斯的箱
子)，但是到了1993年該公司一年賣出飲料高達107億箱，對這家當時已經成
為市場領導者的公司，在後來將近50的期間總共又成長了50倍，對於1938
年加入的投資者來說，Party根本還沒有結束，雖然在1919年投資40美元在
可口可樂股票的投資人(含將所收到的股利再投資)，到了1938年可獲得3,277
美元，但是若是在1938年重新以40美元投資可口可樂股票，時至1993年底，
還是照樣可以成長到25,000美元。
I can't resist one more quote from that 1938 Fortune story:
"It would be hard to name any company comparable in size to Coca-
Cola and selling, as Coca-Cola does, an unchanged product that can
point to a ten-year record anything like Coca-Cola's." In the 55
years that have since passed, Coke's product line has broadened
somewhat, but it's remarkable how well that description still fits.
我忍不住想要在引用1938年財富雜誌的報導，「實在是很難在找到像可口可樂
這樣規模而且又能持續十年保持不變的產品內容」，如今又過了55個年頭，可
口可樂的產品線雖然變得更廣泛，但令人印象深刻的是這種形容詞還依舊適用。
Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime
it's just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That
judgment became ever more compelling as Berkshire's capital
mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly
affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted a
strategy that required our being smart - and not too smart at that
- only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one good
idea a year. (Charlie says it's my turn.)
查理跟我老早以前便明瞭要一個人的投資生涯中，做出上百個小一點投資決策是
件很辛苦的一件事，這種想法隨著Berkshire資金規模日益擴大而益形明顯，而
放眼投資世界中，可以大幅影響本公司投資成效的機會已越來越少，因此我們決
定採取一種只要求自己在少數的時候夠聰明就好，而不是每回都要非常的聰明，
所以我們現在只要求每年出現一次好的投資主意就可以了，(查理提醒我今年該
輪到我)。
The strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard
diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the
strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional
investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio
concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should,
both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business
and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics
before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk,
using dictionary terms, as "the possibility of loss or injury."
我們採取的這種策略排除了依照普通分散風險的教條，許多學者便會言之鑿鑿說
我們這種策略比起一般傳統的投資風險要高的許多，這點我們不敢苟同，我們相
信集中持股的做法同樣可以大幅降低風險，只要投資人在買進股份之前，能夠加
強本身對於企業的認知以及對於競爭能力熟悉的程度，在這裡我們將風險定義，
與一般字典裡的一樣，係指損失或受傷的可能性。
Academics, however, like to define investment "risk"
differently, averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock
or portfolio of stocks - that is, their volatility as compared to
that of a large universe of stocks. Employing data bases and
statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the
"beta" of a stock - its relative volatility in the past - and then
build arcane investment and capital-allocation theories around this
calculation. In their hunger for a single statistic to measure
risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle: It is better
to be approximately right than precisely wrong.
然而在學術界，卻喜歡將投資的風險給予不同的定義，堅持把它當作是股票價格
相對波動的程度，也就是個別投資相較於全體投資波動的幅度，運用資料庫與統
計方法，這些學者能夠計算出一隻股票"精確"的Beta值，代表其過去相對波動
的幅度，然後根據這項公式建立一套晦澀難解的投資與資金分配理論，為了渴望
找出可以衡量風險的單一統計值，但他們卻忘了一項基本的原則，寧願大概對，
也不要完全錯。
For owners of a business - and that's the way we think of
shareholders - the academics' definition of risk is far off the
mark, so much so that it produces absurdities. For example, under
beta-based theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared
to the market - as had Washington Post when we bought it in 1973 -
becomes "riskier" at the lower price than it was at the higher
price. Would that description have then made any sense to someone
who was offered the entire company at a vastly-reduced price?
對於企業的所有權人來說，這是我們認為公司股東應該有的想法，學術界對於風
險的定義實在是有點離譜，甚至於有點荒謬，舉例來說，根據Beta理論，若是
有一種股票的價格相對於大盤下跌的幅度更高，就像是我們在1973年買進華盛
頓郵報股份時一樣，那麼其風險遠比原來高股價時還要更高，那麼要是哪天有人
願意以極低的價格把整家公司賣給你時，你是否也會認為這樣的風險太高，而予
以拒絕呢?
In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham
explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor. There he
introduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who shows up every day
to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish. The
more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities
available to the investor. That's true because a wildly
fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will
periodically be attached to solid businesses. It is impossible to
see how the availability of such prices can be thought of as
increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to
either ignore the market or exploit its folly.
事實上，真正的投資人喜歡波動都還來不及，班哲明．葛拉漢在智慧型投資人一
書的第八章便有所解釋，他引用了市場先生理論，市場先生每天都會出現在你面
前，只要你願意都可以從他那裡買進或賣出你的投資，只要他老兄越沮喪，投資
人擁有的機會也就越多，這是由於只要市場波動的幅度越大，一些超低的價格就
更有機會會出現在一些好公司身上，很難想像這種低價的優惠會被投資人視為對
其有害，對於投資人來說，你完全可以無視於他的存在或是好好地利用這種愚蠢
的行為。
In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a
company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much
borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer not to
know the company's name. What he treasures is the price history of
its stock. In contrast, we'll happily forgo knowing the price
history and instead will seek whatever information will further our
understanding of the company's business. After we buy a stock,
consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a
year or two. We don't need a daily quote on our 100% position in
See's or H. H. Brown to validate our well-being. Why, then, should
we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke?
在評估風險時，Beta理論學者根本就不屑於了解這家公司到底是在做什麼，他
的競爭對手在幹嘛，或是他們到底借了多少錢來營運，他們甚至不願意知道公司
的名字叫什麼，他們在乎的只是這家公司的歷史股價，相對地，我們很願意不管
這家公司過去股價的歷史，反而希望盡量能夠得到有助於我們了解這家公司的資
訊，另外在我們買進股份之後，我們一點也不在意這家公司的股份在未來的一、
兩年內是否有交易，就像是我們根本就不需要持有100%股權的喜斯糖果或是布
朗鞋業的股票報價來證明我們的權益是否存在，同樣地我們也不需要持有7%的
可口可樂每日的股票行情。
In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is
whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment
(including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective
holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he
had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial
stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering
precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy
that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation
are:
我們認為投資人應該真正評估的風險是他們從一項投資在其預計持有的期間內
所收到的稅後收入加總(也包含出售股份所得)，是否能夠讓他保有原來投資時擁
有的購買力，再加上合理的利率，雖然這樣的風險無法做到像工程般的精確，但
它至少可以做到足以做出有效判斷的的程度，在做評估時主要的因素有下列幾
點︰
1) The certainty with which the long-term economic
characteristics of the business can be evaluated;
1)這家公司長期競爭能力可以衡量的程度
2) The certainty with which management can be evaluated,
both as to its ability to realize the full potential of
the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;
2)這家公司管理階層發揮公司潛能以及有效運用現金可以衡量的程度
3) The certainty with which management can be counted on
to channel the rewards from the business to the
shareholders rather than to itself;
3)這家公司管理階層將企業獲得的利益確實回報給股東而非中飽私囊可
以衡量的程度
4) The purchase price of the business;
4)買進這家企業的價格
5) The levels of taxation and inflation that will be
experienced and that will determine the degree by which
an investor's purchasing-power return is reduced from his
gross return.
5)投資人的淨購買力所得，須考慮稅負與通貨膨脹等因素必須從投資收
益總額中扣除的部份
These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably
fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind.
But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not
negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as Justice
Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but
nevertheless asserted, "I know it when I see it," so also can
investors - in an inexact but useful way - "see" the risks inherent
in certain investments without reference to complex equations or
price histories.
這些因素對於許多分析師來說，可能是丈二金剛摸不著頭腦，因為他們根本無法
從現有的資料庫中找到這些資訊，但是取得這些精確數字的難度高並不代表他們
就不重要或是無法克服，就像是司法正義一樣，Stewart法官發現他根本無法找
到何謂猥褻的標準，不過他還是堅稱，只要我一看到就知道是不是，同樣地對於
投資人來說，不需靠精確的公式或是股價歷史，而只要運用不太精確但卻有用的
方式，就可以看到潛藏在某些投資裡的風險。
Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and
Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than,
say, any computer company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about
44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in
value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum, in which
Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in
which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.
就長期而言，可口可樂與吉列所面臨的產業風險，要比任何電腦公司或是通路商
或小得多，可口可樂佔全世界飲料銷售量的44%，吉列則擁有60%的刮鬍刀市
場佔有率(以銷售額計)，除了稱霸口香糖的箭牌公司之外，我看不出還有那家公
司可以像他們一樣長期以來享有傲視全球的競爭力。
Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their
worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their
brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of
their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive
advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic
castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily
without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks
of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a
warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."
更重要的，可口可樂與吉列近年來也確實一點一滴地在增加他們全球市場的佔有
率，品牌的力量、產品的特質與配銷通路的優勢，使得他們擁有超強的競爭力，
就像是樹立起高聳的護城河來保衛其經濟城堡，相對的，一般公司卻要每天耗盡
心思去打沒有意義的游擊戰，就像是彼得．林區所說的，對於那些只會銷售量販
式產品的公司來說，大家應該在其股票上加印這句警語-「競爭可能有害於人類
的利益」。
The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to
even the casual observer of business. Yet the beta of their stocks
is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who
possess little or no competitive advantage. Should we conclude
from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and
Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured?
Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a company
- its stock - is somehow divorced from the long-term risk inherent
in its business operations? We believe neither conclusion makes
sense and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no
sense.
可口可樂與吉列的競爭力在一般產業觀察家眼中實在是顯而易見的，然而其股票
的Beta值卻與一般平庸、完全沒有競爭優勢的公司相似，難道只因為這樣我們
就該認為在衡量公司所面臨的產業風險時，完全不須考慮他們所享有的競爭優勢
嗎? 或者就可以說持有一家公司部份所有權-也就是股票的風險，與公司長期所
面臨的營運風險一點關係都沒有，我們認為這些說法，包含衡量投資風險的Beta
公式在內，一點道理都沒有。
The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for
differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product toy
company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy
company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's quite
possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they
have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the
factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness.
Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining
himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably
intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment
risks with a useful degree of accuracy.
Beta學者所架構的理論根本就沒有能力去分辨，銷售寵物玩具或呼拉圈的玩具
公司與銷售大富翁或芭比娃娃的玩具公司，所隱藏的風險有何不同? 但對一般普
通的投資人來說，只要他略懂得消費者行為以及形成企業長期競爭優勢或弱勢的
原因的話，就可以很明確的看出兩者的差別，當然每個投資人都會犯錯，但只要
將自己集中在相對少數，容易了解的投資個案上，一個理性、知性與耐性兼具的
投資人一定能夠將投資風險限定在可接受的範圍之內。
In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine
whether we are dealing with a "pet rock" or a "Barbie." We
couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend
years intensely studying those industries. Sometimes our own
intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding,
and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the
roadblock. For example, a business that must deal with fast-moving
technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of
its long-term economics. Did we foresee thirty years ago what
would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer
industries? Of course not. (Nor did most of the investors and
corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.)
Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict the
future of other rapidly-evolving businesses? We'll stick instead
with the easy cases. Why search for a needle buried in a haystack
when one is sitting in plain sight?
當然有許多產業，連查理或是我可能都無法判斷到底我們在玩的是寵物玩具或芭
比娃娃，甚至在花了許多年時間努力的研究這些產業之後，我們還是無法解決這
個問題，有時是因為我們本身智識上的缺陷，阻礙了我們對事情的了解，有時則
是因為產業特性的關係，例如對於一家隨時都比須面臨快速變遷技術的公司來
說，我們根本就無法對其長期的競爭力做出任何的評斷，人類在三十年前，是否
就能預知現在電視製造或電腦產業的演進，當然不能，就算是大部分鑽研於這方
面領域的投資人與企業經理人也沒有辦法，那麼為什麼查理跟我要覺得應該要有
去預測其他產業快速變遷前景的能力呢? 我們寧願挑些簡單一點的，一個人坐的
舒舒服服就好了，為什麼還要費事去挨稻草裡的針呢?
Of course, some investment strategies - for instance, our
efforts in arbitrage over the years - require wide diversification.
If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk
should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually-
independent commitments. Thus, you may consciously purchase a
risky investment - one that indeed has a significant possibility of
causing loss or injury - if you believe that your gain, weighted
for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably
weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar, but
unrelated opportunities. Most venture capitalists employ this
strategy. Should you choose to pursue this course, you should
adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which
will want to see lots of action because it is favored by
probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single, huge bet.
當然，有些投資策略，例如我們從事多年的套利活動，就必須將風險分散，若是
單一交易的風險過高，就比須將資源分散到幾個各自獨立的個案之上，如此一
來，雖然每個個案都有可能導致損失或傷害，但只要你確信每個獨立的個案經過
機率的加權平均能夠讓你獲致滿意的報酬就行了，許多創業投資者用的就是這種
方法，若是你也打算這樣做的話，記得採取與賭場老闆搞輪盤遊戲同樣的心態，
那就是鼓勵大家持續不斷的下注，因為長期而言，機率對莊家有利，但千萬要拒
絕單一一次的大賭注。
Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when
an investor who does not understand the economics of specific
businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a long-
term owner of American industry. That investor should both own a
large number of equities and space out his purchases. By
periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the know-
nothing investor can actually out-perform most investment
professionals. Paradoxically, when "dumb" money acknowledges its
limitations, it ceases to be dumb.
另外一種需要分散風險的特殊情況是，當投資人並沒有對任何單一產業有特別的
熟悉，不過他卻對美國整體產業前景有信心，則這類的投資人應該分散持有許多
公司的股份，同時將投入的時點拉長，例如，透過定期投資指數基金，一個什麼
都不懂的投資人通常都能打敗大部分的專業經理人，很奇怪的是，當愚昧的金錢
了解到自己的極限之後，它就不再愚昧了。
On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able
to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly-
priced companies that possess important long-term competitive
advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you.
It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I
cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money
into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding
that money to his top choices - the businesses he understands best
and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit
potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: "Too much of a
good thing can be wonderful."
另一方面，若是你是稍具常識的投資人，能夠了解產業經濟的話，應該就能夠找
出五到十家股價合理並享有長期競爭優勢的公司，此時一般分散風險的理論對你
來說就一點意義也沒有，要是那樣做反而會傷害到你的投資成果並增加你的風
險，我實在不了解那些投資人為什麼要把錢擺在他排名第20的股票上，而不是
把錢集中在排名最前面，最熟悉了解同時風險最小，獲利可能最大的投資之上，
或許這就是先知梅西衛斯特所說的，「好事物越多，就越完美」。
Corporate Governance
企業治理
At our annual meetings, someone usually asks "What happens to
this place if you get hit by a truck?" I'm glad they are still
asking the question in this form. It won't be too long before the
query becomes: "What happens to this place if you don't get hit by
a truck?"
在年度的股東會上，有人常常會問︰「要是那天你不幸被車撞到，該怎麼辦?」
我只能說很慶幸他們還是在問這樣的問題，而不是「要是那天你不被車撞到，我
們該怎麼辦?」。
Such questions, in any event, raise a reason for me to discuss
corporate governance, a hot topic during the past year. In
general, I believe that directors have stiffened their spines
recently and that shareholders are now being treated somewhat more
like true owners than was the case not long ago. Commentators on
corporate governance, however, seldom make any distinction among
three fundamentally different manager/owner situations that exist
in publicly-held companies. Though the legal responsibility of
directors is identical throughout, their ability to effect change
differs in each of the cases. Attention usually falls on the first
case, because it prevails on the corporate scene. Since Berkshire
falls into the second category, however, and will someday fall into
the third, we will discuss all three variations.
這樣的問題讓我有機會談談近年來相當熱門的話題-公司治理，首先我相信最近
許多公司的董事們已開始試著把他們的腰桿打直，而現在的投資人比起以前來
說，也慢慢地被公司當作真正的擁有人來對待，但是評論專家並沒有仔細地去區
別目前公開上市公司三種截然不同的經營權與所有權形態，雖然在法律上，董事
們應該承擔的責任是責無旁貸的，但他們能發揮影響力進行改變的程度卻有很大
的不同，大家通常都把注意力擺在第一類的案例之上，因為這是目前一般企業的
常態，但由於Berkshire本身是屬於第二類，甚至有一天會變成第三類，所以在
這裡我們有必要討論一下三者的不同。
The first, and by far most common, board situation is one in
which a corporation has no controlling shareholder. In that case,
I believe directors should behave as if there is a single absentee
owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further in all
proper ways. Unfortunately, "long-term" gives directors a lot of
wiggle room. If they lack either integrity or the ability to think
independently, directors can do great violence to shareholders
while still claiming to be acting in their long-term interest. But
assume the board is functioning well and must deal with a
management that is mediocre or worse. Directors then have the
responsibility for changing that management, just as an intelligent
owner would do if he were present. And if able but greedy managers
over-reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders'
pockets, directors must slap their hands.
首先是第一類，也是目前最普遍的一類，在公司的股權結構中，並沒有一個具掌
控能力的大股東，在這種情況下，我相信董事會的行為應該要像是公司有一個因
事未出席的大股東一樣，在各種情況下，都要能夠確保這位虛擬大股東的長期利
益不會受到損害，然而很不幸的是，所謂的長期利益，反而給了董事會很大的彈
性操作空間，而假設董事會運作尚稱順暢，不過經營階層卻很平庸甚至差勁時，
那麼董事會就必須負起責任將經營階層換掉，就好像一般公司老闆會做的決定一
樣，另外要是經營階層能力尚可，只不過過於貪心，不時地想要從股東的口袋裡
撈錢，那麼董事會就必須適時地出手制止並給予警告。
In this plain-vanilla case, a director who sees something he
doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his
views. If he is successful, the board will have the muscle to make
the appropriate change. Suppose, though, that the unhappy director
can't get other directors to agree with him. He should then feel
free to make his views known to the absentee owners. Directors
seldom do that, of course. The temperament of many directors would
in fact be incompatible with critical behavior of that sort. But I
see nothing improper in such actions, assuming the issues are
serious. Naturally, the complaining director can expect a vigorous
rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors, a prospect that should
discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non-rational
causes.
在這種一般常見的情況下，當個別董事發覺有不合理的現象時，應該試著說服其
他董事有關他的看法，若能夠成功，那麼董事會就有能力做出適當的決定，但是
假設要是這位落寞的董事孤掌難鳴，無法獲得其他董事的支持，那麼他就應該要
讓沒能出席的股東知道他的看法，當然很少有董事真的這樣做，很多的董事事實
上並沒有足夠的膽識敢做這樣大膽的動作，但我卻認為這樣的舉動並沒有什麼不
妥，當然假設問題真的很嚴重的話，自然而然發出不平之鳴的董事一定會遭到其
他不認同看法的董事嚴正的駁斥，認為反對的董事不要在枝微末節或是非理性的
原因上搗亂。
For the boards just discussed, I believe the directors ought
to be relatively few in number - say, ten or less - and ought to
come mostly from the outside. The outside board members should
establish standards for the CEO's performance and should also
periodically meet, without his being present, to evaluate his
performance against those standards.
對於前述討論的董事會形態，我認為董事的人數不必太多，最好是十個以內，同
時大部分成員應該從外部遴選，而外部董事應該要能夠建立對CEO表現的評核
制度，並定期聚會，在CEO不在場的情況下，依據這些原則評斷其表現。
The requisites for board membership should be business savvy,
interest in the job, and owner-orientation. Too often, directors
are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity to
the board. That practice is a mistake. Furthermore, mistakes in
selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments
are so hard to undo: The pleasant but vacuous director need never
worry about job security.
至於董事會成員遴選的條件，並須具備商業經驗、對這項角色有興趣同時以股東
利益為導向，只是目前大部分被遴選出來的董事，大多是因為他們的社會地位或
只是為了增加董事會成員的多樣化，這樣的做法是錯誤的，更有甚至，這種錯誤
還有後遺症，因為董事被任命之後就很難再加以撤消，好說話且沒有意見的董事
是不怕找不到位置的。
The second case is that existing at Berkshire, where the
controlling owner is also the manager. At some companies, this
arrangement is facilitated by the existence of two classes of stock
endowed with disproportionate voting power. In these situations,
it's obvious that the board does not act as an agent between owners
and management and that the directors cannot effect chang，e except
through persuasion. Therefore, if the owner/manager is mediocre or
worse - or is over-reaching - there is little a director can do
about it except object. If the directors having no connections to
the owner/manager make a unified argument, it may well have some
effect. More likely it will not.
第二種就像是發生在Berkshire的，具控制權的大股東本身也是經營階層，在某
些公司，經過特殊的安排，將公司的股權按投票權重的不同分成兩類，也會產生
這種情況，在這種情況下，很明顯的董事會並非所有權人與經營階層之間的中
介，且除非經由勸說，否則董事會很難發揮改變的影響力，也因此要是老闆經營
者本身的能力平庸或很差勁或不顧他人，則董事除了表示反對以外，別無他法，
而要是與老闆經營者沒有關係的董事碰巧做出相同的結論，有時或許還有用，但
大部分的狀況下是無濟於事的。
If change does not come, and the matter is sufficiently
serious, the outside directors should resign. Their resignation
will signal their doubts about management, and it will emphasize
that no outsider is in a position to correct the owner/manager's
shortcomings.
而要是公司無法做出改變，且情況演變的很嚴重時，外部董事就應該要辭職，外
部董事的辭職等於是對現有的經營階層投下反對票，同時凸顯外部董事沒有能力
糾正老闆經營者缺失的現象。
The third governance case occurs when there is a controlling
owner who is not involved in management. This case, examples of
which are Hershey Foods and Dow Jones, puts the outside directors
in a potentially useful position. If they become unhappy with
either the competence or integrity of the manager, they can go
directly to the owner (who may also be on the board) and report
their dissatisfaction. This situation is ideal for an outside
director, since he need make his case only to a single, presumably
interested owner, who can forthwith effect change if the argument
is persuasive. Even so, the dissatisfied director has only that
single course of action. If he remains unsatisfied about a
critical matter, he has no choice but to resign.
第三種情況是公司擁有具控制權的大股東，但卻不參與公司經營，這種特殊個案
在現實社會中有Hershey食品與道瓊公司等例子，公司能夠充分運用外部董事
的能力，若是董事們對於經營階層的能力或品格感到不滿意，他們可以直接向大
股東反應(當然大股東可能也是董事成員)，這種環境相當適合外部董事的發揮，
因為他只需要將情況向單一且關心公司前景的所有權人報告，同時只要論點理由
充分就可以馬上發揮改變的效果，但即便如此，有意見的董事也只能有這樣的選
擇管道，若是他對於特定事情的處理結果不滿意，他還是只能辭職而別無其他選
擇。
Logically, the third case should be the most effective in
insuring first-class management. In the second case the owner is
not going to fire himself, and in the first case, directors often
find it very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild over-
reaching. Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority of
the board - an awkward social and logistical task, particularly if
management's behavior is merely odious, not egregious - their hands
are effectively tied. In practice, directors trapped in situations
of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying around
they can do at least some good. Meanwhile, management proceeds
unfettered.
理論上，第三種情況最能夠確保一流的經營階層存在，因為第二種情況，老闆不
可能把自己給Fire掉，而第一種情況，董事們通常很難與表現平庸又難以駕馭
的經理人打交道，而除非那些有意見的董事能夠獲得董事會多數的支持，這是一
件很困難的協調溝通任務，尤其是經營階層的表現雖然可恨但卻罪不至死的時
候，基本上他們的手腳是被綁的死死的，實務上，面臨這種現象的董事通常會說
服自己留在董事會，至少還能有所圖，但在此同時，經營階層卻還是同樣可以為
所欲為。
In the third case, the owner is neither judging himself nor
burdened with the problem of garnering a majority. He can also
insure that outside directors are selected who will bring useful
qualities to the board. These directors, in turn, will know that
the good advice they give will reach the right ears, rather than
being stifled by a recalcitrant management. If the controlling
owner is intelligent and self-confident, he will make decisions in
respect to management that are meritocratic and pro-shareholder.
Moreover - and this is critically important - he can readily
correct any mistake he makes.
在第三種情況下，老闆本身不必衡量自己的表現也不必費心去取得多數人的支
持，同時他也可以確保所遴選出來的外部董事將可對董事會的素質有所提升，而
這些被選中的董事，也可以確定所提出的建議會真正被聽進去，而不是被消極抵
制的經營階層當作是耳邊風，而若是大股東本身夠聰明且有自信，那麼他就能夠
找到以股東利益為優先的菁英經理人，還有一點更重要的是，他能夠隨時準備改
正本身所犯的錯誤。
At Berkshire we operate in the second mode now and will for as
long as I remain functional. My health, let me add, is excellent.
For better or worse, you are likely to have me as an owner/manager
for some time.
在Berkshire，我們現在是以第二種情況在做營運，而且在我有生之年都會是如
此，至於我個人的健康狀況，我必須要強調，實在是好極了，不管是好或壞，大
家都必須繼續接受我擔任大股東兼經營者。
After my death, all of my stock will go to my wife, Susie,
should she survive me, or to a foundation if she dies before I do.
In neither case will taxes and bequests require the sale of
consequential amounts of stock.
直到我死後，我擁有的所有股份將會歸我內人Susie擁有，要是她比我長壽的
話，不過要是她比我早死，所有的股份將會捐給一個基金會，且不論如何都不會
因為遺產或贈與稅而必須被迫出售相當的股份。
When my stock is transferred to either my wife or the
foundation, Berkshire will enter the third governance mode, going
forward with a vitally interested, but non-management, owner and
with a management that must perform for that owner. In preparation
for that time, Susie was elected to the board a few years ago, and
in 1993 our son, Howard, joined the board. These family members
will not be managers of the company in the future, but they will
represent the controlling interest should anything happen to me.
Most of our other directors are also significant owners of
Berkshire stock, and each has a strong owner-orientation. All in
all, we're prepared for "the truck."
而當我的股份移轉到我內人或是基金會之後，Berkshire將會進入第三種公司治
理情況，變成一個關心公司但卻不參與經營的大股東搭配完全為股東設想的經理
人，為了預先做準備，Susie在幾年前已經被選為公司的董事，而1993年我的
兒子豪爾也緊接著加入董事會，這些家族成員以後將不會擔任公司的經理人，但
要是萬一我不在時，他們將繼承控制公司的權力，當然公司其他的董事本身也都
是主要的股東，且皆有很強的股東利益導向，總而言之，對於那輛卡車可能到來，
我們已經作好了準備。
Shareholder-Designated Contributions
股東指定捐贈計畫
About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's
1993 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions
made through the program were $9.4 million and 3,110 charities were
recipients.
大約有97%的有效股權參與1993年的股東指定捐贈計劃，總計約940萬美
元捐出的款項分配給3,110家慈善機構。
Berkshire's practice in respect to discretionary philanthropy
- as contrasted to its policies regarding contributions that are
clearly related to the company's business activities - differs
significantly from that of other publicly-held corporations.
There, most corporate contributions are made pursuant to the wishes
of the CEO (who often will be responding to social pressures),
employees (through matching gifts), or directors (through matching
gifts or requests they make of the CEO).
Berkshire在自由樂捐方面的做法，(不同於具有特定商業目的的捐贈)，與其他
公開上市公司的做法有很大的不同，因為大部分的公司所作的捐贈大多是依照
CEO的意願(他們通常背負許多社會壓力)，員工(透過相對贈與)或董事(透過相對
贈與或是對於CEO的要求)。
At Berkshire, we believe that the company's money is the
owners' money, just as it would be in a closely-held corporation,
partnership, or sole proprietorship. Therefore, if funds are to be
given to causes unrelated to Berkshire's business activities, it is
the charities favored by our owners that should receive them.
We've yet to find a CEO who believes he should personally fund the
charities favored by his shareholders. Why, then, should they foot
the bill for his picks?
不過在Berkshire我們相信公司所有的錢都是屬於股東的，就像是在私人家族合
夥企業一樣，因此只要這些捐贈資金與公司本身商業活動無關的話，那麼就應該
要由股東們所想要贈與的慈善機構收到這些款項，就像是我們還沒看到過有
CEO願意拿自己的錢，依照股東們的意願進行樂捐，那麼又有什麼理由，讓股
東為公司的CEO買單呢?
Let me add that our program is easy to administer. Last fall,
for two months, we borrowed one person from National Indemnity to
help us implement the instructions that came from our 7,500
registered shareholders. I'd guess that the average corporate
program in which employee gifts are matched incurs far greater
administrative costs. Indeed, our entire corporate overhead is
less than half the size of our charitable contributions. (Charlie,
however, insists that I tell you that $1.4 million of our $4.9 million
overhead is attributable to our corporate jet, The Indefensible.)
而我必須說明的是我們這項計畫執行起來並不困難，去年秋天，我們從國家產險
公司借調一個人為期兩個月，幫我們處理來自7,500位股東的捐款指示，而我
也相信其他公司花在處理相同捐贈規模所發生的成本鐵定比我們高出許多，事實
上，我們公司每年所有的行政費用甚至不到我們每年捐贈金額的一半，(查理堅
持我必須向大家報告，總計490萬美元的營業費用當中，有140萬是發生在公
司的企業專機-無可辯解號之上)。
Below is a list showing the largest categories to which our
shareholders have steered their contributions.
(a) 347 churches and synagogues received 569 gifts
(b) 283 colleges and universities received 670 gifts
(c) 244 K-12 schools (about two-thirds secular, one-
third religious) received 525 gifts
(d) 288 institutions dedicated to art, culture or the
humanities received 447 gifts
(e) 180 religious social-service organizations (split
about equally between Christian and Jewish) received
411 gifts
(f) 445 secular social-service organizations (about 40%
youth-related) received 759 gifts
(g) 153 hospitals received 261 gifts
(h) 186 health-related organizations (American Heart
Association, American Cancer Society, etc.) received
320 gifts
下表顯示股東指定捐贈的前十大慈善機構
(a)347個教堂與猶太教堂收到569筆善款
(b)283所大專院校收到670筆善款
(c)244所K-12學校收到525筆善款(三分之二是普通學校，另外三分之一屬教會學校)
(d)288所藝術、文化或人類學研究機構收到447筆善款
(e)180所宗教性社福機構(猶太教與基督教各半)收到411筆善款
(f)445所民間社福機構(其中四成與青少年相關)收到759筆善款
(g)153所醫療機構收到261筆善款
(h)186所與醫療相關的機構(如美國心臟學會，美國癌症協會等) 收到320筆善款
Three things about this list seem particularly interesting to
me. First, to some degree it indicates what people choose to give
money to when they are acting of their own accord, free of pressure
from solicitors or emotional appeals from charities. Second, the
contributions programs of publicly-held companies almost never
allow gifts to churches and synagogues, yet clearly these
institutions are what many shareholders would like to support.
Third, the gifts made by our shareholders display conflicting
philosophies: 130 gifts were directed to organizations that
believe in making abortions readily available for women and 30
gifts were directed to organizations (other than churches) that
discourage or are opposed to abortion.
在這之中，有三點我認為特別有趣，首先，某種程度可以顯示出當人們係依個人
意志而非迫於募款人的壓力或募款機構感性的訴求時，所可能做出的選擇，第
二，一般大公司的捐贈計畫從未將教堂或猶太教堂列入考慮，但這卻是股東心目
中最佳的選擇之一，第三，股東們所做出的決定有時有明顯的衝突，有130筆
捐款給支持墮胎的機構團體，而另外有30筆的捐款指定要給反墮胎的機構團體
(扣除宗教機構不算)。
Last year I told you that I was thinking of raising the amount
that Berkshire shareholders can give under our designated-
contributions program and asked for your comments. We received a
few well-written letters opposing the entire idea, on the grounds
that it was our job to run the business and not our job to force
shareholders into making charitable gifts. Most of the
shareholders responding, however, noted the tax efficiency of the
plan and urged us to increase the designated amount. Several
shareholders who have given stock to their children or
grandchildren told me that they consider the program a particularly
good way to get youngsters thinking at an early age about the
subject of giving. These people, in other words, perceive the
program to be an educational, as well as philanthropic, tool. The
bottom line is that we did raise the amount in 1993, from $8 per
share to $10.
去年我曾經告訴大家我考慮提高Berkshire股東指定捐贈計畫的額度，並詢問大
家的意見，不過我們卻收到一些股東來信反對整個計畫，他們認為我們的責任是
將公司經營好而不是去強迫股東做一些慈善捐贈，當然大部分的股東還是支持這
項計畫，認為這種做法可以享受租稅優惠，並敦促我們提高捐贈的額度，有好幾
位把部份股份移轉給子女或孫子女的股東告訴我，他們認為這是讓下一代了解施
比受有福最好的教育方法，因此最後我們還是決定將下限從每股8美元提高到
每股10元。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that
Berkshire distributes, our operating businesses make contributions,
including merchandise, averaging about $2.5 million annually.
These contributions support local charities, such as The United
Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.
Berkshire除了透過股東指定捐贈計畫對外捐贈之外，我們旗下事業的經理人每
年也會透過公司對外捐贈，包含商品在內每年平均金額約在250萬美元左右。
這些捐贈主要是贊助當地像是聯合勸募等慈善團體，所得的效益應該與我們所捐
出的相當。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages
50-51. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your
shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the
nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so
registered on August 31, 1994 will be ineligible for the 1994
program.
我們敦促新加入的股東，仔細閱讀年報上有關股東捐贈計畫的詳細內容，如果在
未來年度內，你想要參加這類的計畫，我們強烈建議你將股份登記在自己而不是
受託人的名下，必須在1994年8月31日之前完成登記，才有權利參與1994
年的捐贈計畫。
A Few Personal Items
幾件私人事務
Mrs. B - Rose Blumkin - had her 100th birthday on December 3,
1993. (The candles cost more than the cake.) That was a day on
which the store was scheduled to be open in the evening. Mrs. B,
who works seven days a week, for however many hours the store
operates, found the proper decision quite obvious: She simply
postponed her party until an evening when the store was closed.
B太太在12月3日渡過她100歲的生日，(光是蠟燭錢就比蛋糕還貴)，本來當
天傢具店預計營業到晚上，對於每週工作七天的B太太來說，二話不說，等到晚
上店關門之後，才開始她的生日宴會。
Mrs. B's story is well-known but worth telling again. She
came to the United States 77 years ago, unable to speak English and
devoid of formal schooling. In 1937, she founded the Nebraska
Furniture Mart with $500. Last year the store had sales of $200
million, a larger amount by far than that recorded by any other
home furnishings store in the United States. Our part in all of
this began ten years ago when Mrs. B sold control of the business
to Berkshire Hathaway, a deal we completed without obtaining
audited financial statements, checking real estate records, or
getting any warranties. In short, her word was good enough for us.
雖然B太太的傳奇故事已廣為人知，但我還是不厭其煩地再說一次，77年前她
逃到美國來，不會說英文也沒有受過正式的教育，1937年她以500美元創立
內布拉斯加傢具店，截至去年該店的年營業額達到2億美元，遠遠超過全美其
他單一傢具店的業績，我們與她的關係肇始於十年前，B太太將大部分的股權賣
給Berkshire，當然雙方既沒有看會計師的財務報表、也沒有對房地產權狀或是
提供任何保證，簡而言之，B太太的一諾值千金。
Naturally, I was delighted to attend Mrs. B's birthday party.
After all, she's promised to attend my 100th.
當然我很高興能受邀參加她100歲的生日宴會，另外她還答應以後要來參加我
100歲的生日宴會。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Katharine Graham retired last year as the chairman of The
Washington Post Company, having relinquished the CEO title three
years ago. In 1973, we purchased our stock in her company for
about $10 million. Our holding now garners $7 million a year in
dividends and is worth over $400 million. At the time of our
purchase, we knew that the economic prospects of the company were
good. But equally important, Charlie and I concluded that Kay
would prove to be an outstanding manager and would treat all
shareholders honorably. That latter consideration was particularly
important because The Washington Post Company has two classes of
stock, a structure that we've seen some managers abuse.
華盛頓郵報的發行人-凱薩琳葛蘭姆女士在去年決定正式退休，1973年我們斥
資1,000萬美元買進她公司的股份，時至今日我們每年從該公司取得700萬美
元的股利，而持有股票的市值已超過4億美元，當初在決定買進該公司的股份
時，我們便看好該公司的前景，但另外一點同樣重要的是，查理跟我都認為凱薩
琳將會證明自己是位傑出的經理人，同時能夠誠實地對待所有的股東，後面那一
點尤其重要，因為該公司股份分成兩種，而這種架構常常遭到許多經理人濫用。
All of our judgments about this investment have been validated
by events. Kay's skills as a manager were underscored this past
year when she was elected by Fortune's Board of Editors to the
Business Hall of Fame. On behalf of our shareholders, Charlie and
I had long ago put her in Berkshire's Hall of Fame.
而我們做這項投資的正確判斷可由許多事件獲得證明，凱薩琳傑出的表現使得她
獲得財富雜誌編輯群選為商業名人堂，而對於身為股東的我們來說，查理跟我早
就把她列入Berkshire的名人堂之中。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Another of last year's retirees was Don Keough of Coca-Cola,
although, as he puts it, his retirement lasted "about 14 hours."
Don is one of the most extraordinary human beings I've ever known -
a man of enormous business talent, but, even more important, a man
who brings out the absolute best in everyone lucky enough to
associate with him. Coca-Cola wants its product to be present at
the happy times of a person's life. Don Keough, as an individual,
invariably increases the happiness of those around him. It's
impossible to think about Don without feeling good.
另外一位在去年退休的人是可口可樂的Don Keough，雖然如同他本人所說的
他的退休只維持了14個小時，Don是我認識最優秀的人類之一，他不但擁有絕
佳的商業天分，同時更重要的是使得每個幸運能夠與他共事的人發揮其潛能，可
口可樂希望其產品能夠伴隨每個人一生最快樂的時光，而Don這個人卻帶給周
圍的人無限的歡樂，每當想起Don時，沒有不讓人會心一笑的。
I will edge up to how I met Don by slipping in a plug for my
neighborhood in Omaha: Though Charlie has lived in California for
45 years, his home as a boy was about 200 feet away from the house
where I now live; my wife, Susie, grew up 1 1/2 blocks away; and we
have about 125 Berkshire shareholders in the zip code. As for Don,
in 1958 he bought the house directly across the street from mine.
He was then a coffee salesman with a big family and a small income.
在介紹我如何結識Don時，順便介紹一下我在奧瑪哈的街坊鄰居，雖然查理住
在加州長達45年，但他兒時的老家距離我現在住的地方不到100公尺，而我
的內人蘇珊從小就住在對街，Berkshire有125個股東住在同一個郵遞區號，
而Don在1958買的房子就在我家的正對面，當年他還是一個收入微薄，卻必
須養一大家子的咖啡銷售員。
The impressions I formed in those days about Don were a factor
in my decision to have Berkshire make a record $1 billion
investment in Coca-Cola in 1988-89. Roberto Goizueta had become
CEO of Coke in 1981, with Don alongside as his partner. The two of
them took hold of a company that had stagnated during the previous
decade and moved it from $4.4 billion of market value to $58
billion in less than 13 years. What a difference a pair of
managers like this makes, even when their product has been around
for 100 years.
當年我對Don的印象是我在1988到1989年間，決定替Berkshire買下10
億美元可口可樂股票的因素之一，Roberto Goizueta在1981年當上可口可樂
總裁時，Don是他的副手，兩人聯手接掌這家業務已停滯成長10多年的公司，
短短13年期間將這家原本44億市值的公司變成為580億美元，雖然所販賣的
產品已經問世100年，這兩個人卻還能讓這家公司產生如此大的變化。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Frank Rooney did double duty last year. In addition to
leading H. H. Brown to record profits - 35% above the 1992 high -
he also was key to our merger with Dexter.
Frank Rooney從去年開始做了雙份的工作，除了領導的HH布朗鞋業在去年創
下獲利歷史新高，較去年同期增加35%之外，他也是購併Dexter鞋業的主要靈
魂人物。
Frank has known Harold Alfond and Peter Lunder for decades,
and shortly after our purchase of H. H. Brown, told me what a
wonderful operation they managed. He encouraged us to get together
and in due course we made a deal. Frank told Harold and Peter that
Berkshire would provide an ideal corporate "home" for Dexter, and
that assurance undoubtedly contributed to their decision to join
with us.
Frank認識Harold與Peter有好幾十年了，在買下布朗鞋業不久之後，他向我
提到這家由他們管理良善的公司，他積極地把我們湊在一起，過了不久之後，我
們便達成協議，Frank告訴Harold與Peter說，Berkshire將會是Dexter企
業最理想的歸宿，而這種安全感無疑的是他們最後決定加入我們最關鍵的因素。
I've told you in the past of Frank's extraordinary record in
building Melville Corp. during his 23 year tenure as CEO. Now, at
72, he's setting an even faster pace at Berkshire. Frank has a
low-key, relaxed style, but don't let that fool you. When he
swings, the ball disappears far over the fence.
過去我曾向各位提過Frank在Melville企業23年總裁期間的傑出表現，如今
高齡72歲的他在Berkshire的速度甚至比以前還快，雖然Frank有個低調又閒
散的Style，但千萬不要被他的外表所騙，當他大棒一揮時，球兒可是會一飛沖
天、消失在圍牆之外呢！
The Annual Meeting
年度股東會
This year the Annual Meeting will be held at the Orpheum
Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 25, 1994.
A record 2,200 people turned up for the meeting last year, but the
theater can handle many more. We will have a display in the lobby
featuring many of our consumer products - candy, spray guns, shoes,
cutlery, encyclopedias, and the like. Among my favorites slated to
be there is a See's candy assortment that commemorates Mrs. B's
100th birthday and that features her picture, rather than Mrs.
See's, on the package.
今年的股東會預計在1994年4月25日，星期一早上9點30分在位於奧瑪哈
市中心的Orpheum中心召開，去年股東會參加人數又創新高突破2,200人，
不過這個會場還可以容納更多的人，會場中將展示我們所銷售的許多產品，包含
糖果、水槍、鞋子、刀叉、百科全書等，其中喜斯糖果為了慶祝B太太100年
生日所推出的紀念禮盒是我的最愛，不同於原本喜斯太太的畫像，禮盒上所附的
是B太太的畫像。
We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations at one
of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms)
but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much
larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the
Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards
from Borsheim's, which is a twenty-minute drive from downtown. We
will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45
for the meeting and return after it ends.
我們建議大家最好先向以下旅館預訂房間(1)Radisson-Redick旅館-就位在
Orpheum中心對街擁有88個房間的一家小旅館(2)較大一點的Red Lion旅館
-離Orpheum中心約五分鐘路程，或是(3)Marriott位在奧瑪哈西區，離波仙珠
寶店約100公尺，開車到市中心約需20分鐘，屆時將會有巴士接送大家往返
股東會會場。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can
obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With
the admission card, we will enclose information about parking
facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a
little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk
a few blocks.
後面附有股東會開會投票的相關資料，跟各位解釋如何拿到入場所許的識別證，
由於開會當天會場不好停車，如果你開車過來，記得早一點到，否則附近的車位
很快就會停滿，你可能就必須要停遠一點，再走路過來。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture
Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to
downtown hotels or the airport later. Those of you arriving early
can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from
10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on
Sundays. Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open
for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday,
April 24.
一如往年，會後我們備有巴士帶大家到內布拉斯加傢具店與波仙珠寶店或是到飯
店與機場，我希望大家能有多一點的時間好好探索這兩家店的奧妙，當然早幾天
到的股東也可利用假日逛逛傢具店，星期六從早上10點到下午5點30分，星
期日則從中午開到下午5點30分，平時禮拜天不營業的波仙珠寶，在4月24
號當天會特別為股東與來賓開放。
In past trips to Borsheim's, many of you have met Susan
Jacques. Early in 1994, Susan was made President and CEO of the
company, having risen in 11 years from a $4-an-hour job that she
took at the store when she was 23. Susan will be joined at
Borsheim's on Sunday by many of the managers of our other
businesses, and Charlie and I will be there as well.
過去幾年若你去過波仙，應該都碰到過Susan Jacques， 23歲那年她進入公
司從4美元時薪的小妹做起，經過11年的工作生涯，在1994年初Susan成
為波仙珠寶公司的總裁，星期天Susan連同Berkshire旗下許多經理人以及查
理和我都會出席。
On the previous evening, Saturday, April 23, there will be a
baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and
the Nashville Sounds (which could turn out to be Michael Jordan's
team). As you may know, a few years ago I bought 25% of the Royals
(a capital-allocation decision for which I will not become famous)
and this year the league has cooperatively scheduled a home stand
at Annual Meeting time.
在前一天4月23日，星期六晚上，在Rosenblatt體育館將會有一場奧瑪哈皇
家隊對Nashville (就是麥可喬登後來加入的那隻棒球隊)，或許大家知道，幾年
前我個人買下皇家隊25%的股權(一個我自己不太好意思讓大家知道的資金分配
決策)，今年聯盟特地將主場安排在Berkshire股東年會期間。
I will throw the first pitch on the 23rd, and it's a certainty
that I will improve on last year's humiliating performance. On
that occasion, the catcher inexplicably called for my "sinker" and
I dutifully delivered a pitch that barely missed my foot. This
year, I will go with my high hard one regardless of what the
catcher signals, so bring your speed-timing devices. The proxy
statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the
game. I regret to report that you won't have to buy them from
scalpers.
我將會擔任開場的先發投手，而我絕對保證將一雪去年差勁的表現，記得當時捕
手突然向我做出投出下沈球的指示，我遵照指示投出卻差點砸到我自己的腳，今
年不管捕手做出什麼暗號，我都將祭出個人最拿手的上飄速球，所以大家最好把
測速器都帶來，股東會資料將告訴大家如何取得入場的門票，大家千萬不要向黃
牛買門票。
Warren E. Buffett
March 1, 1994 Chairman of the Board
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
1994年3月1日
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股東:
Our per-share book value increased 14.3% during 1993. Over
the last 29 years (that is, since present management took over)
book value has grown from $19 to $8,854, or at a rate of 23.3%
compounded annually.
1993年本公司的淨值成長了14.3%，總計過去29年以來，也就是自從現有經
營階層接手之後，每股淨值由當初的19元成長到現在的8,854美元，年複合成
長率約為23.3%。
During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.5
billion, a figure affected by two negative and two positive non-
operating items. For the sake of completeness, I'll explain them
here. If you aren't thrilled by accounting, however, feel free
to fast-forward through this discussion:
回顧過去一年，Berkshire的淨值增加了15億美元，主要受到兩項負面以及兩
項正面非營業的因素所影響，為了做完整的表達，我將它們條列如下，若是大家
對於會計有點感冒，大可直接跳過本段不看。
1. The first negative was produced by a change in
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
having to do with the taxes we accrue against
unrealized appreciation in the securities we
carry at market value. The old rule said that
the tax rate used should be the one in effect
when the appreciation took place. Therefore,
at the end of 1992, we were using a rate of 34%
on the $6.4 billion of gains generated after
1986 and 28% on the $1.2 billion of gains
generated before that. The new rule stipulates
that the current tax rate should be applied to
all gains. The rate in the first quarter of
1993, when this rule went into effect, was 34%.
Applying that rate to our pre-1987 gains
reduced net worth by $70 million.
第一個負面因素是由於一般公認會計原則變動所造成，主要與
帳上依照市價計算的未實現增值利益所估列的所得稅有關，原來規
定稅率必須按照漲價所發生時點來計算，因此在1992年底，我們
的未實現利益也64億美元係按照34%計算，其餘12億則按28%
計算；而新的規定則改成全部依照現行稅率計算，故1993年第一
季所適用的稅率則為34%，包含1987年以前的未實現利得在內全
部適用，此舉將使得我們的淨值因此減少7,000萬美元。
2. The second negative, related to the first, came
about because the corporate tax rate was raised
in the third quarter of 1993 to 35%. This
change required us to make an additional charge
of 1% against all of our unrealized gains, and
that charge penalized net worth by $75 million.
Oddly, GAAP required both this charge and the
one described above to be deducted from the
earnings we report, even though the unrealized
appreciation that gave rise to the charges was
never included in earnings, but rather was
credited directly to net worth.
2.第二個負面因素與第一個也有關，因為從1993年開始企業稅率提
高為35%，此舉又使得我們必須為帳上未實現利得多提1%的稅負，
導致我們的淨值又減少7,500萬美元，奇怪的是一般公認會計原則要
求這兩項變動皆須列入損益表，卻不顧當初這些未實現利得根本就從
未列入盈餘之內，而是直接當作是淨值的增加。
3. Another 1993 change in GAAP affects the value
at which we carry the securities that we own.
In recent years, both the common stocks and
certain common-equivalent securities held by
our insurance companies have been valued at
market, whereas equities held by our non-
insurance subsidiaries or by the parent company
were carried at their aggregate cost or market,
whichever was lower. Now GAAP says that all
common stocks should be carried at market, a
rule we began following in the fourth quarter
of 1993. This change produced a gain in
Berkshire's reported net worth of about $172
million.
3.1993年另外一個會計原則的變動影響的則是我們帳上持有的這些
有價證券的價值，近幾年來，我們保險公司所持有的不管是普通股或
是約當普通股，都是按市價計算，至於母公司或是其他非保險業子公
司所持有的的股票則以成本與市價孰低法計算，現在一般公認會計原
則則改成全部都按市價計算，這個規定將從1993年的第四季開始實
施，此舉將使得Berkshire的淨值增加1.72億美元。
4. Finally, we issued some stock last year. In a
transaction described in last year's Annual
Report, we issued 3,944 shares in early
January, 1993 upon the conversion of $46
million convertible debentures that we had
called for redemption. Additionally, we issued
25,203 shares when we acquired Dexter Shoe, a
purchase discussed later in this report. The
overall result was that our shares outstanding
increased by 29,147 and our net worth by about
$478 million. Per-share book value also grew,
because the shares issued in these transactions
carried a price above their book value.
4.最後去年我們又發行的一些股份，在一項去年曾提過的購併交易
中，我們在1993年一月將4,600萬美元的可轉換債券贖回，而發行
了3,944股，此外在買下Dexter鞋業時，(後面報告還會詳加敘述)
我們又發行了25,203股，總計一共新發行了29,147股，增加4.78
億美元的淨值，每股帳面淨值也因發行價格高於原先帳面每股淨值而
提升。
Of course, it's per-share intrinsic value, not book value,
that counts. Book value is an accounting term that measures the
capital, including retained earnings, that has been put into a
business. Intrinsic value is a present-value estimate of the
cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining
life. At most companies, the two values are unrelated.
Berkshire, however, is an exception: Our book value, though
significantly below our intrinsic value, serves as a useful
device for tracking that key figure. In 1993, each measure grew
by roughly 14%, advances that I would call satisfactory but
unexciting.
當然真正重要的是每股實質價值而非帳面淨值，帳面淨值是一個會計名詞，用來
衡量一家公司所投入的資本，也包含未分配的盈餘在內，實質價值則是對於一家
企業終其一生所能產生現金流量的估計折現值，對大部分的公司來說，這兩個數
字大多不相關，不過Berkshire算是一個例外，我們的帳面淨值，雖然遠低於實
質價值，但卻是追蹤實質價值相當好的一項指標，在1993年兩項數值大約皆以
14%左右的比率增加，這種成績雖讓人滿意卻不令人驚喜。
These gains, however, were outstripped by a much larger gain
- 39% - in Berkshire's market price. Over time, of course,
market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same
destination. But in the short run the two often diverge in a
major way, a phenomenon I've discussed in the past. Two years
ago, Coca-Cola and Gillette, both large holdings of ours, enjoyed
market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings
gains. In the 1991 Annual Report, I said that the stocks of
these companies could not continuously overperform their
businesses.
這些利得比起Berkshire本身股價39%的漲幅來說還是略微遜色，當然就長期
而言，Berkshire的市價與實質價值將會到達相同的水平，但短期而言，兩者的
變化可能會有很大的差異，這種現象稍後我們會再詳細討論，兩年前我們兩項主
要的投資可口可樂與吉列刮鬍刀的股價表現遠超過本身的盈餘成長，在1991年
的年報中，我便說過這些公司的股票市價不可能永遠持續超越其本業。
From 1991 to 1993, Coke and Gillette increased their annual
operating earnings per share by 38% and 37% respectively, but
their market prices moved up only 11% and 6%. In other words,
the companies overperformed their stocks, a result that no doubt
partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand names.
Whatever the reason, what will count over time is the earnings
performance of these companies. If they prosper, Berkshire will
also prosper, though not in a lock-step manner.
從1991年到1993年，可口可樂與吉列刮鬍刀每股獲利的增加幅度分別為38%
與37%，但是同期間股票市價的漲幅卻只有11%與6%，換句話說，這些公司的
表現超越股票市場，主要的原因還在於華爾街對於品牌有很深的疑慮，但是不管
怎樣，真正重要的還是這些公司本身的獲利情況，如果他們經營順利，Berkshire
也就跟著水漲船高，雖然不是依照一步步穩定的方式前進。
Let me add a lesson from history: Coke went public in 1919
at $40 per share. By the end of 1920 the market, coldly
reevaluating Coke's future prospects, had battered the stock down
by more than 50%, to $19.50. At yearend 1993, that single share,
with dividends reinvested, was worth more than $2.1 million. As
Ben Graham said: "In the short-run, the market is a voting
machine - reflecting a voter-registration test that requires only
money, not intelligence or emotional stability - but in the long-
run, the market is a weighing machine."
接著讓我為各位上一次歷史課，1919年可口可樂股票以每股40美元公開上
市，到了1920年由於市場對於可口可樂的前景看法相當冷淡，而將股價下修一
半至19.5美元，然而時至今日，1993年底，若是將收到的股利再重複投資下
去，則當初股票的價值將變成210萬美元，就像葛拉罕所說：「短期而言，市
場是投票機器，投資人不須靠智慧或情緒控制，只要有錢都可以登記參加投票，
但就長期而言，股票市場卻是一個體重機。」
So how should Berkshire's over-performance in the market
last year be viewed? Clearly, Berkshire was selling at a higher
percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the
case at the beginning of the year. On the other hand, in a world
of 6% or 7% long-term interest rates, Berkshire's market price
was not inappropriate if - and you should understand that this is
a huge if - Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I can
attain our long-standing goal of increasing Berkshire's per-share
intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15%. We have not
retreated from this goal. But we again emphasize, as we have for
many years, that the growth in our capital base makes 15% an
ever-more difficult target to hit.
所以我們應該如何看待Berkshire去年的股價超越本質的表現呢? 很明顯的在
1993年底Berkshire的股價佔實質價值比重較年初為高，另外一方面，在長期
利率只有6%到7%的投資環境下，同時若是你了解查理孟格跟本人只能讓
Berkshire的實質價值每年達到15%的成長的話，你就知道Berkshire去年這樣
的股價表現實在是有點反常，雖然對於這樣的目標我們從不妥協，但我們必須再
一次強調，隨著資本規模的日益擴大，想要達到這個目標的困難度也與日俱增。
What we have going for us is a growing collection of good-
sized operating businesses that possess economic characteristics
ranging from good to terrific, run by managers whose performance
ranges from terrific to terrific. You need have no worries about
this group.
不過另一方面，伴隨我們的是由一些相當規模且擁有競爭優勢的企業，並且由傑
出的經理人所經營，對於這樣的夢幻組合大家大可以放心。
The capital-allocation work that Charlie and I do at the
parent company, using the funds that our managers deliver to us,
has a less certain outcome: It is not easy to find new
businesses and managers comparable to those we have. Despite
that difficulty, Charlie and I relish the search, and we are
happy to report an important success in 1993.
倒是查理跟我在母公司利用子公司所貢獻資金所作的資金分配工作，所面臨的不
確定性就比較高，要找到像我們現在擁有一樣好的企業並不容易，但是雖然難度
高，查理跟我卻絕對不會放棄追尋，而很高興在1993年我們能有相當成功的斬
獲。
Dexter Shoe
Detxter 鞋業
What we did last year was build on our 1991 purchase of H.
H. Brown, a superbly-run manufacturer of work shoes, boots and
other footwear. Brown has been a real winner: Though we had
high hopes to begin with, these expectations have been
considerably exceeded thanks to Frank Rooney, Jim Issler and the
talented managers who work with them. Because of our confidence
in Frank's team, we next acquired Lowell Shoe, at the end of
1992. Lowell was a long-established manufacturer of women's and
nurses' shoes, but its business needed some fixing. Again,
results have surpassed our expectations. So we promptly jumped
at the chance last year to acquire Dexter Shoe of Dexter, Maine,
which manufactures popular-priced men's and women's shoes.
Dexter, I can assure you, needs no fixing: It is one of the
best-managed companies Charlie and I have seen in our business
lifetimes.
去年我們所做的乃是基於1991年買進HH布朗鞋業-一家管理良善的鞋子、靴
子製造公司的續曲，布朗鞋業成為一家真正成功的贏家，雖然一開始我們就對他
就有相當高的標準，但是在Frank與其他經理人的努力之下，這家公司的表現
甚至還超過我們的預期，基於我們對Frank團隊的信心，接著在1992年年底
我們又買下Lowell鞋業，Lowell是一家女鞋與護士鞋的老牌製造公司，不過他
的管理還需要改進，再一次他的表現又超乎我們的預期，所以我們立刻又再接再
厲在去年又趁機買下緬因州的Dexter鞋業，一家專門製造高級男女鞋的品牌，
這次我可以向大家保證Dexter並不需要改造，Dexter是查理跟我在職業生涯
中，所見過最好的公司之一。
Harold Alfond, who started working in a shoe factory at 25
cents an hour when he was 20, founded Dexter in 1956 with $10,000
of capital. He was joined in 1958 by Peter Lunder, his nephew.
The two of them have since built a business that now produces over
7.5 million pairs of shoes annually, most of them made in Maine
and the balance in Puerto Rico. As you probably know, the
domestic shoe industry is generally thought to be unable to
compete with imports from low-wage countries. But someone forgot
to tell this to the ingenious managements of Dexter and H. H.
Brown and to their skilled labor forces, which together make the
U.S. plants of both companies highly competitive against all
comers.
話說Harold Alfond從20歲以時薪25美分開始到製鞋工廠做工，並在1956
年靠著一萬美元的資本創立Dexter，1958年他的侄子Peter加入，從此兩人
建立起年產750萬雙鞋子的企業，大部分的鞋子都在緬因州生產，其餘的則在
波多黎各，就像大家都知道的，國內的製鞋業，一般被認為無法與國外進口低價
產品競爭，但是大家似乎忘記提醒布朗鞋業與Dexter經營團隊有這麼一回事，
是他們讓兩家公司位於美國的工廠擁有高度的競爭力以對抗外來的入侵者。
Dexter's business includes 77 retail outlets, located
primarily in the Northeast. The company is also a major
manufacturer of golf shoes, producing about 15% of U.S. output.
Its bread and butter, though, is the manufacture of traditional
shoes for traditional retailers, a job at which it excels: Last
year both Nordstrom and J.C. Penney bestowed special awards upon
Dexter for its performance as a supplier during 1992.
Dexter還包含77家的零售門市，主要集中在西北地區，該公司同時也是高爾
夫球鞋的主要製造商，全美的市場佔有率約為15%，不過他的主要業務還是傳
統通路商的傳統鞋類，這也是它最擅長的領域，去年Dexter還獲得Nordstrom
與JC Penny所頒發的年度最佳供應商獎項。
Our 1993 results include Dexter only from our date of
merger, November 7th. In 1994, we expect Berkshire's shoe
operations to have more than $550 million in sales, and we would
not be surprised if the combined pre-tax earnings of these
businesses topped $85 million. Five years ago we had no thought
of getting into shoes. Now we have 7,200 employees in that
industry, and I sing "There's No Business Like Shoe Business" as
I drive to work. So much for strategic plans.
Berkshire只能從1993年11月7號購併日後開始計入Dexter的業績，在1994
年我們預計Berkshire光是在鞋類方面的銷售額就達到5.5億美元，而總計稅前
獲利極有可能超過8,500萬，記得在五年前我們根本就沒想到會跨進鞋類這一
行，現在光是在這個產業所雇用的員工就超過7,200人，現在我每天上班，都
會邊開車邊唱，沒有一個行業會像賣鞋這一行，策略計畫還有很多發揮的空間。
At Berkshire, we have no view of the future that dictates
what businesses or industries we will enter. Indeed, we think
it's usually poison for a corporate giant's shareholders if it
embarks upon new ventures pursuant to some grand vision. We
prefer instead to focus on the economic characteristics of
businesses that we wish to own and the personal characteristics
of managers with whom we wish to associate - and then to hope we
get lucky in finding the two in combination. At Dexter, we did.
在Berkshire，對於將來會進入那個產業，我們並沒有特定的看法，事實上，我
們常在想對於一家大型企業的股東來說，與其追求具有遠景的新創事業有時反而
有害，所以我們比較偏愛專注於那些我們想要擁有的經濟型態以及我們喜愛一起
共事的經理人，剩下的就只看我們有沒有足夠的運氣，找到同時擁有這兩項特點
的組合了，在Dexter我們確實找到了。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now we pause for a short commercial: Though they owned
a business jewel, we believe that Harold and Peter (who were not
interested in cash) made a sound decision in exchanging their
Dexter stock for shares of Berkshire. What they did, in effect,
was trade a 100% interest in a single terrific business for a
smaller interest in a large group of terrific businesses. They
incurred no tax on this exchange and now own a security that can
be easily used for charitable or personal gifts, or that can be
converted to cash in amounts, and at times, of their own
choosing. Should members of their families desire to, they can
pursue varying financial paths without running into the
complications that often arise when assets are concentrated in a
private business.
接下來讓我們休息一下，進段小廣告，雖然他們擁有商業界的寶石，但我們也相
信Harold與Peter(他們對於現金都不感興趣)做了一個正確的決定，將Dexter
的股份轉為Berkshire的股份，他們所做的，實際上等於將一家規模小的好公司
的全部權益轉成一家大規模好公司的一部份權益，這樣的轉換並不會產生租稅負
擔，同時還可享有依個人意願隨時進行贈與或變現的好處，如果他們的家族成員
有意願，他們可以依照自己的想法追求不同的目標，而不必像過去那樣所有的資
產全部綁在一家私人的企業。
For tax and other reasons, private companies also often find
it difficult to diversify outside their industries. Berkshire,
in contrast, can diversify with ease. So in shifting their
ownership to Berkshire, Dexter's shareholders solved a
reinvestment problem. Moreover, though Harold and Peter now have
non-controlling shares in Berkshire, rather than controlling
shares in Dexter, they know they will be treated as partners and
that we will follow owner-oriented practices. If they elect to
retain their Berkshire shares, their investment result from the
merger date forward will exactly parallel my own result. Since I
have a huge percentage of my net worth committed for life to
Berkshire shares - and since the company will issue me neither
restricted shares nor stock options - my gain-loss equation will
always match that of all other owners.
基於租稅規劃以及其他理由，私人企業通常很難透過延伸本業以外的投資達到分
散風險的目的，相對的，在Berkshire我們可以很輕易地就多角化，因此藉由經
營權移轉至Berkshire，Dexter的股東可以很輕易地就解決轉投資的問題，更
重要的是，雖然Harold與Peter現在持有的是Berkshire無控制權的股份，而
不是原先Dexter具控制權的股份，但他們很清楚自己將被視為真正的合夥人，
同時我們也會以經營者的心態參與，所以一旦他們決定將自己的投資轉為
Berkshire的股份，那麼從合併那天開始，他們就可以確定本身的投資成果將會
與我個人的投資成果相當，而因為我個人絕大部份的身家都擺在Berkshire，也
因為我個人從不會自公司身上取得特殊的股份或員工認股權，所以我個人的成敗
得失也將與其他所有公司股權持有人一致。
Additionally, Harold and Peter know that at Berkshire we can
keep our promises: There will be no changes of control or
culture at Berkshire for many decades to come. Finally, and of
paramount importance, Harold and Peter can be sure that they will
get to run their business - an activity they dearly love -
exactly as they did before the merger. At Berkshire, we do not
tell .400 hitters how to swing.
此外，Harold與Peter也相當了解，在Berkshire我們言出必行，在可見的未
來幾十年內，Berkshire的控制權與文化將不會有所改變，最後同時也是最重要
的一點，Harold與Peter可以確定將能夠繼續經營原來的企業，這是他們最喜
愛的工作，這點不會因為合併案完成而有任何的改變，在Berkshire，我們不會
雞婆地去提醒打擊率高達四成的強打者應該要如何揮棒。
What made sense for Harold and Peter probably makes sense
for a few other owners of large private businesses. So, if you
have a business that might fit, let me hear from you. Our
acquisition criteria are set forth in the appendix on page 22.
我想這些的道理同樣也適合其他大型私人企業的所有者，所以如果你有公司的情
況符合我們的標準的，請務必讓我知道，在年報的後段有我們擬購併企業的標
準。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帳列盈餘的來源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's
reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of
Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments
are not charged against the specific businesses to which they
apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This
procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they
would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've
explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to
us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing
GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a
business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in
the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our
audited financial statements.
下表顯示Berkshire帳列盈餘的主要來源，在這張表中商譽的攤銷數與購買法會
計調整數會從個別被投資公司分離出來，單獨加總列示，之所以這樣做是為了讓
旗下各事業的盈餘狀況，不因我們的投資而有所影響，過去我一再地強調我們認
為這樣的表達方式，較之一般公認會計原則要求以個別企業基礎做調整，不管是
對投資者或是管理者來說，更有幫助，當然最後損益加總的數字仍然會與經會計
師查核的數字一致。
(000s omitted)
------------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
-------------------- ------------------
1993 1992 1993 1992
---------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............... $ 30,876 $(108,961) $ 20,156 $(71,141)
Net Investment Income ...... 375,946 355,067 321,321 305,763
H. H. Brown, Lowell,
and Dexter ............... 44,025* 27,883 28,829 17,340
Buffalo News ................. 50,962 47,863 29,696 28,163
Commercial & Consumer Finance 22,695 19,836 14,161 12,664
Fechheimer ................... 13,442 13,698 6,931 7,267
Kirby ........................ 39,147 35,653 25,056 22,795
Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 21,540 17,110 10,398 8,072
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 38,196 31,954 23,809 19,883
See's Candies ................ 41,150 42,357 24,367 25,501
World Book ................... 19,915 29,044 13,537 19,503
Purchase-Price Accounting &
Goodwill Charges ......... (17,033) (12,087) (13,996) (13,070)
Interest Expense** ........... (56,545) (98,643) (35,614) (62,899)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions ............ (9,448) (7,634) (5,994) (4,913)
Other ........................ 28,428 67,540 15,094 32,798
---------- ---------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings ............. 643,296 460,680 477,751 347,726
Sales of Securities ............ 546,422 89,937 356,702 59,559
Tax Accruals Caused by
New Accounting Rules ........ --- --- (146,332) ---
---------- ---------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - All Entities .. $1,189,718 $ 550,617 $688,121 $407,285
* Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired,
November 7, 1993.
*Dexter的盈餘僅含購併日1993年11月7日以後的盈餘
**Excludes interest expense of Commercial and Consumer Finance
businesses. In 1992 includes $22.5 million of premiums paid on
the early redemption of debt.
**不含商業與消費金融公司的利息費用，另外1992年部份還包含2,250萬提前贖回債券的溢
價。
A large amount of information about these businesses is given
on pages 38-49, where you will also find our segment earnings
reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 52-59, we have
rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-
GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and
I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the
financial information that we would wish you to give us if our
positions were reversed.
在年報中你可以找到依照一般公認會計原則編製，詳細的部門別資訊，至於我們
的目的是希望給你所有查理跟我認為在評估Berkshire價值時，應該必要的資
訊。
"Look-Through" Earnings
透視盈餘
We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which we
believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does
our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings
consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous
section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major
investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our
profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by
Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been
distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here
exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major
restructuring charges.
之前我們曾經討論過透視盈餘，其主要的組成份子有(1)前段所提到的帳列盈
餘，加上(2)主要被投資公司的保留盈餘，按一般公認會計原則未反應在我們公
司帳上的盈餘，扣除(3)若這些未反應的盈餘分配給我們時，估計可能要繳的所
得稅。在這裡我們所謂的營業盈餘係扣除資本利得、特別會計調整與企業調整的
主要支出。
Over time, our look-through earnings need to increase at about
15% annually if our intrinsic value is to grow at that rate. Last
year, I explained that we had to increase these earnings to about
$1.8 billion in the year 2000, were we to meet the 15% goal.
Because we issued additional shares in 1993, the amount needed has
risen to about $1.85 billion.
長期而言，如果我們的實質價值想要以每年15%的幅度來成長的話，那麼透視
盈餘每年也必須增加以這個幅度來成長，去年我曾經提到，到西元2000年為
止，Berkshire若要以15%的目標，透視盈餘必須成長到18億美元，而由於1993
年我們又發行了一些新股，所以現在的門檻提高到18.5億美元。
That is a tough goal, but one that we expect you to hold us
to. In the past, we've criticized the managerial practice of
shooting the arrow of performance and then painting the target,
centering it on whatever point the arrow happened to hit. We will
instead risk embarrassment by painting first and shooting later.
這是一個高難度的目標，不過也希望大家能夠繼續支持我們，在過去我們常常批
評有些管理階層總是先把箭射出去後再劃上準心，不管這箭射得有多歪，因此關
於這點我們寧願先標出準心，然後再瞄準目標射箭。
If we are to hit the bull's-eye, we will need markets that
allow the purchase of businesses and securities on sensible terms.
Right now, markets are difficult, but they can - and will - change
in unexpected ways and at unexpected times. In the meantime, we'll
try to resist the temptation to do something marginal simply
because we are long on cash. There's no use running if you're on
the wrong road.
如果我們想要命中靶心，那麼我們絕對需要有能以合理價格買到好的公司與股份
的市場，不過對我們來說，現在市場上的情況並不理想，當然這種情況隨時都有
可能會改變，在此同時，我們也會盡量避免手上閒錢太多而去做那些浪費工夫的
蠢事，若方向不對，再怎麼努力衝刺也是白費力氣。
The following table shows how we calculate look-through
earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very
rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been
included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly
under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
各位可以從下表看出我們是如何計算透視盈餘的，不過我還是要提醒各位這些數
字有點粗糙，(被投資公司所分配的股利收入已經包含在保險事業的淨投資收益
項下)。
Berkshire's Share
of Undistributed
Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)
------------------------ --------------------- --------------------
1993 1992 1993 1992
------ ------ ------ ------
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ..... 13.0% 18.2% $ 83(2) $ 70
The Coca-Cola Company ........ 7.2% 7.1% 94 82
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 6.8%(1) 8.2%(1) 41(2) 29(2)
GEICO Corp. .................. 48.4% 48.1% 76(3) 34(3)
General Dynamics Corp. ....... 13.9% 14.1% 25 11(2)
The Gillette Company ......... 10.9% 10.9% 44 38
Guinness PLC ................. 1.9% 2.0% 8 7
The Washington Post Company .. 14.8% 14.6% 15 11
Wells Fargo & Company ........ 12.2% 11.5% 53(2) 16(2)
Berkshire's share of undistributed
earnings of major investees $439 $298
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed
investee earnings(4) (61) (42)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 478 348
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $856 $604
(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest
at Wesco
不包含Wesco的少數股權
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
以年平均持有股權比例計算
(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both
recurring and significant
扣除重複發生且金額大的已實現資本利得，
(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays
on the dividends it receives
適用的稅率為14%，這是Berkshire收到現金股利時的平均稅率。
We have told you that we expect the undistributed,
hypothetically-taxed earnings of our investees to produce at least
equivalent gains in Berkshire's intrinsic value. To date, we have
far exceeded that expectation. For example, in 1986 we bought
three million shares of Capital Cities/ABC for $172.50 per share
and late last year sold one-third of that holding for $630 per
share. After paying 35% capital gains taxes, we realized a $297
million profit from the sale. In contrast, during the eight years
we held these shares, the retained earnings of Cap Cities
attributable to them - hypothetically taxed at a lower 14% in
accordance with our look-through method - were only $152 million.
In other words, we paid a much larger tax bill than our look-
through presentations to you have assumed and nonetheless realized
a gain that far exceeded the undistributed earnings allocable to
these shares.
我曾告訴過各位，我們預估這些已依估計稅率調整過的未分配盈餘至少可以為
Berkshire創造出同等的實質價值，而到目前為止，其真正的結果甚至超乎我們
的預期，舉例來說，我們在1986年以每股172.5美元的價格買進300萬股資
本城/ABC公司的股份，去年我們以每股630美元的價格處分了其中的三分之
一，在支付35%的資本利得稅後，我們實現2.97億美元的稅後盈餘，相對地，
在我們持有這些股份的八年期間，經由這些股份資本城公司分配給我們的透視盈
餘在扣除估計14%的所得稅之後，只有1.52億美元，換句話說，透過出售這些
股份，所獲取的利益，即便在扣除較高的所得稅負之後，還是比原先透過持股所
分配到的盈餘還要高出許多。
We expect such pleasant outcomes to recur often in the future
and therefore believe our look-through earnings to be a
conservative representation of Berkshire's true economic earnings.
而我們也預期這樣的情況在未來還會持續發生，因此我們相信Berkshire所計算
的透視盈餘，算是相當保守的表達方式。
Taxes
稅負
As our Cap Cities sale emphasizes, Berkshire is a substantial
payer of federal income taxes. In aggregate, we will pay 1993
federal income taxes of $390 million, about $200 million of that
attributable to operating earnings and $190 million to realized
capital gains. Furthermore, our share of the 1993 federal and
foreign income taxes paid by our investees is well over $400
million, a figure you don't see on our financial statements but
that is nonetheless real. Directly and indirectly, Berkshire's
1993 federal income tax payments will be about 1/2 of 1% of the total
paid last year by all American corporations.
就像是剛剛提到的資本城股份出售案，Berkshire可以說是聯邦政府的繳稅大
戶，總計在1993年，我們總共繳了3.9億美元的所得稅，其中2億屬於本業
獲利，另外1.9億則源自於資本利得，此外我們的被投資公司另外向聯邦政府與
國外政府又繳交了超過4億美元的所得稅，這是你在本公司的財務報表上看不
到，但卻又確實存在的，直接再加上間接合計，Berkshire佔去年所有美國企業
繳給聯邦政府所得稅總額的1.5%。
Speaking for our own shares, Charlie and I have absolutely no
complaint about these taxes. We know we work in a market-based
economy that rewards our efforts far more bountifully than it does
the efforts of others whose output is of equal or greater benefit
to society. Taxation should, and does, partially redress this
inequity. But we still remain extraordinarily well-treated.
對於這個比例，查理跟我本人一點怨言也沒有，我們知道我們是在一個市場導向
的經濟社會，我們努力所收到的報酬，其比例甚至比一些對這個社會有更多貢獻
的人還要多，透過租稅政策，多多少少可以降低這種不合理性，不過即便是如此，
我們還是認為自己受到特別優厚的待遇。
Berkshire and its shareholders, in combination, would pay a
much smaller tax if Berkshire operated as a partnership or "S"
corporation, two structures often used for business activities.
For a variety of reasons, that's not feasible for Berkshire to do.
However, the penalty our corporate form imposes is mitigated -
though far from eliminated - by our strategy of investing for the
long term. Charlie and I would follow a buy-and-hold policy even
if we ran a tax-exempt institution. We think it the soundest way
to invest, and it also goes down the grain of our personalities. A
third reason to favor this policy, however, is the fact that taxes
are due only when gains are realized.
雖然Berkshire若是以合夥或S型企業的形式來經營，(在美國許多商業活動確
實是以這兩種形態在運作)，Berkshire跟其所有的股東，總的來說可以大大減少
所需負擔的稅負，但基於許多理由，那樣的做法並不適合Berkshire的運作，所
幸我們以企業形態運作的模式所受到的租稅懲罰，因為我們採取長期投資的策略
而稍稍減輕，雖然就算是證交所得免稅，查理跟我還是會堅持遵照買進並持有的
策略，這是我們認為最好的投資方式，同時也最符合我們的個人特質，當然第三
個好處就是因為這樣做可以使我們只有在實現資本利得時才需要繳稅。
Through my favorite comic strip, Li'l Abner, I got a chance
during my youth to see the benefits of delayed taxes, though I
missed the lesson at the time. Making his readers feel superior,
Li'l Abner bungled happily, but moronically, through life in
Dogpatch. At one point he became infatuated with a New York
temptress, Appassionatta Van Climax, but despaired of marrying her
because he had only a single silver dollar and she was interested
solely in millionaires. Dejected, Abner took his problem to Old
Man Mose, the font of all knowledge in Dogpatch. Said the sage:
Double your money 20 times and Appassionatta will be yours (1, 2,
4, 8 . . . . 1,048,576).
經由我個人最喜愛的漫畫短片，Li'l Abner，我有機會可以體會到延遲支付所得
稅的好處，雖然當時我沒有好好地利用那次機會，為了讓他的讀者覺得自己很優
越，Li'l Abner一直快樂地維持單身，直到他為紐約一位女演員Appassionatta
深深地著迷，但由於她只對百萬富翁有興趣，因此一貧如洗的Abner可以說是
一點希望都沒有，在遭到拒絕之後，Abner跑去智慧老人Mose那裡請他指點
迷津，結果這位聖賢對Abner說，很簡單你只要能夠將身上僅有的一塊錢，複
製20次，Appassionatta自然就會投入到你的懷抱(1,2,4,8,….,1,048,576)。
My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a roadhouse,
dropping his dollar into a slot machine, and hitting a jackpot that
spilled money all over the floor. Meticulously following Mose's
advice, Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find his next
double. Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben Graham.
我記得這段漫畫的最後一段是Abner跑到一家旅館，將他僅有的一塊錢投入吃
角子老虎中，結果竟然中了七星，一時之間獎金掉滿地，沒想到他老兄一絲不苟
遵照Mose老人的旨意，只撿起了其中的兩塊錢之後，就出發去尋找下一次複製
的機會，看到這裡我便捨棄了Abner，並開始研讀葛拉漢的理論。
Mose clearly was overrated as a guru: Besides failing to
anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to instructions, he also
forgot about taxes. Had Abner been subject, say, to the 35%
federal tax rate that Berkshire pays, and had he managed one double
annually, he would after 20 years only have accumulated $22,370.
Indeed, had he kept on both getting his annual doubles and paying a
35% tax on each, he would have needed 7 1/2 years more to reach the
$1 million required to win Appassionatta.
Mose很顯然地不配當他人的精神導師，除了低估Abner對於他的指示過於盲
從的程度，他也忘了考慮到可能的稅負，假設今天Abner也像Berkshire一樣
必須負擔高達35%的聯邦所得稅的話，而且他每年只能成功地複製一次的話，
就算連續20年都如他所願，他也只能累積到22,370元，當然若是他能持之以
恆地保持這樣的記錄的話，他則還須多等上七年半，才能累積到所需的100萬
以贏得Appassionatta的芳心。
But what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single
investment and held it until it doubled the same 27 1/2 times? In
that case, he would have realized about $200 million pre-tax or,
after paying a $70 million tax in the final year, about $130
million after-tax. For that, Appassionatta would have crawled to
Dogpatch. Of course, with 27 1/2 years having passed, how
Appassionatta would have looked to a fellow sitting on $130 million
is another question.
然而要是Abner只將資金放在單一不變的投資之上，同時連續27年半都能保
持每年倍數成長的記錄的話，這樣到最後，他在稅前可以累積高達二億美元的獲
利，或是在扣除7,000萬美元的所得稅之後，得到稅後1億3,000萬美元的利
益，屆時可能會換做是Appassionatta爬著來求他了，當然等到27年後，一
個坐擁1億多美元的富翁會怎麼看待年華老去的Appassionatta，則又是另外
一回事了。
What this little tale tells us is that tax-paying investors
will realize a far, far greater sum from a single investment that
compounds internally at a given rate than from a succession of
investments compounding at the same rate. But I suspect many
Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago.
這宗小故事告訴我們必須負擔稅負的投資人從每年固定以一個比率成長的單一
投資上，可以獲得比每年更換投資對象所得的多的多，即便是兩者成長的幅度一
樣也是如此，不過我懷疑許多Berkshire的股東老早就已經知道這個道理了。
Insurance Operations
保險事業營運
At this point in the report we've customarily provided you
with a table showing the annual "combined ratio" of the insurance
industry for the preceding decade. This ratio compares total
insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) to revenue from
premiums. For many years, the ratio has been above 100, a level
indicating an underwriting loss. That is, the industry has taken
in less money each year from its policyholders than it has had to
pay for operating expenses and for loss events that occurred during
the year.
接下來到這裡我們通常會準備一張表來說明保險業過去十多年來的綜合比率，綜
合比率代表保險的總成本(理賠損失加上費用)佔保費收入的比例，多年以來，比
率在100以下代表有承保的損失，也就是說，保險業者當年度從客戶那裡收到
的保費，不足以支應必須支付給保戶的理賠款以及營運所需的費用開支。
Offsetting this grim equation is a happier fact: Insurers get
to hold on to their policyholders' money for a time before paying
it out. This happens because most policies require that premiums
be prepaid and, more importantly, because it often takes time to
resolve loss claims. Indeed, in the case of certain lines of
insurance, such as product liability or professional malpractice,
many years may elapse between the loss event and payment.
當然若是兩者能夠相等，將會是一個很令人高興的結局，因為保險業者在真正支
付給客戶理賠金之前，通常有一段時間可以將這筆錢好好地運用，因為大部分的
保單都是先向客戶收取保費，更重要的是，通常得花上一段時間才會將損失理賠
款給付出去，尤其是像產品責任險或是專門職業執行業務不當等保險，通常要花
上好幾年的時間，才能將理賠損失定案。
To oversimplify the matter somewhat, the total of the funds
prepaid by policyholders and the funds earmarked for incurred-but-
not-yet-paid claims is called "the float." In the past, the
industry was able to suffer a combined ratio of 107 to 111 and
still break even from its insurance writings because of the
earnings derived from investing this float.
再講白一點，這些保戶預付的保險費加上那些已經發生但還未理賠的資金統稱為
保險浮存金，在過去，利用這些浮存金創造投資收益，使得整個保險業即使面臨
高達107到111的綜合比率，卻依然可以維持損益兩平。
As interest rates have fallen, however, the value of float has
substantially declined. Therefore, the data that we have provided
in the past are no longer useful for year-to-year comparisons of
industry profitability. A company writing at the same combined
ratio now as in the 1980's today has a far less attractive business
than it did then.
不過隨著利率下滑，保險浮存金的價值大幅滑落，因此過去我們提供的比率已經
無法用來衡量保險業者每年的獲利狀況比較，今天一家擁有相同綜合比率的保險
公司比起1980年代來說，已無法同日而語。
Only by making an analysis that incorporates both underwriting
results and the current risk-free earnings obtainable from float
can one evaluate the true economics of the business that a
property-casualty insurer writes. Of course, the actual investment
results that an insurer achieves from the use of both float and
stockholders' funds is also of major importance and should be
carefully examined when an investor is assessing managerial
performance. But that should be a separate analysis from the one
we are discussing here. The value of float funds - in effect,
their transfer price as they move from the insurance operation to
the investment operation - should be determined simply by the risk-
free, long-term rate of interest.
我們認為只有將保險業的承保結果與保險浮存金可以獲得的無風險盈餘做分
析，才有辦法正確地評估一家產物意外險公司真正的價值，當然一家保險公司利
用其浮存金與股東資金所能創造的投資收益也相當重要，這點也是投資人在該公
司的經營表現時，必須特別注意的，只不過那需要分開另外分析，而不是我們現
在要討論的主題。事實上，保險浮存金的價值，關鍵在於其從保險營運移轉至投
資營運的轉撥價格，這點可以簡單的以長期無風險的資金利率作為標準。
On the next page we show the numbers that count in an
evaluation of Berkshire's insurance business. We calculate our
float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our
premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves
and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agent's
balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable
to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our
underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an
underwriting profit, which includes 1993, our cost of float has
been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by
adding underwriting profit to float income.
下一頁我們將會列出如何計算出Berkshire保險事業價值，首先先計算浮存金總
額-相對於我們的保費收入總額，我們的浮存金部位算是相當大的，將所有的損
失準備、損失費用調整準備與未賺取保費加總後，再扣除應付佣金、預付購併成
本及相關再保遞延費用，至於浮存金的成本則決定於所發生的承保損失或利益而
定，在某些年度由於我們有承保利益，所以換句話說，我們的資金成本甚至是負
的，此時我們的保險事業盈餘等於是由原先從浮存金獲取的利益再加上承保利
益。
(1) (2) Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term
Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds
------------ ----------- -------------- -------------
(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)
1967 profit $ 17.3 less than zero 5.50%
1968 profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%
1969 profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%
1970 $ 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%
1971 profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%
1972 profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%
1973 profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%
1974 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%
1975 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%
1976 profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%
1977 profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%
1978 profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%
1979 profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%
1980 profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%
1981 profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%
1982 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%
1983 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%
1984 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%
1985 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%
1986 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%
1987 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%
1988 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%
1989 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%
1990 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%
1991 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%
1992 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%
1993 profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%
As you can see, in our insurance operation last year we had
the use of $2.6 billion at no cost; in fact we were paid $31
million, our underwriting profit, to hold these funds. This sounds
good - is good - but is far from as good as it sounds.
大家應該看得出，去年我們保險事業的營運結果，等於是讓我們可以免費利用
26億美元的浮存金，而事實上，應該還要再加上3,100萬美元的承保利益，這
看起來相當不錯，不過實際上並沒有想像中的那麼好。
We temper our enthusiasm because we write a large volume of
"super-cat" policies (which other insurance and reinsurance
companies buy to recover part of the losses they suffer from mega-
catastrophes) and because last year we had no losses of consequence
from this activity. As that suggests, the truly catastrophic
Midwestern floods of 1993 did not trigger super-cat losses, the
reason being that very few flood policies are purchased from
private insurers.
我們試著大家冷靜一下，因為我們接下的生意其中有一大部分屬於霹靂貓保單
(這是其他保險公司或再保公司專門買來分擔他們在發生重大意外災害時，所可
能造成的損失)，同時去年這類的業務並沒有出現重大的損失，意思是說，就連
發生在1993年真正嚴重的中西部水災也沒有觸及霹靂貓損失理賠的門檻，原因
在於很少有私人保險公司會去購買水災險。
It would be fallacious, however, to conclude from this single-
year result that the super-cat business is a wonderful one, or even
a satisfactory one. A simple example will illustrate the fallacy:
Suppose there is an event that occurs 25 times in every century.
If you annually give 5-for-1 odds against its occurrence that year,
you will have many more winning years than losers. Indeed, you may
go a straight six, seven or more years without loss. You also will
eventually go broke.
這樣很容易會產生錯覺，並做出單一年度霹靂貓的成績是相當不錯且令人滿意的
一年，一個簡單的例子足以說明一切，假設每個世紀平均都會發生25次重大的
意外事件，而你每年都以以一賠五的比率賭它今年不會發生，則你賭對的年份可
能遠比賭錯的年份多出許多，甚至你有可能連續賭對六年、七年，甚至是更多年，
但我必須說，不管怎樣，到最後你一定會以破產作為結局。
At Berkshire, we naturally believe we are obtaining adequate
premiums and giving more like 3 1/2-for-1 odds. But there is no way
for us - or anyone else - to calculate the true odds on super-cat
coverages. In fact, it will take decades for us to find out
whether our underwriting judgment has been sound.
在Berkshire，我們直覺地相信我們已經收到合理的保費，以類似以一賠三又二
分之一的賭率接受賭注，當然沒有人可以真正正確地算出霹靂貓保險真正的賠
率，事實上，可能要等到幾十年後，我們才能知道當初的判斷是否正確。
What we do know is that when a loss comes, it's likely to be a
lulu. There may well be years when Berkshire will suffer losses
from the super-cat business equal to three or four times what we
earned from it in 1993. When Hurricane Andrew blew in 1992, we
paid out about $125 million. Because we've since expanded our
super-cat business, a similar storm today could cost us $600
million.
不過我們確實知道，當損失真正降臨時，鐵定是件轟動的事，以後可能會發生三
倍或四倍於我們在1993年所賺到的盈餘那樣大的意外事件，1992年Andrew
颶風發生的那次，我們總共賠了1.25億美元，時至今日由於我們已大幅擴大在
霹靂貓保險的業務量，所以同樣規模的颶風可能會造成我們六億美元左右的理賠
損失。
So far, we have been lucky in 1994. As I write this letter,
we are estimating that our losses from the Los Angeles earthquake
will be nominal. But if the quake had been a 7.5 instead of a 6.8,
it would have been a different story.
1994年到目前為止，我們還算是幸運，在我寫這封信時，我們因為洛杉磯大地
震所造成的損失還算在正常範圍之內，不過要是當時地震發生的規模不是6.8
而是7.5的話，那麼最後的結果就完全不是那麼一回事了。
Berkshire is ideally positioned to write super-cat policies.
In Ajit Jain, we have by far the best manager in this business.
Additionally, companies writing these policies need enormous
capital, and our net worth is ten to twenty times larger than that
of our main competitors. In most lines of insurance, huge
resources aren't that important: An insurer can diversify the
risks it writes and, if necessary, can lay off risks to reduce
concentration in its portfolio. That isn't possible in the super-
cat business. So these competitors are forced into offering far
smaller limits than those we can provide. Were they bolder, they
would run the risk that a mega-catastrophe - or a confluence of
smaller catastrophes - would wipe them out.
Berkshire本身很適合從事霹靂貓保險的業務，我們有業界最優秀的經理人Ajit
Jain，此外從事這行需要相當雄厚的資金實力，在這點我們公司的淨值大概是其
他主要競爭對手的10到20倍，對大部分的保險業務而言，背後所擁有的資源
還不是那麼地重要，一家保險公司可以很輕易地就把它所承擔的風險分散出去，
若有必要，也可以降低險種集中度以減低風險，但是對霹靂貓保險這種特殊的保
險就沒有辦法這樣子做，所以其他的競爭同業只能被迫降低理賠的上限來因應，
而要是他們膽敢承擔更高的風險，則一個超大型的意外災害或是連續發生幾個較
小型的災害，就有可能讓他們粉身碎骨。
One indication of our premier strength and reputation is that
each of the four largest reinsurance companies in the world buys
very significant reinsurance coverage from Berkshire. Better than
anyone else, these giants understand that the test of a reinsurer
is its ability and willingness to pay losses under trying
circumstances, not its readiness to accept premiums when things
look rosy.
有一件事情可以顯示我們超強的競爭力與卓越的聲譽，那就是全世界前四大再保
公司全部都向Berkshire投保鉅額的霹靂貓保險，這些大公司比誰都清楚，對於
再保公司來說，真正要考驗的是他們在困難的狀況下，願意且能夠支付理賠金的
能力與意願，而絕對不是在太平時期勇於接受保費收入的意願。
One caution: There has recently been a substantial increase
in reinsurance capacity. Close to $5 billion of equity capital has
been raised by reinsurers, almost all of them newly-formed
entities. Naturally these new entrants are hungry to write
business so that they can justify the projections they utilized in
attracting capital. This new competition won't affect our 1994
operations; we're filled up there, primarily with business written
in 1993. But we are now seeing signs of price deterioration. If
this trend continues, we will resign ourselves to much-reduced
volume, keeping ourselves available, though, for the large,
sophisticated buyer who requires a super-cat insurer with large
capacity and a sure ability to pay losses.
值得注意的是，近年來願意接受再保業務的供給量大幅增加，再保業者總共募集
了近50億美元的資金來進軍這類業務，且大部分都是新成立的公司，很自然的
這些新進的業者急欲承接業務以證明當初他們吸收資金時所作的預估，這些新加
入的競爭並不會影響我們1994年的營運，因為我們早已經接滿了生意，主要是
在1993年簽下的，不過我們已經看到保費價格有惡化的趨勢，如果這種情況持
續下去，我們將會大幅降低承接的業務量，但隨時準備好接下大型且複雜的保險
業者所欲尋找確定能夠理賠損失的保證。
In other areas of our insurance business, our homestate
operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business,
headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit-card operation, managed by the
Kizer family; and National Indemnity's traditional auto and general
liability business, led by Don Wurster, all achieved excellent
results. In combination, these four units produced a significant
underwriting profit and substantial float.
在我們其他保險業務方面，我們由Rod領導的住宅保險、Brad帶領的員工退休
保險以及由Kizer家族經營的信用卡保險業務，以及由Don所領導的國家產險
所從事的傳統汽車保險與一般責任險方面，總的來說，這四類業務都表現的相當
不錯，不但有承保獲利，還貢獻了相當大金額的保險浮存金。
All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though
its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an
intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount -
larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.
總而言之，我們擁有第一流的保險事業，雖然他們的經營成果變化相當的大，但
是其實質價值卻遠超過其帳面的價值，而事實上，在Berkshire其他事業的身上
也有類似的情況。
Common Stock Investments
股票投資
Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over
$250 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to
subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下表是我們超過二億五千萬美元以上的普通股投資，一部份的投資係屬於
Berkshire關係企業所持有)。
12/31/93
Shares Company Cost Market
------ ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
2,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............. $ 345,000 $1,239,000
93,400,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............... 1,023,920 4,167,975
13,654,600 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
("Freddie Mac") ................... 307,505 681,023
34,250,000 GEICO Corp. .......................... 45,713 1,759,594
4,350,000 General Dynamics Corp. ............... 94,938 401,287
24,000,000 The Gillette Company ................. 600,000 1,431,000
38,335,000 Guinness PLC ......................... 333,019 270,822
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company. ......... 9,731 440,148
6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company ................ 423,680 878,614
Considering the similarity of this year's list and the last,
you may decide your management is hopelessly comatose. But we
continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with an
interest in a business that is both understandable and durably
wonderful. Business interests of that kind are simply too hard to
replace.
看到今年所列的投資與去年竟如此的相似，你可能會認為本公司的管理階層實在
是昏庸到無可救藥的地步，不過我們還是堅持相信離開原本就熟悉且表現優異穩
定的公司，實在是非常不智之舉，這類的公司實在是還難找到更好的替代。
Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble
understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they
operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb long-
term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of
price. "Why," the CEO would ask, "should I part with my crown
jewel?" Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal
investment portfolio, will offhandedly - and even impetuously -
move from business to business when presented with no more than
superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst of
these is perhaps, "You can't go broke taking a profit." Can you
imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star
subsidiary? In our view, what makes sense in business also makes
sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece
of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner
would exhibit if he owned all of that business.
有趣的是企業經理人在認定何者才是自己本業時，從來就不會搞不清楚情況，母
公司是不會單純因為價格因素就將自己旗下最優秀的子公司給賣掉，公司總裁一
定會問，為什麼要把我皇冠上的珠寶給變賣掉，不過當場景轉換到其個人的投資
組合時，他卻又會毫不猶豫地，甚至是情急地從這家公司換到另一家公司，靠的
不過是股票經紀人膚淺的幾句話語，其中最爛的一句當屬，你不會因為獲利而破
產，你能想像要是一家公司的總裁用類似的方式建議董事會將最有潛力的子公司
給賣掉時，就我個人的觀點，適用於企業經營的原則也同樣適用於股票投資，投
資人在持有一家公司的股票所展現的韌性應當與一家公司的老闆持有公司全部
的股權一樣。
Earlier I mentioned the financial results that could have been
achieved by investing $40 in The Coca-Cola Co. in 1919. In 1938,
more than 50 years after the introduction of Coke, and long after
the drink was firmly established as an American icon, Fortune did
an excellent story on the company. In the second paragraph the
writer reported: "Several times every year a weighty and serious
investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca-Cola's
record, but comes regretfully to the conclusion that he is looking
too late. The specters of saturation and competition rise before
him."
先前我曾經提到若是在1919年以40美元投資可口可樂會獲得怎樣的成果，
1938年在可樂問世達50年且早已成為代表美國的產品之後，財富雜誌對該公
司做了一次詳盡的專訪，在文章的第二段作者寫到：每年都會有許多重量型的投
資人看好可口可樂，並對於其過去的輝煌記錄表示敬意，但也都做下自己太晚發
現的結論，認為該公司已達巔峰，前方的道路充滿了競爭與挑戰。
Yes, competition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well. But
it's worth noting that in 1938 The Coca-Cola Co. sold 207 million
cases of soft drinks (if its gallonage then is converted into the
192-ounce cases used for measurement today) and in 1993 it sold
about 10.7 billion cases, a 50-fold increase in physical volume
from a company that in 1938 was already dominant in its very major
industry. Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor: Though
the $40 invested in 1919 in one share had (with dividends
reinvested) turned into $3,277 by the end of 1938, a fresh $40 then
invested in Coca-Cola stock would have grown to $25,000 by yearend
1993.
沒錯，1938年確實充滿了競爭，而1993年也是，不過值得注意的是1938年
可口可樂一年總共賣出二億箱的飲料(若是將當時加侖裝改成現在192盎斯的箱
子)，但是到了1993年該公司一年賣出飲料高達107億箱，對這家當時已經成
為市場領導者的公司，在後來將近50的期間總共又成長了50倍，對於1938
年加入的投資者來說，Party根本還沒有結束，雖然在1919年投資40美元在
可口可樂股票的投資人(含將所收到的股利再投資)，到了1938年可獲得3,277
美元，但是若是在1938年重新以40美元投資可口可樂股票，時至1993年底，
還是照樣可以成長到25,000美元。
I can't resist one more quote from that 1938 Fortune story:
"It would be hard to name any company comparable in size to Coca-
Cola and selling, as Coca-Cola does, an unchanged product that can
point to a ten-year record anything like Coca-Cola's." In the 55
years that have since passed, Coke's product line has broadened
somewhat, but it's remarkable how well that description still fits.
我忍不住想要在引用1938年財富雜誌的報導，「實在是很難在找到像可口可樂
這樣規模而且又能持續十年保持不變的產品內容」，如今又過了55個年頭，可
口可樂的產品線雖然變得更廣泛，但令人印象深刻的是這種形容詞還依舊適用。
Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime
it's just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That
judgment became ever more compelling as Berkshire's capital
mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly
affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted a
strategy that required our being smart - and not too smart at that
- only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one good
idea a year. (Charlie says it's my turn.)
查理跟我老早以前便明瞭要一個人的投資生涯中，做出上百個小一點投資決策是
件很辛苦的一件事，這種想法隨著Berkshire資金規模日益擴大而益形明顯，而
放眼投資世界中，可以大幅影響本公司投資成效的機會已越來越少，因此我們決
定採取一種只要求自己在少數的時候夠聰明就好，而不是每回都要非常的聰明，
所以我們現在只要求每年出現一次好的投資主意就可以了，(查理提醒我今年該
輪到我)。
The strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard
diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the
strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional
investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio
concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should,
both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business
and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics
before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk,
using dictionary terms, as "the possibility of loss or injury."
我們採取的這種策略排除了依照普通分散風險的教條，許多學者便會言之鑿鑿說
我們這種策略比起一般傳統的投資風險要高的許多，這點我們不敢苟同，我們相
信集中持股的做法同樣可以大幅降低風險，只要投資人在買進股份之前，能夠加
強本身對於企業的認知以及對於競爭能力熟悉的程度，在這裡我們將風險定義，
與一般字典裡的一樣，係指損失或受傷的可能性。
Academics, however, like to define investment "risk"
differently, averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock
or portfolio of stocks - that is, their volatility as compared to
that of a large universe of stocks. Employing data bases and
statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the
"beta" of a stock - its relative volatility in the past - and then
build arcane investment and capital-allocation theories around this
calculation. In their hunger for a single statistic to measure
risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle: It is better
to be approximately right than precisely wrong.
然而在學術界，卻喜歡將投資的風險給予不同的定義，堅持把它當作是股票價格
相對波動的程度，也就是個別投資相較於全體投資波動的幅度，運用資料庫與統
計方法，這些學者能夠計算出一隻股票"精確"的Beta值，代表其過去相對波動
的幅度，然後根據這項公式建立一套晦澀難解的投資與資金分配理論，為了渴望
找出可以衡量風險的單一統計值，但他們卻忘了一項基本的原則，寧願大概對，
也不要完全錯。
For owners of a business - and that's the way we think of
shareholders - the academics' definition of risk is far off the
mark, so much so that it produces absurdities. For example, under
beta-based theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared
to the market - as had Washington Post when we bought it in 1973 -
becomes "riskier" at the lower price than it was at the higher
price. Would that description have then made any sense to someone
who was offered the entire company at a vastly-reduced price?
對於企業的所有權人來說，這是我們認為公司股東應該有的想法，學術界對於風
險的定義實在是有點離譜，甚至於有點荒謬，舉例來說，根據Beta理論，若是
有一種股票的價格相對於大盤下跌的幅度更高，就像是我們在1973年買進華盛
頓郵報股份時一樣，那麼其風險遠比原來高股價時還要更高，那麼要是哪天有人
願意以極低的價格把整家公司賣給你時，你是否也會認為這樣的風險太高，而予
以拒絕呢?
In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham
explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor. There he
introduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who shows up every day
to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish. The
more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities
available to the investor. That's true because a wildly
fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will
periodically be attached to solid businesses. It is impossible to
see how the availability of such prices can be thought of as
increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to
either ignore the market or exploit its folly.
事實上，真正的投資人喜歡波動都還來不及，班哲明．葛拉漢在智慧型投資人一
書的第八章便有所解釋，他引用了市場先生理論，市場先生每天都會出現在你面
前，只要你願意都可以從他那裡買進或賣出你的投資，只要他老兄越沮喪，投資
人擁有的機會也就越多，這是由於只要市場波動的幅度越大，一些超低的價格就
更有機會會出現在一些好公司身上，很難想像這種低價的優惠會被投資人視為對
其有害，對於投資人來說，你完全可以無視於他的存在或是好好地利用這種愚蠢
的行為。
In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a
company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much
borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer not to
know the company's name. What he treasures is the price history of
its stock. In contrast, we'll happily forgo knowing the price
history and instead will seek whatever information will further our
understanding of the company's business. After we buy a stock,
consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a
year or two. We don't need a daily quote on our 100% position in
See's or H. H. Brown to validate our well-being. Why, then, should
we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke?
在評估風險時，Beta理論學者根本就不屑於了解這家公司到底是在做什麼，他
的競爭對手在幹嘛，或是他們到底借了多少錢來營運，他們甚至不願意知道公司
的名字叫什麼，他們在乎的只是這家公司的歷史股價，相對地，我們很願意不管
這家公司過去股價的歷史，反而希望盡量能夠得到有助於我們了解這家公司的資
訊，另外在我們買進股份之後，我們一點也不在意這家公司的股份在未來的一、
兩年內是否有交易，就像是我們根本就不需要持有100%股權的喜斯糖果或是布
朗鞋業的股票報價來證明我們的權益是否存在，同樣地我們也不需要持有7%的
可口可樂每日的股票行情。
In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is
whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment
(including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective
holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he
had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial
stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering
precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy
that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation
are:
我們認為投資人應該真正評估的風險是他們從一項投資在其預計持有的期間內
所收到的稅後收入加總(也包含出售股份所得)，是否能夠讓他保有原來投資時擁
有的購買力，再加上合理的利率，雖然這樣的風險無法做到像工程般的精確，但
它至少可以做到足以做出有效判斷的的程度，在做評估時主要的因素有下列幾
點︰
1) The certainty with which the long-term economic
characteristics of the business can be evaluated;
1)這家公司長期競爭能力可以衡量的程度
2) The certainty with which management can be evaluated,
both as to its ability to realize the full potential of
the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;
2)這家公司管理階層發揮公司潛能以及有效運用現金可以衡量的程度
3) The certainty with which management can be counted on
to channel the rewards from the business to the
shareholders rather than to itself;
3)這家公司管理階層將企業獲得的利益確實回報給股東而非中飽私囊可
以衡量的程度
4) The purchase price of the business;
4)買進這家企業的價格
5) The levels of taxation and inflation that will be
experienced and that will determine the degree by which
an investor's purchasing-power return is reduced from his
gross return.
5)投資人的淨購買力所得，須考慮稅負與通貨膨脹等因素必須從投資收
益總額中扣除的部份
These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably
fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind.
But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not
negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as Justice
Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but
nevertheless asserted, "I know it when I see it," so also can
investors - in an inexact but useful way - "see" the risks inherent
in certain investments without reference to complex equations or
price histories.
這些因素對於許多分析師來說，可能是丈二金剛摸不著頭腦，因為他們根本無法
從現有的資料庫中找到這些資訊，但是取得這些精確數字的難度高並不代表他們
就不重要或是無法克服，就像是司法正義一樣，Stewart法官發現他根本無法找
到何謂猥褻的標準，不過他還是堅稱，只要我一看到就知道是不是，同樣地對於
投資人來說，不需靠精確的公式或是股價歷史，而只要運用不太精確但卻有用的
方式，就可以看到潛藏在某些投資裡的風險。
Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and
Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than,
say, any computer company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about
44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in
value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum, in which
Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in
which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.
就長期而言，可口可樂與吉列所面臨的產業風險，要比任何電腦公司或是通路商
或小得多，可口可樂佔全世界飲料銷售量的44%，吉列則擁有60%的刮鬍刀市
場佔有率(以銷售額計)，除了稱霸口香糖的箭牌公司之外，我看不出還有那家公
司可以像他們一樣長期以來享有傲視全球的競爭力。
Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their
worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their
brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of
their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive
advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic
castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily
without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks
of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a
warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."
更重要的，可口可樂與吉列近年來也確實一點一滴地在增加他們全球市場的佔有
率，品牌的力量、產品的特質與配銷通路的優勢，使得他們擁有超強的競爭力，
就像是樹立起高聳的護城河來保衛其經濟城堡，相對的，一般公司卻要每天耗盡
心思去打沒有意義的游擊戰，就像是彼得．林區所說的，對於那些只會銷售量販
式產品的公司來說，大家應該在其股票上加印這句警語-「競爭可能有害於人類
的利益」。
The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to
even the casual observer of business. Yet the beta of their stocks
is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who
possess little or no competitive advantage. Should we conclude
from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and
Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured?
Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a company
- its stock - is somehow divorced from the long-term risk inherent
in its business operations? We believe neither conclusion makes
sense and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no
sense.
可口可樂與吉列的競爭力在一般產業觀察家眼中實在是顯而易見的，然而其股票
的Beta值卻與一般平庸、完全沒有競爭優勢的公司相似，難道只因為這樣我們
就該認為在衡量公司所面臨的產業風險時，完全不須考慮他們所享有的競爭優勢
嗎? 或者就可以說持有一家公司部份所有權-也就是股票的風險，與公司長期所
面臨的營運風險一點關係都沒有，我們認為這些說法，包含衡量投資風險的Beta
公式在內，一點道理都沒有。
The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for
differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product toy
company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy
company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's quite
possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they
have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the
factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness.
Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining
himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably
intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment
risks with a useful degree of accuracy.
Beta學者所架構的理論根本就沒有能力去分辨，銷售寵物玩具或呼拉圈的玩具
公司與銷售大富翁或芭比娃娃的玩具公司，所隱藏的風險有何不同? 但對一般普
通的投資人來說，只要他略懂得消費者行為以及形成企業長期競爭優勢或弱勢的
原因的話，就可以很明確的看出兩者的差別，當然每個投資人都會犯錯，但只要
將自己集中在相對少數，容易了解的投資個案上，一個理性、知性與耐性兼具的
投資人一定能夠將投資風險限定在可接受的範圍之內。
In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine
whether we are dealing with a "pet rock" or a "Barbie." We
couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend
years intensely studying those industries. Sometimes our own
intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding,
and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the
roadblock. For example, a business that must deal with fast-moving
technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of
its long-term economics. Did we foresee thirty years ago what
would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer
industries? Of course not. (Nor did most of the investors and
corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.)
Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict the
future of other rapidly-evolving businesses? We'll stick instead
with the easy cases. Why search for a needle buried in a haystack
when one is sitting in plain sight?
當然有許多產業，連查理或是我可能都無法判斷到底我們在玩的是寵物玩具或芭
比娃娃，甚至在花了許多年時間努力的研究這些產業之後，我們還是無法解決這
個問題，有時是因為我們本身智識上的缺陷，阻礙了我們對事情的了解，有時則
是因為產業特性的關係，例如對於一家隨時都比須面臨快速變遷技術的公司來
說，我們根本就無法對其長期的競爭力做出任何的評斷，人類在三十年前，是否
就能預知現在電視製造或電腦產業的演進，當然不能，就算是大部分鑽研於這方
面領域的投資人與企業經理人也沒有辦法，那麼為什麼查理跟我要覺得應該要有
去預測其他產業快速變遷前景的能力呢? 我們寧願挑些簡單一點的，一個人坐的
舒舒服服就好了，為什麼還要費事去挨稻草裡的針呢?
Of course, some investment strategies - for instance, our
efforts in arbitrage over the years - require wide diversification.
If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk
should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually-
independent commitments. Thus, you may consciously purchase a
risky investment - one that indeed has a significant possibility of
causing loss or injury - if you believe that your gain, weighted
for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably
weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar, but
unrelated opportunities. Most venture capitalists employ this
strategy. Should you choose to pursue this course, you should
adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which
will want to see lots of action because it is favored by
probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single, huge bet.
當然，有些投資策略，例如我們從事多年的套利活動，就必須將風險分散，若是
單一交易的風險過高，就比須將資源分散到幾個各自獨立的個案之上，如此一
來，雖然每個個案都有可能導致損失或傷害，但只要你確信每個獨立的個案經過
機率的加權平均能夠讓你獲致滿意的報酬就行了，許多創業投資者用的就是這種
方法，若是你也打算這樣做的話，記得採取與賭場老闆搞輪盤遊戲同樣的心態，
那就是鼓勵大家持續不斷的下注，因為長期而言，機率對莊家有利，但千萬要拒
絕單一一次的大賭注。
Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when
an investor who does not understand the economics of specific
businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a long-
term owner of American industry. That investor should both own a
large number of equities and space out his purchases. By
periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the know-
nothing investor can actually out-perform most investment
professionals. Paradoxically, when "dumb" money acknowledges its
limitations, it ceases to be dumb.
另外一種需要分散風險的特殊情況是，當投資人並沒有對任何單一產業有特別的
熟悉，不過他卻對美國整體產業前景有信心，則這類的投資人應該分散持有許多
公司的股份，同時將投入的時點拉長，例如，透過定期投資指數基金，一個什麼
都不懂的投資人通常都能打敗大部分的專業經理人，很奇怪的是，當愚昧的金錢
了解到自己的極限之後，它就不再愚昧了。
On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able
to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly-
priced companies that possess important long-term competitive
advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you.
It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I
cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money
into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding
that money to his top choices - the businesses he understands best
and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit
potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: "Too much of a
good thing can be wonderful."
另一方面，若是你是稍具常識的投資人，能夠了解產業經濟的話，應該就能夠找
出五到十家股價合理並享有長期競爭優勢的公司，此時一般分散風險的理論對你
來說就一點意義也沒有，要是那樣做反而會傷害到你的投資成果並增加你的風
險，我實在不了解那些投資人為什麼要把錢擺在他排名第20的股票上，而不是
把錢集中在排名最前面，最熟悉了解同時風險最小，獲利可能最大的投資之上，
或許這就是先知梅西衛斯特所說的，「好事物越多，就越完美」。
Corporate Governance
企業治理
At our annual meetings, someone usually asks "What happens to
this place if you get hit by a truck?" I'm glad they are still
asking the question in this form. It won't be too long before the
query becomes: "What happens to this place if you don't get hit by
a truck?"
在年度的股東會上，有人常常會問︰「要是那天你不幸被車撞到，該怎麼辦?」
我只能說很慶幸他們還是在問這樣的問題，而不是「要是那天你不被車撞到，我
們該怎麼辦?」。
Such questions, in any event, raise a reason for me to discuss
corporate governance, a hot topic during the past year. In
general, I believe that directors have stiffened their spines
recently and that shareholders are now being treated somewhat more
like true owners than was the case not long ago. Commentators on
corporate governance, however, seldom make any distinction among
three fundamentally different manager/owner situations that exist
in publicly-held companies. Though the legal responsibility of
directors is identical throughout, their ability to effect change
differs in each of the cases. Attention usually falls on the first
case, because it prevails on the corporate scene. Since Berkshire
falls into the second category, however, and will someday fall into
the third, we will discuss all three variations.
這樣的問題讓我有機會談談近年來相當熱門的話題-公司治理，首先我相信最近
許多公司的董事們已開始試著把他們的腰桿打直，而現在的投資人比起以前來
說，也慢慢地被公司當作真正的擁有人來對待，但是評論專家並沒有仔細地去區
別目前公開上市公司三種截然不同的經營權與所有權形態，雖然在法律上，董事
們應該承擔的責任是責無旁貸的，但他們能發揮影響力進行改變的程度卻有很大
的不同，大家通常都把注意力擺在第一類的案例之上，因為這是目前一般企業的
常態，但由於Berkshire本身是屬於第二類，甚至有一天會變成第三類，所以在
這裡我們有必要討論一下三者的不同。
The first, and by far most common, board situation is one in
which a corporation has no controlling shareholder. In that case,
I believe directors should behave as if there is a single absentee
owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further in all
proper ways. Unfortunately, "long-term" gives directors a lot of
wiggle room. If they lack either integrity or the ability to think
independently, directors can do great violence to shareholders
while still claiming to be acting in their long-term interest. But
assume the board is functioning well and must deal with a
management that is mediocre or worse. Directors then have the
responsibility for changing that management, just as an intelligent
owner would do if he were present. And if able but greedy managers
over-reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders'
pockets, directors must slap their hands.
首先是第一類，也是目前最普遍的一類，在公司的股權結構中，並沒有一個具掌
控能力的大股東，在這種情況下，我相信董事會的行為應該要像是公司有一個因
事未出席的大股東一樣，在各種情況下，都要能夠確保這位虛擬大股東的長期利
益不會受到損害，然而很不幸的是，所謂的長期利益，反而給了董事會很大的彈
性操作空間，而假設董事會運作尚稱順暢，不過經營階層卻很平庸甚至差勁時，
那麼董事會就必須負起責任將經營階層換掉，就好像一般公司老闆會做的決定一
樣，另外要是經營階層能力尚可，只不過過於貪心，不時地想要從股東的口袋裡
撈錢，那麼董事會就必須適時地出手制止並給予警告。
In this plain-vanilla case, a director who sees something he
doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his
views. If he is successful, the board will have the muscle to make
the appropriate change. Suppose, though, that the unhappy director
can't get other directors to agree with him. He should then feel
free to make his views known to the absentee owners. Directors
seldom do that, of course. The temperament of many directors would
in fact be incompatible with critical behavior of that sort. But I
see nothing improper in such actions, assuming the issues are
serious. Naturally, the complaining director can expect a vigorous
rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors, a prospect that should
discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non-rational
causes.
在這種一般常見的情況下，當個別董事發覺有不合理的現象時，應該試著說服其
他董事有關他的看法，若能夠成功，那麼董事會就有能力做出適當的決定，但是
假設要是這位落寞的董事孤掌難鳴，無法獲得其他董事的支持，那麼他就應該要
讓沒能出席的股東知道他的看法，當然很少有董事真的這樣做，很多的董事事實
上並沒有足夠的膽識敢做這樣大膽的動作，但我卻認為這樣的舉動並沒有什麼不
妥，當然假設問題真的很嚴重的話，自然而然發出不平之鳴的董事一定會遭到其
他不認同看法的董事嚴正的駁斥，認為反對的董事不要在枝微末節或是非理性的
原因上搗亂。
For the boards just discussed, I believe the directors ought
to be relatively few in number - say, ten or less - and ought to
come mostly from the outside. The outside board members should
establish standards for the CEO's performance and should also
periodically meet, without his being present, to evaluate his
performance against those standards.
對於前述討論的董事會形態，我認為董事的人數不必太多，最好是十個以內，同
時大部分成員應該從外部遴選，而外部董事應該要能夠建立對CEO表現的評核
制度，並定期聚會，在CEO不在場的情況下，依據這些原則評斷其表現。
The requisites for board membership should be business savvy,
interest in the job, and owner-orientation. Too often, directors
are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity to
the board. That practice is a mistake. Furthermore, mistakes in
selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments
are so hard to undo: The pleasant but vacuous director need never
worry about job security.
至於董事會成員遴選的條件，並須具備商業經驗、對這項角色有興趣同時以股東
利益為導向，只是目前大部分被遴選出來的董事，大多是因為他們的社會地位或
只是為了增加董事會成員的多樣化，這樣的做法是錯誤的，更有甚至，這種錯誤
還有後遺症，因為董事被任命之後就很難再加以撤消，好說話且沒有意見的董事
是不怕找不到位置的。
The second case is that existing at Berkshire, where the
controlling owner is also the manager. At some companies, this
arrangement is facilitated by the existence of two classes of stock
endowed with disproportionate voting power. In these situations,
it's obvious that the board does not act as an agent between owners
and management and that the directors cannot effect chang，e except
through persuasion. Therefore, if the owner/manager is mediocre or
worse - or is over-reaching - there is little a director can do
about it except object. If the directors having no connections to
the owner/manager make a unified argument, it may well have some
effect. More likely it will not.
第二種就像是發生在Berkshire的，具控制權的大股東本身也是經營階層，在某
些公司，經過特殊的安排，將公司的股權按投票權重的不同分成兩類，也會產生
這種情況，在這種情況下，很明顯的董事會並非所有權人與經營階層之間的中
介，且除非經由勸說，否則董事會很難發揮改變的影響力，也因此要是老闆經營
者本身的能力平庸或很差勁或不顧他人，則董事除了表示反對以外，別無他法，
而要是與老闆經營者沒有關係的董事碰巧做出相同的結論，有時或許還有用，但
大部分的狀況下是無濟於事的。
If change does not come, and the matter is sufficiently
serious, the outside directors should resign. Their resignation
will signal their doubts about management, and it will emphasize
that no outsider is in a position to correct the owner/manager's
shortcomings.
而要是公司無法做出改變，且情況演變的很嚴重時，外部董事就應該要辭職，外
部董事的辭職等於是對現有的經營階層投下反對票，同時凸顯外部董事沒有能力
糾正老闆經營者缺失的現象。
The third governance case occurs when there is a controlling
owner who is not involved in management. This case, examples of
which are Hershey Foods and Dow Jones, puts the outside directors
in a potentially useful position. If they become unhappy with
either the competence or integrity of the manager, they can go
directly to the owner (who may also be on the board) and report
their dissatisfaction. This situation is ideal for an outside
director, since he need make his case only to a single, presumably
interested owner, who can forthwith effect change if the argument
is persuasive. Even so, the dissatisfied director has only that
single course of action. If he remains unsatisfied about a
critical matter, he has no choice but to resign.
第三種情況是公司擁有具控制權的大股東，但卻不參與公司經營，這種特殊個案
在現實社會中有Hershey食品與道瓊公司等例子，公司能夠充分運用外部董事
的能力，若是董事們對於經營階層的能力或品格感到不滿意，他們可以直接向大
股東反應(當然大股東可能也是董事成員)，這種環境相當適合外部董事的發揮，
因為他只需要將情況向單一且關心公司前景的所有權人報告，同時只要論點理由
充分就可以馬上發揮改變的效果，但即便如此，有意見的董事也只能有這樣的選
擇管道，若是他對於特定事情的處理結果不滿意，他還是只能辭職而別無其他選
擇。
Logically, the third case should be the most effective in
insuring first-class management. In the second case the owner is
not going to fire himself, and in the first case, directors often
find it very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild over-
reaching. Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority of
the board - an awkward social and logistical task, particularly if
management's behavior is merely odious, not egregious - their hands
are effectively tied. In practice, directors trapped in situations
of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying around
they can do at least some good. Meanwhile, management proceeds
unfettered.
理論上，第三種情況最能夠確保一流的經營階層存在，因為第二種情況，老闆不
可能把自己給Fire掉，而第一種情況，董事們通常很難與表現平庸又難以駕馭
的經理人打交道，而除非那些有意見的董事能夠獲得董事會多數的支持，這是一
件很困難的協調溝通任務，尤其是經營階層的表現雖然可恨但卻罪不至死的時
候，基本上他們的手腳是被綁的死死的，實務上，面臨這種現象的董事通常會說
服自己留在董事會，至少還能有所圖，但在此同時，經營階層卻還是同樣可以為
所欲為。
In the third case, the owner is neither judging himself nor
burdened with the problem of garnering a majority. He can also
insure that outside directors are selected who will bring useful
qualities to the board. These directors, in turn, will know that
the good advice they give will reach the right ears, rather than
being stifled by a recalcitrant management. If the controlling
owner is intelligent and self-confident, he will make decisions in
respect to management that are meritocratic and pro-shareholder.
Moreover - and this is critically important - he can readily
correct any mistake he makes.
在第三種情況下，老闆本身不必衡量自己的表現也不必費心去取得多數人的支
持，同時他也可以確保所遴選出來的外部董事將可對董事會的素質有所提升，而
這些被選中的董事，也可以確定所提出的建議會真正被聽進去，而不是被消極抵
制的經營階層當作是耳邊風，而若是大股東本身夠聰明且有自信，那麼他就能夠
找到以股東利益為優先的菁英經理人，還有一點更重要的是，他能夠隨時準備改
正本身所犯的錯誤。
At Berkshire we operate in the second mode now and will for as
long as I remain functional. My health, let me add, is excellent.
For better or worse, you are likely to have me as an owner/manager
for some time.
在Berkshire，我們現在是以第二種情況在做營運，而且在我有生之年都會是如
此，至於我個人的健康狀況，我必須要強調，實在是好極了，不管是好或壞，大
家都必須繼續接受我擔任大股東兼經營者。
After my death, all of my stock will go to my wife, Susie,
should she survive me, or to a foundation if she dies before I do.
In neither case will taxes and bequests require the sale of
consequential amounts of stock.
直到我死後，我擁有的所有股份將會歸我內人Susie擁有，要是她比我長壽的
話，不過要是她比我早死，所有的股份將會捐給一個基金會，且不論如何都不會
因為遺產或贈與稅而必須被迫出售相當的股份。
When my stock is transferred to either my wife or the
foundation, Berkshire will enter the third governance mode, going
forward with a vitally interested, but non-management, owner and
with a management that must perform for that owner. In preparation
for that time, Susie was elected to the board a few years ago, and
in 1993 our son, Howard, joined the board. These family members
will not be managers of the company in the future, but they will
represent the controlling interest should anything happen to me.
Most of our other directors are also significant owners of
Berkshire stock, and each has a strong owner-orientation. All in
all, we're prepared for "the truck."
而當我的股份移轉到我內人或是基金會之後，Berkshire將會進入第三種公司治
理情況，變成一個關心公司但卻不參與經營的大股東搭配完全為股東設想的經理
人，為了預先做準備，Susie在幾年前已經被選為公司的董事，而1993年我的
兒子豪爾也緊接著加入董事會，這些家族成員以後將不會擔任公司的經理人，但
要是萬一我不在時，他們將繼承控制公司的權力，當然公司其他的董事本身也都
是主要的股東，且皆有很強的股東利益導向，總而言之，對於那輛卡車可能到來，
我們已經作好了準備。
Shareholder-Designated Contributions
股東指定捐贈計畫
About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's
1993 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions
made through the program were $9.4 million and 3,110 charities were
recipients.
大約有97%的有效股權參與1993年的股東指定捐贈計劃，總計約940萬美
元捐出的款項分配給3,110家慈善機構。
Berkshire's practice in respect to discretionary philanthropy
- as contrasted to its policies regarding contributions that are
clearly related to the company's business activities - differs
significantly from that of other publicly-held corporations.
There, most corporate contributions are made pursuant to the wishes
of the CEO (who often will be responding to social pressures),
employees (through matching gifts), or directors (through matching
gifts or requests they make of the CEO).
Berkshire在自由樂捐方面的做法，(不同於具有特定商業目的的捐贈)，與其他
公開上市公司的做法有很大的不同，因為大部分的公司所作的捐贈大多是依照
CEO的意願(他們通常背負許多社會壓力)，員工(透過相對贈與)或董事(透過相對
贈與或是對於CEO的要求)。
At Berkshire, we believe that the company's money is the
owners' money, just as it would be in a closely-held corporation,
partnership, or sole proprietorship. Therefore, if funds are to be
given to causes unrelated to Berkshire's business activities, it is
the charities favored by our owners that should receive them.
We've yet to find a CEO who believes he should personally fund the
charities favored by his shareholders. Why, then, should they foot
the bill for his picks?
不過在Berkshire我們相信公司所有的錢都是屬於股東的，就像是在私人家族合
夥企業一樣，因此只要這些捐贈資金與公司本身商業活動無關的話，那麼就應該
要由股東們所想要贈與的慈善機構收到這些款項，就像是我們還沒看到過有
CEO願意拿自己的錢，依照股東們的意願進行樂捐，那麼又有什麼理由，讓股
東為公司的CEO買單呢?
Let me add that our program is easy to administer. Last fall,
for two months, we borrowed one person from National Indemnity to
help us implement the instructions that came from our 7,500
registered shareholders. I'd guess that the average corporate
program in which employee gifts are matched incurs far greater
administrative costs. Indeed, our entire corporate overhead is
less than half the size of our charitable contributions. (Charlie,
however, insists that I tell you that $1.4 million of our $4.9 million
overhead is attributable to our corporate jet, The Indefensible.)
而我必須說明的是我們這項計畫執行起來並不困難，去年秋天，我們從國家產險
公司借調一個人為期兩個月，幫我們處理來自7,500位股東的捐款指示，而我
也相信其他公司花在處理相同捐贈規模所發生的成本鐵定比我們高出許多，事實
上，我們公司每年所有的行政費用甚至不到我們每年捐贈金額的一半，(查理堅
持我必須向大家報告，總計490萬美元的營業費用當中，有140萬是發生在公
司的企業專機-無可辯解號之上)。
Below is a list showing the largest categories to which our
shareholders have steered their contributions.
(a) 347 churches and synagogues received 569 gifts
(b) 283 colleges and universities received 670 gifts
(c) 244 K-12 schools (about two-thirds secular, one-
third religious) received 525 gifts
(d) 288 institutions dedicated to art, culture or the
humanities received 447 gifts
(e) 180 religious social-service organizations (split
about equally between Christian and Jewish) received
411 gifts
(f) 445 secular social-service organizations (about 40%
youth-related) received 759 gifts
(g) 153 hospitals received 261 gifts
(h) 186 health-related organizations (American Heart
Association, American Cancer Society, etc.) received
320 gifts
下表顯示股東指定捐贈的前十大慈善機構
(a)347個教堂與猶太教堂收到569筆善款
(b)283所大專院校收到670筆善款
(c)244所K-12學校收到525筆善款(三分之二是普通學校，另外三分之一屬教會學校)
(d)288所藝術、文化或人類學研究機構收到447筆善款
(e)180所宗教性社福機構(猶太教與基督教各半)收到411筆善款
(f)445所民間社福機構(其中四成與青少年相關)收到759筆善款
(g)153所醫療機構收到261筆善款
(h)186所與醫療相關的機構(如美國心臟學會，美國癌症協會等) 收到320筆善款
Three things about this list seem particularly interesting to
me. First, to some degree it indicates what people choose to give
money to when they are acting of their own accord, free of pressure
from solicitors or emotional appeals from charities. Second, the
contributions programs of publicly-held companies almost never
allow gifts to churches and synagogues, yet clearly these
institutions are what many shareholders would like to support.
Third, the gifts made by our shareholders display conflicting
philosophies: 130 gifts were directed to organizations that
believe in making abortions readily available for women and 30
gifts were directed to organizations (other than churches) that
discourage or are opposed to abortion.
在這之中，有三點我認為特別有趣，首先，某種程度可以顯示出當人們係依個人
意志而非迫於募款人的壓力或募款機構感性的訴求時，所可能做出的選擇，第
二，一般大公司的捐贈計畫從未將教堂或猶太教堂列入考慮，但這卻是股東心目
中最佳的選擇之一，第三，股東們所做出的決定有時有明顯的衝突，有130筆
捐款給支持墮胎的機構團體，而另外有30筆的捐款指定要給反墮胎的機構團體
(扣除宗教機構不算)。
Last year I told you that I was thinking of raising the amount
that Berkshire shareholders can give under our designated-
contributions program and asked for your comments. We received a
few well-written letters opposing the entire idea, on the grounds
that it was our job to run the business and not our job to force
shareholders into making charitable gifts. Most of the
shareholders responding, however, noted the tax efficiency of the
plan and urged us to increase the designated amount. Several
shareholders who have given stock to their children or
grandchildren told me that they consider the program a particularly
good way to get youngsters thinking at an early age about the
subject of giving. These people, in other words, perceive the
program to be an educational, as well as philanthropic, tool. The
bottom line is that we did raise the amount in 1993, from $8 per
share to $10.
去年我曾經告訴大家我考慮提高Berkshire股東指定捐贈計畫的額度，並詢問大
家的意見，不過我們卻收到一些股東來信反對整個計畫，他們認為我們的責任是
將公司經營好而不是去強迫股東做一些慈善捐贈，當然大部分的股東還是支持這
項計畫，認為這種做法可以享受租稅優惠，並敦促我們提高捐贈的額度，有好幾
位把部份股份移轉給子女或孫子女的股東告訴我，他們認為這是讓下一代了解施
比受有福最好的教育方法，因此最後我們還是決定將下限從每股8美元提高到
每股10元。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that
Berkshire distributes, our operating businesses make contributions,
including merchandise, averaging about $2.5 million annually.
These contributions support local charities, such as The United
Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.
Berkshire除了透過股東指定捐贈計畫對外捐贈之外，我們旗下事業的經理人每
年也會透過公司對外捐贈，包含商品在內每年平均金額約在250萬美元左右。
這些捐贈主要是贊助當地像是聯合勸募等慈善團體，所得的效益應該與我們所捐
出的相當。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages
50-51. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your
shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the
nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so
registered on August 31, 1994 will be ineligible for the 1994
program.
我們敦促新加入的股東，仔細閱讀年報上有關股東捐贈計畫的詳細內容，如果在
未來年度內，你想要參加這類的計畫，我們強烈建議你將股份登記在自己而不是
受託人的名下，必須在1994年8月31日之前完成登記，才有權利參與1994
年的捐贈計畫。
A Few Personal Items
幾件私人事務
Mrs. B - Rose Blumkin - had her 100th birthday on December 3,
1993. (The candles cost more than the cake.) That was a day on
which the store was scheduled to be open in the evening. Mrs. B,
who works seven days a week, for however many hours the store
operates, found the proper decision quite obvious: She simply
postponed her party until an evening when the store was closed.
B太太在12月3日渡過她100歲的生日，(光是蠟燭錢就比蛋糕還貴)，本來當
天傢具店預計營業到晚上，對於每週工作七天的B太太來說，二話不說，等到晚
上店關門之後，才開始她的生日宴會。
Mrs. B's story is well-known but worth telling again. She
came to the United States 77 years ago, unable to speak English and
devoid of formal schooling. In 1937, she founded the Nebraska
Furniture Mart with $500. Last year the store had sales of $200
million, a larger amount by far than that recorded by any other
home furnishings store in the United States. Our part in all of
this began ten years ago when Mrs. B sold control of the business
to Berkshire Hathaway, a deal we completed without obtaining
audited financial statements, checking real estate records, or
getting any warranties. In short, her word was good enough for us.
雖然B太太的傳奇故事已廣為人知，但我還是不厭其煩地再說一次，77年前她
逃到美國來，不會說英文也沒有受過正式的教育，1937年她以500美元創立
內布拉斯加傢具店，截至去年該店的年營業額達到2億美元，遠遠超過全美其
他單一傢具店的業績，我們與她的關係肇始於十年前，B太太將大部分的股權賣
給Berkshire，當然雙方既沒有看會計師的財務報表、也沒有對房地產權狀或是
提供任何保證，簡而言之，B太太的一諾值千金。
Naturally, I was delighted to attend Mrs. B's birthday party.
After all, she's promised to attend my 100th.
當然我很高興能受邀參加她100歲的生日宴會，另外她還答應以後要來參加我
100歲的生日宴會。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Katharine Graham retired last year as the chairman of The
Washington Post Company, having relinquished the CEO title three
years ago. In 1973, we purchased our stock in her company for
about $10 million. Our holding now garners $7 million a year in
dividends and is worth over $400 million. At the time of our
purchase, we knew that the economic prospects of the company were
good. But equally important, Charlie and I concluded that Kay
would prove to be an outstanding manager and would treat all
shareholders honorably. That latter consideration was particularly
important because The Washington Post Company has two classes of
stock, a structure that we've seen some managers abuse.
華盛頓郵報的發行人-凱薩琳葛蘭姆女士在去年決定正式退休，1973年我們斥
資1,000萬美元買進她公司的股份，時至今日我們每年從該公司取得700萬美
元的股利，而持有股票的市值已超過4億美元，當初在決定買進該公司的股份
時，我們便看好該公司的前景，但另外一點同樣重要的是，查理跟我都認為凱薩
琳將會證明自己是位傑出的經理人，同時能夠誠實地對待所有的股東，後面那一
點尤其重要，因為該公司股份分成兩種，而這種架構常常遭到許多經理人濫用。
All of our judgments about this investment have been validated
by events. Kay's skills as a manager were underscored this past
year when she was elected by Fortune's Board of Editors to the
Business Hall of Fame. On behalf of our shareholders, Charlie and
I had long ago put her in Berkshire's Hall of Fame.
而我們做這項投資的正確判斷可由許多事件獲得證明，凱薩琳傑出的表現使得她
獲得財富雜誌編輯群選為商業名人堂，而對於身為股東的我們來說，查理跟我早
就把她列入Berkshire的名人堂之中。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Another of last year's retirees was Don Keough of Coca-Cola,
although, as he puts it, his retirement lasted "about 14 hours."
Don is one of the most extraordinary human beings I've ever known -
a man of enormous business talent, but, even more important, a man
who brings out the absolute best in everyone lucky enough to
associate with him. Coca-Cola wants its product to be present at
the happy times of a person's life. Don Keough, as an individual,
invariably increases the happiness of those around him. It's
impossible to think about Don without feeling good.
另外一位在去年退休的人是可口可樂的Don Keough，雖然如同他本人所說的
他的退休只維持了14個小時，Don是我認識最優秀的人類之一，他不但擁有絕
佳的商業天分，同時更重要的是使得每個幸運能夠與他共事的人發揮其潛能，可
口可樂希望其產品能夠伴隨每個人一生最快樂的時光，而Don這個人卻帶給周
圍的人無限的歡樂，每當想起Don時，沒有不讓人會心一笑的。
I will edge up to how I met Don by slipping in a plug for my
neighborhood in Omaha: Though Charlie has lived in California for
45 years, his home as a boy was about 200 feet away from the house
where I now live; my wife, Susie, grew up 1 1/2 blocks away; and we
have about 125 Berkshire shareholders in the zip code. As for Don,
in 1958 he bought the house directly across the street from mine.
He was then a coffee salesman with a big family and a small income.
在介紹我如何結識Don時，順便介紹一下我在奧瑪哈的街坊鄰居，雖然查理住
在加州長達45年，但他兒時的老家距離我現在住的地方不到100公尺，而我
的內人蘇珊從小就住在對街，Berkshire有125個股東住在同一個郵遞區號，
而Don在1958買的房子就在我家的正對面，當年他還是一個收入微薄，卻必
須養一大家子的咖啡銷售員。
The impressions I formed in those days about Don were a factor
in my decision to have Berkshire make a record $1 billion
investment in Coca-Cola in 1988-89. Roberto Goizueta had become
CEO of Coke in 1981, with Don alongside as his partner. The two of
them took hold of a company that had stagnated during the previous
decade and moved it from $4.4 billion of market value to $58
billion in less than 13 years. What a difference a pair of
managers like this makes, even when their product has been around
for 100 years.
當年我對Don的印象是我在1988到1989年間，決定替Berkshire買下10
億美元可口可樂股票的因素之一，Roberto Goizueta在1981年當上可口可樂
總裁時，Don是他的副手，兩人聯手接掌這家業務已停滯成長10多年的公司，
短短13年期間將這家原本44億市值的公司變成為580億美元，雖然所販賣的
產品已經問世100年，這兩個人卻還能讓這家公司產生如此大的變化。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Frank Rooney did double duty last year. In addition to
leading H. H. Brown to record profits - 35% above the 1992 high -
he also was key to our merger with Dexter.
Frank Rooney從去年開始做了雙份的工作，除了領導的HH布朗鞋業在去年創
下獲利歷史新高，較去年同期增加35%之外，他也是購併Dexter鞋業的主要靈
魂人物。
Frank has known Harold Alfond and Peter Lunder for decades,
and shortly after our purchase of H. H. Brown, told me what a
wonderful operation they managed. He encouraged us to get together
and in due course we made a deal. Frank told Harold and Peter that
Berkshire would provide an ideal corporate "home" for Dexter, and
that assurance undoubtedly contributed to their decision to join
with us.
Frank認識Harold與Peter有好幾十年了，在買下布朗鞋業不久之後，他向我
提到這家由他們管理良善的公司，他積極地把我們湊在一起，過了不久之後，我
們便達成協議，Frank告訴Harold與Peter說，Berkshire將會是Dexter企
業最理想的歸宿，而這種安全感無疑的是他們最後決定加入我們最關鍵的因素。
I've told you in the past of Frank's extraordinary record in
building Melville Corp. during his 23 year tenure as CEO. Now, at
72, he's setting an even faster pace at Berkshire. Frank has a
low-key, relaxed style, but don't let that fool you. When he
swings, the ball disappears far over the fence.
過去我曾向各位提過Frank在Melville企業23年總裁期間的傑出表現，如今
高齡72歲的他在Berkshire的速度甚至比以前還快，雖然Frank有個低調又閒
散的Style，但千萬不要被他的外表所騙，當他大棒一揮時，球兒可是會一飛沖
天、消失在圍牆之外呢！
The Annual Meeting
年度股東會
This year the Annual Meeting will be held at the Orpheum
Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 25, 1994.
A record 2,200 people turned up for the meeting last year, but the
theater can handle many more. We will have a display in the lobby
featuring many of our consumer products - candy, spray guns, shoes,
cutlery, encyclopedias, and the like. Among my favorites slated to
be there is a See's candy assortment that commemorates Mrs. B's
100th birthday and that features her picture, rather than Mrs.
See's, on the package.
今年的股東會預計在1994年4月25日，星期一早上9點30分在位於奧瑪哈
市中心的Orpheum中心召開，去年股東會參加人數又創新高突破2,200人，
不過這個會場還可以容納更多的人，會場中將展示我們所銷售的許多產品，包含
糖果、水槍、鞋子、刀叉、百科全書等，其中喜斯糖果為了慶祝B太太100年
生日所推出的紀念禮盒是我的最愛，不同於原本喜斯太太的畫像，禮盒上所附的
是B太太的畫像。
We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations at one
of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms)
but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much
larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the
Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards
from Borsheim's, which is a twenty-minute drive from downtown. We
will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45
for the meeting and return after it ends.
我們建議大家最好先向以下旅館預訂房間(1)Radisson-Redick旅館-就位在
Orpheum中心對街擁有88個房間的一家小旅館(2)較大一點的Red Lion旅館
-離Orpheum中心約五分鐘路程，或是(3)Marriott位在奧瑪哈西區，離波仙珠
寶店約100公尺，開車到市中心約需20分鐘，屆時將會有巴士接送大家往返
股東會會場。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can
obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With
the admission card, we will enclose information about parking
facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a
little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk
a few blocks.
後面附有股東會開會投票的相關資料，跟各位解釋如何拿到入場所許的識別證，
由於開會當天會場不好停車，如果你開車過來，記得早一點到，否則附近的車位
很快就會停滿，你可能就必須要停遠一點，再走路過來。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture
Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to
downtown hotels or the airport later. Those of you arriving early
can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from
10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on
Sundays. Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open
for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday,
April 24.
一如往年，會後我們備有巴士帶大家到內布拉斯加傢具店與波仙珠寶店或是到飯
店與機場，我希望大家能有多一點的時間好好探索這兩家店的奧妙，當然早幾天
到的股東也可利用假日逛逛傢具店，星期六從早上10點到下午5點30分，星
期日則從中午開到下午5點30分，平時禮拜天不營業的波仙珠寶，在4月24
號當天會特別為股東與來賓開放。
In past trips to Borsheim's, many of you have met Susan
Jacques. Early in 1994, Susan was made President and CEO of the
company, having risen in 11 years from a $4-an-hour job that she
took at the store when she was 23. Susan will be joined at
Borsheim's on Sunday by many of the managers of our other
businesses, and Charlie and I will be there as well.
過去幾年若你去過波仙，應該都碰到過Susan Jacques， 23歲那年她進入公
司從4美元時薪的小妹做起，經過11年的工作生涯，在1994年初Susan成
為波仙珠寶公司的總裁，星期天Susan連同Berkshire旗下許多經理人以及查
理和我都會出席。
On the previous evening, Saturday, April 23, there will be a
baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and
the Nashville Sounds (which could turn out to be Michael Jordan's
team). As you may know, a few years ago I bought 25% of the Royals
(a capital-allocation decision for which I will not become famous)
and this year the league has cooperatively scheduled a home stand
at Annual Meeting time.
在前一天4月23日，星期六晚上，在Rosenblatt體育館將會有一場奧瑪哈皇
家隊對Nashville (就是麥可喬登後來加入的那隻棒球隊)，或許大家知道，幾年
前我個人買下皇家隊25%的股權(一個我自己不太好意思讓大家知道的資金分配
決策)，今年聯盟特地將主場安排在Berkshire股東年會期間。
I will throw the first pitch on the 23rd, and it's a certainty
that I will improve on last year's humiliating performance. On
that occasion, the catcher inexplicably called for my "sinker" and
I dutifully delivered a pitch that barely missed my foot. This
year, I will go with my high hard one regardless of what the
catcher signals, so bring your speed-timing devices. The proxy
statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the
game. I regret to report that you won't have to buy them from
scalpers.
我將會擔任開場的先發投手，而我絕對保證將一雪去年差勁的表現，記得當時捕
手突然向我做出投出下沈球的指示，我遵照指示投出卻差點砸到我自己的腳，今
年不管捕手做出什麼暗號，我都將祭出個人最拿手的上飄速球，所以大家最好把
測速器都帶來，股東會資料將告訴大家如何取得入場的門票，大家千萬不要向黃
牛買門票。
Warren E. Buffett
March 1, 1994 Chairman of the Board
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
1994年3月1日
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