麥克風的求生手冊

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司


To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股東:

Our gain in net worth during 1994 was $1.45 billion or 13.9%.

Over the last 30 years (that is, since present management took

over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $10,083, or

at a rate of 23% compounded annually.

　

1994年本公司的淨值成長了14.5億美元或是14.3%，總計過去30年以來，
也就是自從現有經營階層接手之後，每股淨值由當初的19元成長到現在的
10,083美元，年複合成長率約為23%。

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner,

and I make few predictions. One we will confidently offer,

however, is that the future performance of Berkshire won't come

close to matching the performance of the past.

查理．孟格-Berkshire的主要合夥人跟我本身很少做預測，不過有一點我們倒
是很確定，那就是Berkshire未來的表現將很難再像過去那樣的輝煌。

The problem is not that what has worked in the past will

cease to work in the future. To the contrary, we believe that

our formula - the purchase at sensible prices of businesses that

have good underlying economics and are run by honest and able

people - is certain to produce reasonable success. We expect,

therefore, to keep on doing well.

問題不在於過去的方法在以後會不管用，相反的，我們認為我們的成功方程式-
那就是以合理的價格買進具有產業競爭優勢同時由誠實有才幹的人經營的做
法，在往後同樣能夠獲致令人滿意的結果，我們預估應該可以繼續保持這種好成
績。

A fat wallet, however, is the enemy of superior investment

results. And Berkshire now has a net worth of $11.9 billion

compared to about $22 million when Charlie and I began to manage

the company. Though there are as many good businesses as ever,

it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential

in relation to Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie regularly

reminds me, "If something is not worth doing at all, it's not

worth doing well.") We now consider a security for purchase only

if we believe we can deploy at least $100 million in it. Given

that minimum, Berkshire's investment universe has shrunk

dramatically.

然而皮夾子太厚，卻是投資成果的大敵，目前Berkshire的淨值已高達119億
美元，還記得當初查理跟我開始經營這家公司時，公司的淨值只有2,200萬美
元，雖然還是一樣有許多好的公司，但卻很難在找到規模夠大的對象，(就像是
查理常常說的，如果一件事情不值得去做，那麼就算是你把它做的再好也沒有用)
現在我們只考慮買進至少一億美元以上的投資，在這樣的高門檻下，Berkshire
的投資世界，一下子縮小了許多。

Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us

here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in

The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be

a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the

first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out

of my happy zone, I'm not a .344 hitter. I might only be a .250

hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for

opportunities that are well within our own "happy zone."

盡管如此，我們才是會堅持讓我們成功的方法，絕對不會放寬原有的標準，Ted
Williams在我妻子的故事中寫到，我個人的看法是如果你想成為一個優秀的打
擊者的話，首先你得先相中一顆好球來打，這是教科書裡的第一課，如果強迫自
己在不中意的好球帶揮棒，我絕對無法成為打擊率3成44的強打者，而可能變
成2成5的普通球員，查理跟我都很同意這樣的看法，所以我們寧願靜靜的等
待球兒滑進我們喜歡的好球帶。

We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts,

which are an expensive distraction for many investors and

businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the

huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two

oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of

the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or

treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.

對於坊間一般投資人與商業人士相當迷信的政治與經濟的預測，我們仍將保持視
而不見的態度，三十年來，沒有人能夠正確地預測到越戰會持續擴大、工資與價
格管制、兩次的石油危機、總統的辭職下台以及蘇聯的解體、道瓊在一天之內大
跌508點或者是國庫券殖利率在2.8%與17.4%之間巨幅波動。

But, surprise - none of these blockbuster events made the

slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles. Nor did

they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses

at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let

a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of

capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when

apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the

foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.

不過令人驚訝的是，這些曾經轟動一時的重大事件卻從未讓班哲明．葛拉罕的投
資哲學造成絲毫的損傷，也從沒有讓以合理的價格買進優良的企業看起來有任何
的不妥，想像一下，若是我們因為這些莫名的恐懼而延遲或改變我們運用資金的
態度，將會使我們付出多少的代價，事實上，我們通常都是利用某些歷史事件發
生，悲觀氣氛到達頂點時，找到最好的進場機會，恐懼雖然是盲從者的敵人，但
卻是基本面信徒的好朋友。

A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next

30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit

from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we

have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little

effect on our long-term results.

在往後的三十年間，一定還會有一連串令人震驚的事件發生，我們不會妄想要去
預測它或是從中獲利，如果我們還能夠像過去那樣找到優良的企業，那麼長期而
言，外在的意外對我們的影響實屬有限。

What we promise you - along with more modest gains - is that

during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie

and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will

you. And we will not break this bond by introducing compensation

arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside

than the downside.

而就像我曾經承諾過的，除了獲利沒辦法像以前那麼好之外，你們在Berkshire
股權所得到的待遇將會與查理和我一完全致，如果你遭受損失，我們也不好過，
如果我們吃香的，那麼你們也就跟著喝辣的，而且我們絕對不會靠任何獎金報酬
制度讓我們多佔點便宜而破壞這樣美好的關係。

We further promise you that our personal fortunes will

remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will

not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money

elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment

portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many

friends who belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in

the 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do our best.

此外我們也向大家保證我個人絕大部份的身家都將繼續擺在Berkshire的股份
之上，我們不會在央求各位參與我們投資的同時，還把自己的錢擺在別的地方，
甚至於巴菲特家族以及查理跟我在1960年代經營合夥企業時期的老朋友，所擁
有的投資絕大部份也都是以Berkshire股份為主。

Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years

ago, in 1984, Berkshire's insurance companies held securities

having a value of $1.7 billion, or about $1,500 per Berkshire

share. Leaving aside all income and capital gains from those

securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only

about $6 million. We had earnings, yes, from our various

manufacturing, retailing and service businesses, but they were

almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses

in our insurance business, corporate overhead and interest

expense.

值得慶幸的是，我們可以在一個很好的基礎上努力打拼，十年前，也就是在1984
年，Berkshire的保險子公司持有價值17億美元的股票投資組合，每股約當有
1,500美元的投資，扣除這部份的收益與資本利得不算，Berkshire當年的稅前
盈餘只有區區的600萬美元，沒錯，雖然我們在製造、零售以及服務事業方面
依然有不錯的利潤，但是大部分的盈餘都被保險事業的承保損失、營業費用以及
利息支出所抵消掉。

Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or over $15,000

per Berkshire share. If you again exclude all income from these

securities, our pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million.

During the decade, employment has grown from 5,000 to 22,000

(including eleven people at World Headquarters).

時至今日，我們持有的股票投資組合價值超過180億美元，每股約當有15,000
美元，若是再一次我們將這些股票投資所產生的收益扣除的話，我們在1994年
的稅前盈餘是3.84億美元，十年來，雇用的員工人數從原先的5,000人增加到
22,000人，(包含企業總部的11人在內)。

We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps

of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some

ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing

a baseball team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows

hit." That's my formula at Berkshire, also.

之所以能有這樣的成果，要歸功於旗下這群特別的經理人，是他們讓那些看起來
很普通平凡的事業能有不凡的結果，Casey曾經把他帶領一支棒球隊的工作，形
容為靠著別人擊出全壘打賺錢過活，這也是我在Berkshire維生的方式。

The businesses in which we have partial interests are

equally important to Berkshire's success. A few statistics will

illustrate their significance: In 1994, Coca-Cola sold about 280

billion 8-ounce servings and earned a little less than a penny on

each. But pennies add up. Through Berkshire's 7.8% ownership of

Coke, we have an economic interest in 21 billion of its servings,

which produce "soft-drink earnings" for us of nearly $200

million. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has

a 7% share of the world's razor and blade market (measured by

revenues, not by units), a proportion according us about $250

million of sales in 1994. And, at Wells Fargo, a $53 billion

bank, our 13% ownership translates into a $7 billion "Berkshire

Bank" that earned about $100 million during 1994.

我們持有少數股權企業的貢獻，對Berkshire來說也功不可沒，從一些統計數字
中，可以看出他們的重要性，1994年可口可樂總計賣出2,800億罐八盎斯飲
料，每罐大概能賺一美分，不過積沙成塔，若按Berkshire擁有7.8%可口可樂
的股權比例，我們大概可以分配到210億罐，總計光是飲料貢獻給我們的盈餘
就有二億美元；同樣的，透過對於吉列的持股，Berkshire大概可以分得全世界
刮鬍刀7%的市場佔有率(以營收而非銷量計算)，約為2.5億美元的銷售額；另
外在擁有530億美元資產的富國銀行，我們持有13%的股權大概就等於是一家
擁有70億美元資產同時每年獲利一億美元的銀行。

It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope

diamond than 100% of a rhinestone, and the companies just

mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't

limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a

growing collection.

我們寧願擁有天然鑽石的一小部份，也不要有100%的人工鑽石，而剛剛提到的
那些公司堪稱為天然的稀有寶石，更難得的是我們不是只擁有現在這一些，以後
還會得到更多更多。

Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply

- and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time,

however, we believe it highly probable that the sort of

businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a

satisfactory rate.

股票價格仍會持續波動，有時幅度會很大，同時經濟景氣的循環也會上上下下，
然而就長期而言，我們相信所擁有的這類優良企業的價值很有可能還會繼續以穩
定的速度成長。

Book Value and Intrinsic Value

帳面價值與實質價值

We regularly report our per-share book value, an easily

calculable number, though one of limited use. Just as regularly,

we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is

impossible to pinpoint but essential to estimate.

我們會固定公佈每股的帳面價值，雖然它的用處不大，但這總算是一個比較容易
計算的數字，就像是我們一再提醒各位真正重要的是實質價值，雖然這個數字沒
有辦法準確計算但卻有必要將以估算。

For example, in 1964, we could state with certitude that

Berkshire's per-share book value was $19.46. However, that

figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since

all of the company's resources were tied up in a sub-profitable

textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern

nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. In 1964,

then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance

sheet might well have deserved the answer once offered up by a

Hollywood mogul of dubious reputation: "Don't worry, the

liabilities are solid."

例如我們可以很確定的告訴大家1964年每股的帳面價值是19.46美元，不過
這個數字很明顯的高於其實質的價值，因為公司的資產主要集中於獲利不怎麼理
想的紡織事業，我們紡織資產的繼續經營或清算價值都遠比不上帳面價值，所以
任何想要了解1964年Berkshire資產負債表健全性的人士，得到的答案跟惡名
昭彰的好萊塢大亨可能給你的答案一樣，「放心好了，所有的負債都如假包
換！」。

Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: Many of the

businesses we control are worth far more than their carrying

value. (Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette,

are carried at current market values.) We continue to give you

book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough,

albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's

intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the two measures moved in

concert: Book value gained 13.9%, and that was the approximate

gain in intrinsic value also.

如今Berkshire的情況已完全倒轉，我們掌控的許多企業其實際的價值遠高於帳
面價值，(至於無法掌控的公司，如可口可樂或吉列刮鬍刀則是以目前市價列
示)，不過我們還是照舊提供各位帳面價值的數字，因為雖然這項數字被嚴重低
估，但仍然可以被當作為追蹤Berkshire實質價值的一項指標，事實上，以去年
來說，這兩項數字以頗為一致的速度變動，帳面價值增加了13.9%，而實質價
值大概也是以這個速度成長。

We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the

cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining

life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up

with a highly subjective figure that will change both as

estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates

move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is all-

important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative

attractiveness of investments and businesses.

我們將實質價值定義為一家企業在其生涯中所能產生現金流量的折現值，任何人
在計算實質價值都必須特別注意未來現金流量的修正與利率的變動都會影響到
最後計算出來的結果，雖然模糊難辨，但實質價值卻是最重要的，也是唯一能夠
作為評估投資標的與企業的合理方法。

To see how historical input (book value) and future output

(intrinsic value) can diverge, let's look at another form of

investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost

as its "book value." If it is to be accurate, the cost should

include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he

chose college rather than a job.

為了了解歷史投入的帳面價值與未來產出的實質價值會有怎樣不同的演變，讓我
看看另外一種不同形式的投資-大學教育，假設把教育成本當作是帳面價值，再
算的仔細一點，還要包含學生因為讀書而放棄工作收入的機會成本。

For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic

benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic

value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate

will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an

estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his

education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must

then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to

graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic

value of the education.

在這裡，我們姑且先不論非經濟的效益而只專注於經濟效益，首先，我們必須先
估計這位畢業生在畢業後終其一生的職場生涯所能得到的收入，然後再扣除要是
他沒有接受這項教育，原本可以得到的收入，從而我們可以得到因為這項投資，
他可以獲得的額外收入，當然之後還要利用一個適當的利率加以折現，得到截至
畢業日止的折現值，所得到的數字也就等於這場教育所能夠帶來的實質經濟價
值。

Some graduates will find that the book value of their

education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever

paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other

cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its

book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In

all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an

indicator of intrinsic value.

有些畢業生可能會發現其帳面成本可能遠高於計算出來的實質價值，這就代表著
不值得他去接受這樣的教育，相對地，要是接受教育所產生的實質價值遠高於投
入的成本，那麼就表示這樣的投資是明智的抉擇，不過不管怎樣，有一點很明確
的，那就是實質價值的多寡跟帳面投入成本一點關係都沒有。

Now let's get less academic and look at Scott Fetzer, an

example from Berkshire's own experience. This account will not

only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic

value can change but also will provide an accounting lesson that

I know you have been breathlessly awaiting. Naturally, I've

chosen here to talk about an acquisition that has turned out to

be a huge winner.

若各位覺得這種說法學究氣太重，就讓我們以Berkshire本身實際投資史考特飛
茲的經驗當做具體的例證，在這裡我們不但可以解釋帳面價值與實質價值之間的
關係會有多大的變化，同時可以藉此替大家上一課期待已久的會計學，當然這次
我選擇說明的對象是一個相當成功的購併投資案。

Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986.

At the time, the company was a collection of 22 businesses, and

today we have exactly the same line-up - no additions and no

disposals. Scott Fetzer's main operations are World Book, Kirby,

and Campbell Hausfeld, but many other units are important

contributors to earnings as well.

Berkshire是在1986年初買下史考特飛茲的，在當時這家公司擁有22項不同
的事業，時至今日我們沒有新增，也沒有處分其中任何一項，史考特飛茲主要的
營運集中在世界百科全書、寇比吸塵器與Campbell空壓機，當然其餘的事業對
盈餘的貢獻也相當重要。

We paid $315.2 million for Scott Fetzer, which at the time

had $172.6 million of book value. The $142.6 million premium we

handed over indicated our belief that the company's intrinsic

value was close to double its book value.

當時我們斥資3.152億美元買下帳面價值1.726億美元的史考特飛茲，超過的
1.426億美元溢價，代表著我們認為這家公司的實質價值大概是其帳面價值的兩
倍。

In the table below we trace the book value of Scott Fetzer,

as well as its earnings and dividends, since our purchase.

下表顯示的是自我們買下史考特飛茲後，歷年來的帳面價值以及它的獲利與股利
收入。


(1) (4)

Beginning (2) (3) Ending

Year Book Value Earnings Dividends Book Value

---- ---------- -------- --------- ----------

(In $ Millions) (1)+(2)-(3)

1986 ............... $172.6 $ 40.3 $125.0 $ 87.9

1987 ............... 87.9 48.6 41.0 95.5

1988 ............... 95.5 58.0 35.0 118.6

1989 ............... 118.6 58.5 71.5 105.5

1990 ............... 105.5 61.3 33.5 133.3

1991 ............... 133.3 61.4 74.0 120.7

1992 ............... 120.7 70.5 80.0 111.2

1993 ............... 111.2 77.5 98.0 90.7

1994 ............... 90.7 79.3 76.0 94.0

Because it had excess cash when our deal was made, Scott

Fetzer was able to pay Berkshire dividends of $125 million in

1986, though it earned only $40.3 million. I should mention that

we have not introduced leverage into Scott Fetzer's balance

sheet. In fact, the company has gone from very modest debt when

we purchased it to virtually no debt at all (except for debt used

by its finance subsidiary). Similarly, we have not sold plants

and leased them back, nor sold receivables, nor the like.

Throughout our years of ownership, Scott Fetzer has operated as a

conservatively-financed and liquid enterprise.

因為在購併交易完成當年，公司帳上有多餘的現金，所以雖然史考特飛茲1986
年的獲利只有4,030萬美元，但卻能夠支付Berkshire 1.25億美元的股利，另
外還有一點我必須強調的是，在史考特飛茲我們並沒有運用任何的財務槓桿，事
實上，該公司在我們購併之初的負債便相當有限，之後甚至還掉了所有的債務(除
了財務子公司的借款)，同時我們也沒有把工廠賣掉再租回來或是出售應收帳款
之類的舉動，在我們擁有的這幾年，史考特飛茲一直以相當保守的財務槓桿經營
並且維持相當高的流動性。

As you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings have increased

steadily since we bought it, but book value has not grown

commensurately. Consequently, return on equity, which was

exceptional at the time of our purchase, has now become truly

extraordinary. Just how extraordinary is illustrated by

comparing Scott Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune 500,

a group it would qualify for if it were a stand-alone company.

大家可以看到，史考特飛茲的盈餘在我們買下之後持續穩定的增加，不過在此同
時淨值卻未呈等比例的增加，也因此在我們買下該公司時，就已經相當不錯的股
東權益報酬率，到現在又變得更加優異，我們甚至可以拿它與財星五百大作比
較，事實上以史考特飛茲的規模，若單獨計便得以列入五百大之林。

Had Scott Fetzer been on the 1993 500 list - the latest

available for inspection - the company's return on equity would

have ranked 4th. But that is far from the whole story. The top

three companies in return on equity were Insilco, LTV and Gaylord

Container, each of which emerged from bankruptcy in 1993 and none

of which achieved meaningful earnings that year except for those

they realized when they were accorded debt forgiveness in

bankruptcy proceedings. Leaving aside such non-operating

windfalls, Scott Fetzer's return on equity would have ranked it

first on the Fortune 500, well ahead of number two. Indeed,

Scott Fetzer's return on equity was double that of the company

ranking tenth.

以所能得到最新的1993年五百大名單來說，該公司的股東權益報酬率可以名列
第四，故事還沒結束，前三名分別是Insilco、LTV與Gaylord，全部都是因為
當年度脫離破產邊緣，除了當年因為債務獲得免除致使盈餘暴增之外，其他年度
的獲利皆乏善可陳，因此若扣除這些沒什麼營運的爛果子的話，史考特飛茲的股
東權益報酬率足以名列財星五百大首位，遠遠比其他對手拋在腦後，甚至是第十
名的兩倍之多。

You might expect that Scott Fetzer's success could only be

explained by a cyclical peak in earnings, a monopolistic

position, or leverage. But no such circumstances apply. Rather,

the company's success comes from the managerial expertise of CEO

Ralph Schey, of whom I'll tell you more later.

或許你會認為史考特飛茲的成功不過是盈餘循環的高峰、獨佔壟斷或是靠財務槓
桿，不過全都不對，這家公司真正成功的原因在於總裁Ralph Schey優異的管
理技能，這點在後面我們還會詳加報告。

First, however, the promised accounting lesson: When we

paid a $142.6 million premium over book value for Scott Fetzer,

that figure had to be recorded on Berkshire's balance sheet.

I'll spare you the details of how this worked (these were laid

out in an appendix to our 1986 Annual Report) and get to the

bottom line: After a premium is initially recorded, it must in

almost all cases be written off over time through annual charges

that are shown as costs in the acquiring company's earnings

statement.

接下來是之前說過的會計課，我們支付超過史考特飛茲帳面價值1.426億美元
的溢價，將會被記錄在Berkshire的資產負債表上，詳細的細節我就予以省略(這
些在我們1986年年報的附錄都有)，而溢價在登錄之後，不管怎樣都必須按年
攤銷當作成本，並顯現在每年的盈餘報表之上。

The following table shows, first, the annual charges

Berkshire has made to gradually extinguish the Scott Fetzer

acquisition premium and, second, the premium that remains on our

books. These charges have no effect on cash or the taxes we pay,

and are not, in our view, an economic cost (though many

accountants would disagree with us). They are merely a way for

us to reduce the carrying value of Scott Fetzer on our books so

that the figure will eventually match the net worth that Scott

Fetzer actually employs in its business.

下表顯示，第一欄是Berkshire每年必須慢慢地攤銷購買史考特飛茲所產生的溢
價的餘額，第二欄是每年必須攤銷的金額，這些費用對現金部位或稅負支出都不
會有影響，同時就我們的觀點而言，也沒有任何實質的經濟意義(雖然很多會計
師可能不同意我們的看法)，這不過是讓我們的帳列投資成本能夠慢慢減少，到
最後終與史考特飛茲本身帳列淨值一致的方法而已。

Beginning Purchase-Premium Ending

Purchase Charge to Purchase

Year Premium Berkshire Earnings Premium

---- --------- ------------------ --------

(In $ Millions)

1986 ................ $142.6 $ 11.6 $131.0

1987 ................ 131.0 7.1 123.9

1988 ................ 123.9 7.9 115.9

1989 ................ 115.9 7.0 108.9

1990 ................ 108.9 7.1 101.9

1991 ................ 101.9 6.9 95.0

1992 ................ 95.0 7.7 87.2

1993 ................ 87.2 28.1 59.1

1994 ................ 59.1 4.9 54.2

Note that by the end of 1994 the premium was reduced to

$54.2 million. When this figure is added to Scott Fetzer's year-

end book value of $94 million, the total is $148.2 million, which

is the current carrying value of Scott Fetzer on Berkshire's

books. That amount is less than half of our carrying value for

the company when it was acquired. Yet Scott Fetzer is now

earning about twice what it then did. Clearly, the intrinsic

value of the business has consistently grown, even though we have

just as consistently marked down its carrying value through

purchase-premium charges that reduced Berkshire's earnings and

net worth.

大家可能注意到截至1994年底為止，帳列的溢價還剩下5,420萬美元，這個
數字若再加上史考特飛茲當年底的淨值9,400萬美元的話，就等於Berkshire
帳上持有該公司的投資成本1.482億美元，這個數字甚至不到當初我們買下它
時的一半不到，然而史考特飛茲現在每年所賺的錢，卻是當時的二倍，很明顯的，
其實質價值一直都在成長，然而透過溢價攤銷，Berkshire帳上持有的投資成本
卻一再向下調整。

The difference between Scott Fetzer's intrinsic value and

its carrying value on Berkshire's books is now huge. As I

mentioned earlier - but am delighted to mention again - credit

for this agreeable mismatch goes to Ralph Schey, a focused, smart

and high-grade manager.

史考特飛茲實質價值與其在Berkshire帳上的帳面價值差距越來越大，如同先前
我曾經提到而現在也很高興在重申一次，這種不對稱的現象完全都要歸功於
Ralph Schey-這位專注、聰明且高格調的經理人。

The reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben

Graham taught me 45 years ago that in investing it is not

necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary

results. In later life, I have been surprised to find that this

statement holds true in business management as well. What a

manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted.

That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals

and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side,

Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and

is self-confident without being self-important.

Ralph之所以能夠成功的原因並不複雜，我的老師葛拉漢四十五年前就告訴我，
畫蛇不必添足，爾後在我個人的投資生涯，我相當驚訝地發現，這道理也適用在
企業管理之上，經理人真正應該做的是把基本工夫做好而不分心，這正是Ralph
的做事方法，在設立好正確的目標後，並毫不猶豫放手去做，至於在私底下，
Ralph也是很好共事的人，對於問題他坦率直言，自信卻不自大。

He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age, I

do know that, like many of our managers, he is over 65. At

Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar. Charlie

and I, at 71 and 64 respectively, now keep George Foreman's

picture on our desks. You can make book that our scorn for a

mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year.

我忘了經驗豐富的Ralph今年真正的歲數? 但我確信他跟我們旗下其他許多經
理人一樣，老早就過了65歲，在Berkshire，我們注重的是績效，而不是年資，
查理今年71歲，而我64歲，兩人都把拳王George Foreman的照片擺在桌上，
你可以記下，我們對於強制退休年齡的反感將會與日俱增。

Intrinsic Value and Capital Allocation

實質價值與資金分配

Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers

as it is for investors. When managers are making capital

allocation decisions - including decisions to repurchase shares -

it's vital that they act in ways that increase per-share

intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle

may seem obvious but we constantly see it violated. And, when

misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt.

了解實質價值，對經理人來說，其重要性與投資人一般，當經理人本身在做資金
分配的決策時-也包含決定買回股份，必須確定這些舉動能夠增加公司的實質價
值，並盡量避免損害實質價值的舉動，這原則看來理所當然，但是違反的情況卻
屢見不鮮，而只要不當的決策形成，股東的權益立即就會受到傷害。

For example, in contemplating business mergers and

acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the

transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings

per share (or, at financial institutions, to per-share book

value). An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. Going

back to our college-education example, imagine that a 25-year-old

first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic

interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA

student, a non-earner, would find that a "share-for-share" merger

of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer

would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what

could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?

舉例來說，在思考企業合併與購併活動時，許多經理人都會專注於每股盈餘是會
被稀釋或是反稀釋(或是在金融機構，則是每股帳面價值)，過分強調這點是相當
危險的，回到我們先前所舉大學教育的例子，假設一位25歲MBA一年級的學
生，考慮將他個人未來的經濟利益與另一位25歲的工人做結合，他會發現如果
現在尚無謀生能力的他，要是現在與工人做一比一的合併的話，他往後幾年的賺
錢能力將會立即大幅提升，但是你想這位MBA會笨到接受這樣的提議嗎?

In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the would-

be purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective

acquiree has either different prospects, different amounts of

non-operating assets, or a different capital structure. At

Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase

opportunities that would have boosted current and near-term

earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value.

Our approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice:

"Go to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is." As a

result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer

than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.

談到企業購併，對於可能的買主來說，只專注於現在的獲利情況卻不管潛在的賣
方擁有不同的前景、不一樣的非營業資產或不同的資本結構，是一件很愚蠢的
事，在Berkshire我們不知拒絕了多少那種雖然會讓短期盈餘美觀但卻可能損及
每股實質價值的合併案或投資機會；總之我們的方式乃效法Wayne Gretzky的
建議，要緊盯小精靈的去向而不是它現在的位置，結果長期下來比起運用一般的
投資標準方法，我們的股東因此多賺了好幾十億美元。

The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an

egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of

the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the

acquirer's management; and they are a honey pot for the

investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But,

alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders,

often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer

typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that

enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and

"you are running a chain letter in reverse."

很遺憾的是，大部分的購併交易案都充滿了不公平性，對於被購併方來說，算是
得到解脫，購併一方的管理階層則名利雙收，旁邊的投資銀行家與專業顧問也都
能跟著大撈一筆，只不過真正受害的卻是購併方背後全體的股東，他們損失慘
重，原因在於購併公司最後所得到的實質價值通常遠比得到的低，就像是
Wachovia公司已退休的領導人John Medlin說，這種事做太多，就好像是在倒
寫連鎖信一樣。

Over time, the skill with which a company's managers

allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's

value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates

far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use

internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money

to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But

often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or

investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make

sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you

need a $50,000 rug.

就長期而言，公司經理然濫用公司資金將會對企業的價值有很大的影響，我們認
為一家好公司所能貢獻出的現金(至少是在早期)，一定會超過其本身內部所需，
而公司當然可以透過分配股利或買回股份的方式回饋給股東，但是通常企業的
CEO會要求公司策略企劃部門、顧問或是投資銀行，做出購併一、兩家公司的
必要性報告，這樣的做法就好像是問你的室內設計師，你是否應該增添一條五萬
美元的地毯。

The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological

bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they

possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive

is heavily endowed with these qualities - which, it should be

acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages - they won't

disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged

by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a

teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex

life. It's not a push he needs.

這類購併問題又因為隱藏在背後的生物原始本能而變得更複雜，許多CEO之所
以能夠做到這個位置，部份的原因在於他們先天擁有相當豐富的動物本能與自
尊，當然我們必須承認一位主管擁有這樣的特質，有時對他們有極大的優勢，然
而這種本能在他們爬上頂峰之後並不會消失，而當CEO被其顧問們鼓勵去進行
購併交易時，我想他的反應跟一位青少年被父親鼓勵可以擁有正常的性生活一
樣，這樣的做法未免有點揠苗助長。

Some years back, a CEO friend of mine - in jest, it must be

said - unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals.

This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining

to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life

insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through

the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he

abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply

said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."

幾年前，我的一位CEO朋友半開玩笑地在無意間透露出許多大交易的病態心
理，我這位朋友經營的是一家產物意外險公司，當時他在董事會上向所有的成員
解釋為何公司必須要取得一家人壽保險公司，在就經濟與策略面解釋了半天理由
之後，突然間他停止了演說，同時露出頑皮的眼神說道：「好吧！我承認，誰叫
其他人也都有一家。」

At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn

extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses.

As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy

their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left,

they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those

funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal

will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we

believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying

economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and

trust.

在Berkshire，我們的經理人不斷地透過看似平凡普通的事業，賺取驚人的報
酬，這些經理人的第一步是先尋找可以充分利用其盈餘的最佳方法，之後再把剩
餘的資金交回給查理跟我，然後我們會試著為這些資金尋找更好的出路以創造出
更多的實質價值，我們的目標是取得我們熟悉了解、有持續競爭力且由我們喜
愛、崇拜與信任的經理人所經營的公司的部份或全部所有權。

Compensation

薪資報酬

At Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as

about capital allocation. For example, we compensate Ralph Schey

based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of

Berkshire. What could make more sense, since he's responsible

for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock

option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally

capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for example, be hitting

home runs at Scott Fetzer while Charlie and I rang up mistakes at

Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts many times over.

Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon

Ralph if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire

but Scott Fetzer is lagging?

在Berkshire，有關薪資報酬這方面，我們試著採取與處理資金分配時一樣合理
的做法，舉例來說，我們給付給Ralph Schey的報酬是根據他在史考特飛茲而
非Berkshire的成績而定，這樣的方式再合理不過了，因為他負責的是單一部門
而非全Berkshire的營運，若是將他的報酬全部鎖在Berkshire的榮枯身上，對
Ralph Schey來說，其報酬將會顯得不公平，比如說有可能他在史考特飛茲擊出
全壘打但查理跟我卻在Berkshire把事情給搞砸了，最後使得他的功勞與我們的
過錯相抵銷，而萬一要是Berkshire別的部門大放異彩的同時，史考特飛茲的表
現卻平平，那麼Ralph Schey又有什麼理由跟其他人一樣分享Berkshire的獲
利與獎金呢?


In setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of

large carrots, but make sure their delivery is tied directly to

results in the area that a manager controls. When capital

invested in an operation is significant, we also both charge

managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and

credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release.

在設定薪資報酬標準時，我們不會吝嗇提出重賞的承諾，但絕對必須是在各個經
理人的職權範圍內論功行賞，當我們決定對某項營運投入大筆資金時，我們會將
高額的資金利息成本算在其經理人的頭上，相對地，當他們將多餘的資金釋回給
我們時，我們也會對等的利息收入記在其經理人的功勞簿上。

The product of this money's-not-free approach is definitely

visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ incremental funds

at good returns, it pays him to do so: His bonus increases when

earnings on additional capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge.

But our bonus calculation is symmetrical: If incremental

investment yields sub-standard returns, the shortfall is costly

to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The consequence of this two-

way arrangement is that it pays Ralph - and pays him well - to

send to Omaha any cash he can't advantageously use in his

business.

這種資金有價的遊戲規則，在史考特飛茲決策上再清楚也不過了，如果Ralph
可以運用額外的資金創造出高額的報酬，那麼他就絕對有理由這麼做，因為當公
司的投資報酬超過一定的門檻後，他本身所獲得的獎金也會跟著水漲船高，不過
我們的獎勵方式可是賞罰分明，相對地，要是額外的投入的資金沒有辦法貢獻足
夠的報酬，Ralph本身連同Berkshire都將一體受害，另一方面，要是Ralph
能將多餘用不到的資金送回奧瑪哈給我們的話，他將可以因而獲得豐厚的獎金報
酬。

It has become fashionable at public companies to describe

almost every compensation plan as aligning the interests of

management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment

means being a partner in both directions, not just on the upside.

Many "alignment" plans flunk this basic test, being artful forms

of "heads I win, tails you lose."

最近上市公司很流行強調管理階層的利益與公司的股東是一致的，不過在我們的
賞罰簿上，所謂的"一致"是對等的，而不是只有當公司營運順利時才如此，許多
公司的一致性就不符合我們的標準，因為表面上雖是如此，但其實骨子裡玩的卻
是"正面我贏，反面你輸"的遊戲。

A common form of misalignment occurs in the typical stock

option arrangement, which does not periodically increase the

option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings

are building up the wealth of the company. Indeed, the

combination of a ten-year option, a low dividend payout, and

compound interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has

done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic might even

note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to

the option-holding manager increases. I have yet to see this

vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders

to approve an option plan.

這種不一致的情況最明顯的莫過於員工認股權了，因為認股權的認購價格並沒有
定期予以檢視調整，這等於是漠視公司本身隨著盈餘的累積自動可增加的獲利能
力，假設一家公司給予員工十年的認股權，又該公司股利發放的比例很低，則經
理人就很有可能會得到超過其本身應得的報酬，計較一點的人甚至會發現，每年
支付給股東的盈餘越來越少，但經理人透過認股權行使所得到的利益卻越來越
多，到目前為止，我還沒有在一般公司股東會的投票議案裡，看到有要求股東表
決是否核准認股權計畫案的。

I can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement

with Ralph Schey was worked out in about five minutes,

immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the

"help" of lawyers or compensation consultants. This arrangement

embodies a few very simple ideas - not the kind of terms favored

by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they

have established that you have a large problem (and one, of

course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with

Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to me in

1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with

the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though

the terms of each agreement vary to fit the economic

characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some

cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, etc.

我忍不住要提到我們與史考特飛茲總裁Ralph Schey所做的薪資協議，在我們
正式買下史考特飛茲之後，只花了五分鐘就達成這項協議，這中間沒有律師或人
力資源顧問的"協助"，這些條件僅僅包含了幾個簡單的概念，與那些不得不提出
複雜的條款否則就無法附上高昂的帳單的人力資源顧問有很大的不同(而且這些
條款每年還須定期檢視以決定是否有修正的必要)，反觀我們與Ralph的協議到
目前為止從未更動過，當初在1986年我們雙方認為公平合理的，至今仍然是如
此，同樣的我們與旗下事業其他經理人的協議也都相當簡單，當然依照產業特性
的不同以及部份經理人同時擁有部份所有權等情形，而有所變化。

In all instances, we pursue rationality. Arrangements that

pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a manager's personal

accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who,

after all, refuses a free lottery ticket? But such arrangements

are wasteful to the company and cause the manager to lose focus

on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally,

irrational behavior at the parent may well encourage imitative

behavior at subsidiaries.

在所有的個案中，我們強調的是公平合理，當然經理人對於高的不合理，或是名
不符實的報酬通常都來者不拒，必竟沒有人會拒絕免費的熱透彩，但是這類的安
排，對於公司的資源來說是一種浪費，同時也會導致經理人忘記他真正應該關心
的事，此外，母公司脫序的行為等於是間接鼓勵旗下子公司起而效尤。

At Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial

responsibility for the entire business. Therefore, we are the

only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of

what the enterprise does as a whole. Even so, that is not a

compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed

both the company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with

people we like. Equally important, we are forced to do very few

boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of

the abundant array of material and psychic perks that flow to the

heads of corporations. Under such idyllic conditions, we don't

expect shareholders to ante up loads of compensation for which we

have no possible need.

在Berkshire，只有查理跟我對公司整體的經營負全責，因此我們兩人是唯一應
該以公司整體的表現作為薪資報酬的依據，即便如此，那也不是我們兩人真正想
要的方式，我們花了相當的時間塑造我們的公司與工作模式，好讓我們可以與我
們欣賞的人一起做我們想做的事，同時也讓我們可以不會被迫去做一些無聊或是
不想做的工作，當這些物質與精神的報酬流向企業總部時，我們是最大的受惠
者，在這種田園詩歌般的工作環境下，我們不期望股東們還需要額外給予一些我
們不太需要的多餘報酬。

Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be

delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At bottom, we subscribe

to Ronald Reagan's creed: "It's probably true that hard work

never killed anyone, but I figure why take the chance."

事實上，就算不領薪水，查理跟我還是會樂在我們現在這種舒適的工作，最起碼，
我們效法雷根總統的信條，辛勤的工作不太可能要一個人的命，但我在想為何要
冒這個險呢。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帳列盈餘的來源

The table on the next page shows the main sources of

Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-

premium charges of the type we discussed in our earlier analysis

of Scott Fetzer are not assigned to the specific businesses to

which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown

separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our

businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased

them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to

investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires

purchase premiums to be charged off, business-by-business. The

total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to

the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表顯示Berkshire帳列盈餘的主要來源，在這張表中商譽的攤銷數與購買法會
計調整數會從個別被投資公司分離出來，單獨加總列示，之所以這樣做是為了讓
旗下各事業的盈餘狀況，不因我們的投資而有所影響，過去我一再地強調我們認
為這樣的表達方式，較之一般公認會計原則要求以個別企業基礎做調整，不管是
對投資者或是管理者來說，更有幫助，當然最後損益加總的數字仍然會與經會計
師查核的數字一致。


Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)

------------------- -------------------

1994 1993 1994 1993

-------- -------- -------- --------

(000s omitted)

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting ............... $129,926 $ 30,876 $ 80,860 $ 20,156

Net Investment Income ...... 419,422 375,946 350,453 321,321

Buffalo News ................. 54,238 50,962 31,685 29,696

Fechheimer ................... 14,260 13,442 7,107 6,931

Finance Businesses ........... 21,568 22,695 14,293 14,161

Kirby ........................ 42,349 39,147 27,719 25,056

Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 17,356 21,540 8,652 10,398

Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 39,435 38,196 24,909 23,809

See's Candies ................ 47,539 41,150 28,247 24,367

Shoe Group ................... 85,503 44,025* 55,750 28,829

World Book ................... 24,662 19,915 17,275 13,537

Purchase-Price Premium Charges (22,595) (17,033) (19,355) (13,996)

Interest Expense** ........... (60,111) (56,545) (37,264) (35,614)

Shareholder-Designated

Contributions ............. (10,419) (9,448) (6,668) (5,994)

Other ........................ 36,232 28,428 22,576 15,094

-------- -------- -------- --------

Operating Earnings ............. 839,365 643,296 606,239 477,751

Sales of Securities ............ 91,332 546,422 61,138 356,702

Decline in Value of

USAir Preferred Stock ..... (268,500) --- (172,579) ---

Tax Accruals Caused by

New Accounting Rules ...... --- --- --- (146,332)

-------- --------- -------- --------

Total Earnings - All Entities .. $662,197 $1,189,718 $494,798 $688,121

======== ======= ======= =======

* Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired,

November 7, 1993.

*Dexter的盈餘僅含購併日1993年11月7日以後的盈餘

**Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.

**不含商業與消費金融公司的利息費用。

A large amount of information about these businesses is given

on pages 37-48, where you will also find our segment earnings

reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 53-59, we have

rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-

GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and

I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the

financial information that we would wish you to give us if our

positions were reversed.

在年報中你可以找到依照一般公認會計原則編製，詳細的部門別資訊，至於我們
的目的是希望給你所有查理跟我認為在評估Berkshire價值時，應該必要的資
訊。

"Look-Through" Earnings

透視盈餘

In past reports, we've discussed look-through earnings, which

we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than

does our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings

consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous

section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major

investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our

profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by

Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been

distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here

exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major

restructuring charges.

之前我們曾經討論過透視盈餘，比起一般公認會計原則的數字，這是我們認為它
更能反應Berkshire本身實際的獲利狀況，其主要的組成份子有(1)前段所提到
的帳列盈餘，加上(2)主要被投資公司的保留盈餘，按一般公認會計原則未反應
在我們公司帳上的盈餘，扣除(3)若這些未反應的盈餘分配給我們時，估計可能
要繳的所得稅。在這裡我們所謂的營業盈餘係扣除資本利得、特別會計調整與企
業調整的主要支出。

If our intrinsic value is to grow at our target rate of 15%,

our look-through earnings, over time, must also increase at about

that pace. When I first explained this concept a few years back, I

told you that meeting this 15% goal would require us to generate

look-through earnings of about $1.8 billion by 2000. Because we've

since issued about 3% more shares, that figure has grown to $1.85

billion.

長期而言，如果我們的實質價值想要以每年15%的幅度來成長的話，那麼透視
盈餘每年也必須增加以這個幅度來成長，幾年前我第一次提到這個觀念時曾表
示，到西元2000年為止，Berkshire若要以15%的目標，透視盈餘必須成長
18億美元以上，而由於1993年我們又發行了一些新股，所以現在的門檻提高
到18.5億美元。

We are now modestly ahead of schedule in meeting our goal, but

to a significant degree that is because our super-cat insurance

business has recently delivered earnings far above trend-line

expectancy (an outcome I will discuss in the next section). Giving

due weight to that abnormality, we still expect to hit our target

but that, of course, is no sure thing.

到目前為止，我們稍微超越目標進度，但其中有一項很重要的原因是我們的霹靂
貓保險近年來的表現超乎預期的好 (有關這部份在下一段我還會詳加敘述)，雖
然即使扣除這項不正常部份，我們還是符合當初預期，但還是不能保證一定達的
到。

The following table shows how we calculate look-through

earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very

rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been

included in the operating earnings itemized on page 12, mostly

under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

各位可以從下表看出我們是如何計算透視盈餘的，不過我還是要提醒各位這些數
字有點粗糙，(被投資公司所分配的股利收入已經包含在保險事業的淨投資收益
項下)。

Berkshire's Share

of Undistributed

Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings

Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)

----------------------- ---------------------- -----------------

1994 1993 1994 1993

------ ------ ------ ------

American Express Company ...... 5.5% 2.4% $ 25(2) $ 16

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ...... 13.0% 13.0% 85 83(2)

The Coca-Cola Company ......... 7.8% 7.2% 116(2) 94

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 6.3%(1) 6.8%(1) 47(2) 41(2)

Gannett Co., Inc. ............. 4.9% --- 4(2) ---

GEICO Corp. ................... 50.2% 48.4% 63(3) 76(3)

The Gillette Company .......... 10.8% 10.9% 51 44

PNC Bank Corp. ................ 8.3% --- 10(2) ---

The Washington Post Company ... 15.2% 14.8% 18 15

Wells Fargo & Company ......... 13.3% 12.2% 73 53(2)

------ ------

Berkshire's share of undistributed

earnings of major investees $ 492 $422

Hypothetical tax on these undistributed

investee earnings(4) (68) (59)

Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 606 478

------- ------

Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $1,030 $ 841

(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest

at Wesco
不包含Wesco的少數股權

(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year

以年平均持有股權比例計算

(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both

recurring and significant
扣除重複發生且金額大的已實現資本利得，

(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays

on the dividends it receives

適用的稅率為14%，這是Berkshire收到現金股利時的平均稅率。

Insurance Operations

保險事業營運

As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our

insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we develop and,

second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In

an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require

that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually

takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.

就像我們在過去年報跟各位解釋過的，保險事業最重要的關鍵，第一是保險浮存
金的數量，第二是它的成本，浮存金是我們持有並非我們所有，保險事業營運之
所以能有浮存金的原因在於大部分的保單都要求保戶必須預付保險費，另外更重
要的是保險公司在被知會並真正理賠之前，通常都要經過好長的一段時間。

Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover

the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an

"underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float.

通常保險公司實際上收到的保費並不足以支應發生的損失與費用，所以大多會產
生承保的損失，而這就是浮存金的成本。

An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of

float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to

obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of

its float is higher than market rates for money.

長期而言，保險公司的浮存金成本若能低於其他資金管道所需的成本就能獲利，
但是要是其浮存金成本高於貨幣市場利率的話，其是否有存在的價值就有疑問。

As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's

insurance business has been an enormous winner. For the table, we

have compiled our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts

relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss

adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and
unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agents' balances,
prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges
applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by
our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an

underwriting profit, such as the last two, our cost of float has been

negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding

underwriting profit to float income.

如同下表中的數字所顯示的，Berkshire的保險事業大獲全勝，表中的浮存金，
係將所有的損失準備、損失費用調整準備與未賺取保費加總後，再扣除應付佣
金、預付購併成本及相關再保遞延費用，相對於我們的保費收入總額，我們的浮
存金部位算是相當大的，至於浮存金的成本則決定於所發生的承保損失或利益而
定，在某些年度由於我們有承保利益，所以換句話說，我們的資金成本甚至是負
的，此時我們的保險事業盈餘等於是由原先從浮存金獲取的利益再加上承保利
益。

(1) (2) Yearend Yield

Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term

Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds

------------ ------------- ------------- -------------

(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)

1967 .......... profit $ 17.3 less than zero 5.50%

1968 .......... profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%

1969 .......... profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%

1970 .......... $ 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%

1971 .......... profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%

1972 .......... profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%

1973 .......... profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%

1974 .......... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%

1975 .......... 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%

1976 .......... profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%

1977 .......... profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%

1978 .......... profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%

1979 .......... profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%

1980 .......... profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%

1981 .......... profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%

1982 .......... 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%

1983 .......... 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%

1984 .......... 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%

1985 .......... 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%

1986 .......... 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%

1987 .......... 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%

1988 .......... 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%

1989 .......... 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%

1990 .......... 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%

1991 .......... 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%

1992 .......... 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%

1993 .......... profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%

1994 .......... profit 3,056.6 less than zero 7.88%

Charlie and I are delighted that our float grew in 1994 and

are even more pleased that it proved to be cost-free. But our

message this year echoes the one we delivered in 1993: Though we

have a fine insurance business, it is not as good as it currently

looks.

查理跟我對於1994年的浮存金能夠繼續成長都感到相當高興，更有甚者，這些
資金都是完全免費的，但是我們還是要像去年那樣再強調一次，雖然我們的保險
事業經營得不錯，但實際上並沒有外界想像中的好。

The reason we must repeat this caution is that our "super-cat"

business (which sells policies that insurance and reinsurance

companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-

catastrophes) was again highly profitable. Since truly major

catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be

expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to

record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our

super-cat business will take many years to measure. Certainly 1994

should be regarded as close to a best-case. Our only significant

losses arose from the California earthquake in January. I will add

that we do not expect to suffer a major loss from the early-1995

Kobe earthquake.

我們之所以一再強調這一點的原因在於我們的霹靂貓業務(也就是專門提供保險
公司與再保公司規避重大天然災害風險的保單)今年再度賺大錢，由於真正重大
的災害並不常發生，所以我們的霹靂貓業務有可能在連續幾年賺大錢後，突然發
生重大的損失，換句話說，我們這項霹靂貓業務到底有多吸引人可能要花上好幾
年才有辦法看清，當然1994年絕對是相當好的一年，唯一的重大災害要算是一
月所發生的加州大地震，另外在這裡我要特別聲明1995年初發生的神戶大地震
對我們造成的損失並不大。

Super-cat policies are small in number, large in size and non-

standardized. Therefore, the underwriting of this business

requires far more judgment than, say, the underwriting of auto

policies, for which a mass of data is available. Here Berkshire

has a major advantage: Ajit Jain, our super-cat manager, whose

underwriting skills are the finest. His value to us is simply

enormous.

霹靂貓保單有數量少、金額高且非制式化的特性，因此，要承接這類業務必須仰
賴相當專業的判斷，而不像一般的汽車保險有龐大的資料庫可供參考，就這點而
言，Berkshire擁有一張王牌-Ajit Jain，他是我們霹靂貓業務的經理人，擁有最
精細的承保技巧，他可以說是我們的無價之寶。

In addition, Berkshire has a special advantage in the super-

cat business because of our towering financial strength, which

helps us in two ways. First, a prudent insurer will want its

protection against true mega-catastrophes - such as a $50 billion

windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in

California - to be absolutely certain. But that same insurer knows

that the disaster making it dependent on a large super-cat recovery

is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default.

There's not much sense in paying premiums for coverage that will

evaporate precisely when it is needed. So the certainty that

Berkshire will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of

unthinkable proportions is a major competitive advantage for us.

此外，在霹靂貓業務，Berkshire還擁有一項特殊的優勢，那就是我們雄厚的財
務實力，這對我們有相當大的幫助。首先，謹慎小心的保險公司都會希望對於真
正天大的災害-比如說像是紐約長島發生颶風或加州大地震這類可能造成五百億
美元損失發生時，可以得到相當確切的依靠，但是保險公司也相當清楚，這類會
造成本身財務需要支援的災害，同樣也有可能導致許多再保公司自顧不暇而破
產，所以它們不太可能笨到將保費付出後，卻換得無法兌現的承諾，也因此
Berkshire可以確保在不可預期的天災發生時，仍然有辦法拿得出錢來理賠的穩
當保證，就成為我們最佳的競爭優勢。

The second benefit of our capital strength is that we can

write policies for amounts that no one else can even consider. For

example, during 1994, a primary insurer wished to buy a short-term

policy for $400 million of California earthquake coverage and we

wrote the policy immediately. We know of no one else in the world

who would take a $400 million risk, or anything close to it, for

their own account.

再者雄厚的財務實力讓我們可以簽下別人想都不敢想的大額保單，舉例來說，
1994年，有一家保險業者臨時想要買一張金額高達4億美元的加州地震險保
單，我們二話不說立刻接下來，我們敢說全世界除了我們以外，可能沒有人敢獨
立接下這樣的保單。

Generally, brokers attempt to place coverage for large amounts

by spreading the burden over a number of small policies. But, at

best, coverage of that sort takes considerable time to arrange. In

the meantime, the company desiring reinsurance is left holding a

risk it doesn't want and that may seriously threaten its well-

being. At Berkshire, on the other hand, we will quote prices for

coverage as great as $500 million on the same day that we are asked

to bid. No one else in the industry will do the same.

一般來說，保險經紀人通常傾向將大額的保單拆成數張小額的保單以分散負擔，
但是這樣的作業安排卻頗耗費時間，同時也使得本來想要尋求再保分散風險的保
險公司並須被迫面對它本來不願意承擔的風險，進而危及保險公司本身的利益，
相對地在Berkshire，我們對單一保單的投保上限最高可以到達5億美元，這是
其他同業所做不到的。

By writing coverages in large lumps, we obviously expose

Berkshire to lumpy financial results. That's totally acceptable to

us: Too often, insurers (as well as other businesses) follow sub-

optimum strategies in order to "smooth" their reported earnings.

By accepting the prospect of volatility, we expect to earn higher

long-term returns than we would by pursuing predictability.

雖然接下這類大額的保單，會使得Berkshire的經營成果變得很不穩定，但我們
完全可以接受這樣的結果，通常保險同業(其實其他的行業也一樣)總是傾向採取
比較保守的做法，使得營運數字可以平滑穩定一點，但是就這點而言，我們的做
法比較不一樣，選擇接受變動較大的前景，我們可以獲致比前景確定的方式更高
的長期投資報酬。

Given the risks we accept, Ajit and I constantly focus on our

"worst case," knowing, of course, that it is difficult to judge

what this is, since you could conceivably have a Long Island

hurricane, a California earthquake, and Super Cat X all in the same

year. Additionally, insurance losses could be accompanied by non-

insurance troubles. For example, were we to have super-cat losses

from a large Southern California earthquake, they might well be

accompanied by a major drop in the value of our holdings in See's,

Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac.

在承受這類風險時，Ajit跟我總是會將焦點擺在最壞的狀況下，雖然我們知道實
在是很難去衡量，大家可以想像如果同一年發生長島颶風、加州地震以及霹靂貓
X時，會是怎樣的一個光景，此外，保險損失通常會伴隨非保險的問題，例如假
設我們因為加州大地震而承受大量的霹靂貓損失，在此同時股市的大跌很有可能
也會伴隨而來，此舉將會使得我們在喜斯糖果、富國銀行與弗迪麥的持股價值大
減。

All things considered, we believe our worst-case insurance

loss from a super-cat is now about $600 million after-tax, an

amount that would slightly exceed Berkshire's annual earnings from

other sources. If you are not comfortable with this level of

exposure, the time to sell your Berkshire stock is now, not after

the inevitable mega-catastrophe.

在考慮過所有的狀況之後，我們認為在最壞的情況下，我們在霹靂貓保險所可能
產生的損失大約在6億美元的上下，稍稍超過Berkshire每年從其他事業的盈
餘，如果你對於這樣的風險感到不自在，那麼現在是你賣出Berkshire股份的最
佳時機，而不是等到這種無可避免的大災難發生。

Our super-cat volume will probably be down in 1995. Prices

for garden-variety policies have fallen somewhat, and the torrent

of capital that was committed to the reinsurance business a few

years ago will be inclined to chase premiums, irrespective of their

adequacy. Nevertheless, we have strong relations with an important

group of clients who will provide us with a substantial amount of

business in 1995.

我們霹靂貓的業務量在1995年很有可能會下滑，因為保險的價格略微下滑，原
因在於幾年前新加入再保市場的資金，正以不合理的價格競逐保單，儘管如此，
我們還是擁有一些重要的客戶群，可以穩定的貢獻我們1995年業績。

Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results

in 1994. Our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers'

compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card

operation, managed by the Kizer family; National Indemnity's

traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster

- all of these generated significant underwriting profits

accompanied by substantial float.

Berkshire其他保險事業1994年的營運表現皆相當傑出，由Rod領導的住宅
保險、Brad帶領的員工退休保險以及由Kizer家族經營的信用卡保險業務，以
及由Don所領導的國家產險所從事的傳統汽車保險與一般責任險方面，總的來
說，這四類業務都表現的相當不錯，不但有承保獲利，還貢獻了相當大金額的保
險浮存金。。

We can conclude this section as we did last year: All in all,

we have a first-class insurance business. Though its results will

be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value

that exceeds its book value by a large amount - larger, in fact,

than is the case at any other Berkshire business.

總而言之，我們可以做出與去年同樣的結論，我們擁有第一流的保險事業，雖然
他們的經營成果變化相當的大，但是其實質價值卻遠超過其帳面的價值，而事實
上，在Berkshire其他事業的身上也有類似的情況。

Common Stock Investments

股票投資

Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over

$300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to

subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我們超過三億美元以上的普通股投資，一部份的投資係屬於Berkshire關
係企業所持有。

12/31/94

Shares Company Cost Market

------ ------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

27,759,941 American Express Company. .......... $ 723,919 $ 818,918

20,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ........... 345,000 1,705,000

100,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............. 1,298,888 5,150,000

12,761,200 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.

("Freddie Mac") ................. 270,468 644,441

6,854,500 Gannett Co., Inc. .................. 335,216 365,002

34,250,000 GEICO Corp. ........................ 45,713 1,678,250

24,000,000 The Gillette Company ............... 600,000 1,797,000

19,453,300 PNC Bank Corporation ............... 503,046 410,951

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ........ 9,731 418,983

6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company .............. 423,680 984,727

　

Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in

concept: The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in

a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive

advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When

these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible

prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage

to overcome).

我們的投資組合持續保持集中、簡單的風格，真正重要的投資概念通常可以用簡
單的話語來作說明，我們偏愛具有持續競爭力並且由才能兼具、以股東利益為導
向的經理人所經營的優良企業，只要它們確實擁有這些特質，而且我們能夠以合
理的價格買進，則要出錯的機率可說是微乎其微(這正是我們一直不斷要克服的
挑戰)。

Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed

using Olympic-diving methods: Degree-of-difficulty doesn't count.

If you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent

on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and

enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed

an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting

and complex variables.

投資人必須謹記，你的投資成績並非像奧運跳水比賽的方式評分，難度高低並不
重要，你正確地投資一家簡單易懂而競爭力持續的公司所得到的回報，與你辛苦
地分析一家變數不斷、複雜難懂的公司可以說是不相上下。

We try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it

is folly to forego buying shares in an outstanding business whose

long-term future is predictable, because of short-term worries

about an economy or a stock market that we know to be

unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an

uninformed guess?

對於買進股份我們注意的只是價格而非時間，我們認為因為憂慮短期不可控制的
經濟或是股市變數而放棄買進一家長期前景可合理的預期的好公司是一件很愚
蠢的事，為什麼僅是因為短期不可知的猜測就放棄一個很明顯的投資決策呢?

We purchased National Indemnity in 1967, See's in 1972,

Buffalo News in 1977, Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, and Scott

Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available

and because we thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In

each case, we pondered what the business was likely to do, not what

the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach

as making sense in the purchase of businesses in their entirety,

why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces of

wonderful businesses in the stock market?

我們分別在1967年買進國家產險公司、1972年買下喜斯糖果、1977年買下
水牛城日報、1983年買下內布拉斯加傢具店、1986年買下史考特飛茲，而我
們都是趁它們難得求售時才得以買進，當然也因為它們的開價我們認為可以接
受，當初在評估每個案子時，我們關心的不是道瓊指數的走勢、聯準會的動向或
是總體經濟的發展，而是這些公司本身未來的前景；而如果我們覺得這樣的方式
適用於買下整家公司的話，那麼每當我們決定要透過股市買進一些好公司部份的
股權時，為什麼就必須採取不一樣的做法呢?

Before looking at new investments, we consider adding to old

ones. If a business is attractive enough to buy once, it may well

pay to repeat the process. We would love to increase our economic

interest in See's or Scott Fetzer, but we haven't found a way to

add to a 100% holding. In the stock market, however, an investor

frequently gets the chance to increase his economic interest in

businesses he knows and likes. Last year we went that direction by

enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express.

在尋找新的投資標的之前，我們選擇先增加舊有投資的部位，如果一家企業曾經
好到讓我們願意買進，我想再重複一次這樣的程序應該也是相當不錯的，若是能
夠我們很願意再增加在喜斯糖果或是史考特飛茲的持股，但要增加到100%的比
例實在是有困難，不過在股票市場中，投資人常常有很多的機會可以增加他有興
趣的公司持股，像是去年我們就擴大了我們在可口可樂與美國運通的持股數。

Our history with American Express goes way back and, in fact,

fits the pattern of my pulling current investment decisions out of

past associations. In 1951, for example, GEICO shares comprised

70% of my personal portfolio and GEICO was also the first stock I

sold - I was then 20 - as a security salesman (the sale was 100

shares to my Aunt Alice who, bless her, would have bought anything

I suggested). Twenty-five years later, Berkshire purchased a major

stake in GEICO at the time it was threatened with insolvency. In

another instance, that of the Washington Post, about half of my

initial investment funds came from delivering the paper in the

1940's. Three decades later Berkshire purchased a large position

in the company two years after it went public. As for Coca-Cola,

my first business venture - this was in the 1930's - was buying a

six-pack of Coke for 25 cents and selling each bottle for 5 cents.

It took only fifty years before I finally got it: The real money

was in the syrup.

我們投資美國運通的歷史可以追溯到相當早的時期，而事實上也符合個人過去的
經驗，舉個例子在1951年，當時我還是年僅二十歲的股票業務員，GEICO保
險佔我個人投資組合的70%，同時它也是我第一次賣掉的股票，我將100股的
GEICO股份賣給我的阿姨Alice，基本上只要是我建議的她都照單全收，二十五
年後，趁著該公司面臨倒閉的危機，Berkshire買下GEICO一大部分的股份，
另一個例子就是華盛頓郵報，1940年代，我的第一筆投資資金有一半是來自發
送該報的收入，三十年後，Berkshire趁該公司上市兩年後的股價低檔買下一大
部分的股權，至於可口可樂，可以算得上是我生平從事的第一筆商業交易，1930
年當我還是個小孩子的時候，我花了25美元買了半打的可樂，然後再以每罐5
美分分售出去，而直到五十年後，我才終於搞懂真正有賺頭的還是那糖水。

My American Express history includes a couple of episodes: In

the mid-1960's, just after the stock was battered by the company's

infamous salad-oil scandal, we put about 40% of Buffett Partnership

Ltd.'s capital into the stock - the largest investment the

partnership had ever made. I should add that this commitment gave

us over 5% ownership in Amex at a cost of $13 million. As I write

this, we own just under 10%, which has cost us $1.36 billion.

(Amex earned $12.5 million in 1964 and $1.4 billion in 1994.)

我個人在美國運通的投資歷史包含好幾段插曲，在1960年代中期，趁著該公司
為沙拉油醜聞所苦時，我們將巴菲特合夥企業40%的資金壓在這隻股票上，這
是合夥企業有史以來最大的一筆投資，總計花了1,300萬美元買進該公司5%的
股份，時至今日，我們在美國運通的持股將近10%，但帳列成本卻高達13.6億
美元，(美國運通1964年的獲利為1,250萬美元，1994年則增加至14億美
元)。

My history with Amex's IDS unit, which today contributes about

a third of the earnings of the company, goes back even further. I

first purchased stock in IDS in 1953 when it was growing rapidly

and selling at a price-earnings ratio of only 3. (There was a lot

of low-hanging fruit in those days.) I even produced a long report

- do I ever write a short one? - on the company that I sold for $1

through an ad in the Wall Street Journal.

我對美國運通IDS部門的投資可以追溯更早，該部門目前佔公司整體獲利來源的
三分之一，我在1953年第一次買進成長快速的IDS股份，當時的本益比只有三
倍(在那個年代，結實累累的果子垂手可得)，為此我甚至還特別寫了一篇長篇報
告(不過印象中我好像沒有寫過短的)，並在華爾街日報刊登廣告，以一美元對外
公開銷售。

Obviously American Express and IDS (recently renamed American

Express Financial Advisors) are far different operations today from

what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long-term

familiarity with a company and its products is often helpful in

evaluating it.

當然很顯然的美國運通與IDS(最近已更名為美國運通財務顧問)今日的營運模式
與過去已有很大的不同，但是我還是發現對於該公司與其提供的產品內容長久以
來的熟悉度，仍然有助於我們的評估。

Mistake Du Jour

新鮮出爐的錯誤

Mistakes occur at the time of decision. We can only make our

mistake-du-jour award, however, when the foolishness of the

decision become obvious. By this measure, 1994 was a vintage year

with keen competition for the gold medal. Here, I would like to

tell you that the mistakes I will describe originated with Charlie.

But whenever I try to explain things that way, my nose begins to

grow.

錯誤通常在做決策時就已經造成，不過我們只能將新鮮錯誤獎頒給那些很明顯的
愚蠢決策，照這種標準，1994年可算是競爭相當激烈的一年，在這裡我必須特
別指出以下大部分的錯誤都是查理造成的，不過每當我這樣說時，我的鼻子就會
跟著開始變長。

And the nominees are . . .

獲得提名的有. . .

Late in 1993 I sold 10 million shares of Cap Cities at $63; at

year-end 1994, the price was $85.25. (The difference is $222.5

million for those of you who wish to avoid the pain of calculating

the damage yourself.) When we purchased the stock at $17.25 in

1986, I told you that I had previously sold our Cap Cities holdings

at $4.30 per share during 1978-80, and added that I was at a loss

to explain my earlier behavior. Now I've become a repeat offender.

Maybe it's time to get a guardian appointed.

1993年底，我將1,000萬股資本城股份以每股63美元賣出，不幸的是到了
1994年底，該公司股價變成85.25美元，(我可以直接告訴各位我們損失了
2.225億美元的差價，如果你心痛到不願去算的話)；而當我們在1986年以每
股17.25美元買進該公司股份時，就曾經向各位報告，在更早之前，也就是在
1978年到1980年間，我就曾經以每股4.3美元賣掉該公司股份，並強調對於
個人這樣的行為感到心痛，沒想到現在我卻又明知故犯，看起來我似乎應該要找
個監護人來好好監管一下。

Egregious as it is, the Cap Cities decision earns only a

silver medal. Top honors go to a mistake I made five years ago

that fully ripened in 1994: Our $358 million purchase of USAir

preferred stock, on which the dividend was suspended in September.

In the 1990 Annual Report I correctly described this deal as an

"unforced error," meaning that I was neither pushed into the

investment nor misled by anyone when making it. Rather, this was a

case of sloppy analysis, a lapse that may have been caused by the

fact that we were buying a senior security or by hubris. Whatever

the reason, the mistake was large.

更不幸的是，資本城一案只能得到銀牌，金牌的得主要算是我在五年前就犯下的
一項錯誤，但直到1994年才爆發出來，那就是我們在美國航空3.58億美元的
特別股投資，去年九月，該公司宣佈停止發放特別股股息，早在1990年，我就
很準確地形容這項交易屬於非受迫性的失誤，意思是說，沒有人強迫我投資，同
時也沒有人誤導我，完全要歸咎於我個人草率的分析，這項挫敗導因於我們過於
自大的心態，不論如何，這是一項重大的錯誤。

Before this purchase, I simply failed to focus on the problems

that would inevitably beset a carrier whose costs were both high

and extremely difficult to lower. In earlier years, these life-

threatening costs posed few problems. Airlines were then protected

from competition by regulation, and carriers could absorb high

costs because they could pass them along by way of fares that were

also high.

在做這項投資之前，我竟然沒有把注意力擺在一直為航空深深所苦、居高不下的
成本問題之上，在早年，高成本還不致構成重大的威脅，因為當時航空業受到法
令的管制，航空業者可以將成本反映在票價之上轉嫁給消費者。

When deregulation came along, it did not immediately change

the picture: The capacity of low-cost carriers was so small that

the high-cost lines could, in large part, maintain their existing

fare structures. During this period, with the longer-term problems

largely invisible but slowly metastasizing, the costs that were

non-sustainable became further embedded.

在法令鬆綁的初期，產業界並未立即反應此狀況，主要是由於低成本的業者規模
尚小，所以大部分高成本的主要業者仍然勉力維持現行的票價結構，不過隨著時
間慢慢地發酵，在長久以來隱而未見的問題逐漸浮現的同時，舊有業者完全無競
爭力的高成本結構卻早已積重難返。

As the seat capacity of the low-cost operators expanded, their

fares began to force the old-line, high-cost airlines to cut their

own. The day of reckoning for these airlines could be delayed by

infusions of capital (such as ours into USAir), but eventually a

fundamental rule of economics prevailed: In an unregulated

commodity business, a company must lower its costs to competitive

levels or face extinction. This principle should have been obvious

to your Chairman, but I missed it.

隨著低成本營運業者座位容量的大幅擴增，超低的票價迫使那些高成本的老牌航
空公司也不得不跟進，然而額外資金的挹注(也包含我們在美國航空的那筆投
資)，延遲這些老牌航空公司發現這項問題的時機，然而終究到最後，基本的經
濟法則還是戰勝一切，在一個沒有管制的商品制式化產業，一家公司不是降低成
本增加競爭力，就是被迫倒閉關門，這道理對於身為公司負責人的我，可說是再
清楚也不過了，但是我竟然疏忽了。

Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has worked diligently to correct

the company's historical cost problems but, to date, has not

managed to do so. In part, this is because he has had to deal with

a moving target, the result of certain major carriers having

obtained labor concessions and other carriers having benefitted

from "fresh-start" costs that came out of bankruptcy proceedings.

(As Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, has said:

"Bankruptcy court for airlines has become a health spa.")

Additionally, it should be no surprise to anyone that those airline

employees who contractually receive above-market salaries will

resist any reduction in these as long as their checks continue to

clear.

美國航空的總裁-Seth Schofield一直致力於改正該公司長久以來的成本結構問
題，不過到目前為止，仍然力有未殆，一部份的原因在於，他所面對的是一個不
斷變動的目標，因為部份航空業者幸運地取得勞資雙方的協議，另一些業者則受
惠於破產法令的保護，可以有一個全新出發的成本，(就像是西南航空的總裁-
Herb Kelleher所說的破產法對於航空業者來說，就好像是得到了一次健康的
spa)，此外，對於哪些在合約上受到保護得以獲得高於市場水準薪資的勞工來
說，只要他們發現自己的薪資支票仍能按時兌現，就會全力地抵制減薪的提議。

Despite this difficult situation, USAir may yet achieve the

cost reductions it needs to maintain its viability long-term. But

it is far from sure that will happen.

儘管面臨目前的困境，美國航空還是有可能完成降低成本的任務，以維持長期繼
續生存的能力，不過到目前為止，還很難確定一定能夠成功。

Accordingly, we wrote our USAir investment down to $89.5

million, 25 cents on the dollar at yearend 1994. This valuation

reflects both a possibility that our preferred will have its value

fully or largely restored and an opposite possibility that the

stock will eventually become worthless. Whatever the outcome, we

will heed a prime rule of investing: You don't have to make it

back the way that you lost it.

因此，在1994年底，我們將美國航空帳面的投資金額調降為8,950萬美元，
當初一美元的投資等於僅剩下25美分的價值，這樣的舉動反應出將來我們的特
別股有可能完全或大部分地恢復其價值，但同時也有可能到後來變得一文不值，
不論最後的結果為何，我們必須謹記一項投資的基本原則，那就是你不一定要靠
那些已失去的賺回來。

The accounting effects of our USAir writedown are complicated.

Under GAAP accounting, insurance companies are required to carry

all stocks on their balance sheets at estimated market value.

Therefore, at the end of last year's third quarter, we were

carrying our USAir preferred at $89.5 million, or 25% of cost. In

other words, our net worth was at that time reflecting a value for

USAir that was far below our $358 million cost.

本次打銷美國航空投資價值的會計影響有點複雜，根據一般公認會計原則的規
定，保險公司在資產負債表上必須將它們的投資以市價列示，因此截至去年第三
季止，我們在美國航空投資的帳面價值是8,950萬美元，大概只有原始成本3.58
億美元的25%，換句話說，在當時我們的淨值就已反應了這項調整。

But in the fourth quarter, we concluded that the decline in

value was, in accounting terms, "other than temporary," and that

judgment required us to send the writedown of $269 million through

our income statement. The amount will have no other fourth-quarter

effect. That is, it will not reduce our net worth, because the

diminution of value had already been reflected.

不過到了第四季，我們認為這種下跌的情況，套句會計的專有名詞，並非屬於暫
時性的，所以我們必須將這筆向下調整的金額反應在損益表之上，然而這個動作
對於本公司的淨值並不會再造成任何的影響，因為早在第三季我們便已反應過
了。

Charlie and I will not stand for reelection to USAir's board

at the upcoming annual meeting. Should Seth wish to consult with

us, however, we will be pleased to be of any help that we can.

在即將召開的美國航空年度股東會中，查理跟我決定不再續任董事，當然要是
Seth總裁覺得有任何需要我們幫忙的地方，我們願意提供任何諮詢服務。

Miscellaneous

其他事項

Two CEO's who have done great things for Berkshire

shareholders retired last year: Dan Burke of Capital Cities/ABC

and Carl Reichardt of Wells Fargo. Dan and Carl encountered very

tough industry conditions in recent years. But their skill as

managers allowed the businesses they ran to emerge from these

periods with record earnings, added luster, and bright prospects.

Additionally, Dan and Carl prepared well for their departure and

left their companies in outstanding hands. We owe them our

gratitude.

去年有兩位對Berkshire貢獻卓著的經理人決定退休，分別是資本城/ABC的
Dan Burke與富國銀行的Carl Reichardt，Dan與Carl近年來在各自的產業都
面臨到相當大的挑戰，但他們傑出的管理能力使得他們經營的事業在這段期間內
仍能保有出色的盈餘，並賦予公司光明與璀璨的前景，此外，對於他們的離開，
Dan與Carl都已作好準備，將公司交由能幹的人才接手，我們對他們報以深深
的敬意。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

About 95.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's

1994 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions

made through the program were $10.4 million and 3,300 charities

were recipients.

大約有95.7%的有效股權參與1994年的股東指定捐贈計劃，總計約1,040萬
美元捐出的款項分配給3,300家慈善機構。

Every year a few shareholders miss participating in the

program because they either do not have their shares registered in

their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail

to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period

allowed for its return. Since we don't make exceptions when

requirements aren't met, we urge that both new shareholders and old

read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions

program that appears on pages 50-51.

每年都有一小部份的股東由於沒有將股份登記在本人的名下，或是沒能在60天
的期限內，將指定捐贈的表格送回給我們，而沒辦法參加我們的指定捐贈計畫，
凡是不符合規定者，都不能參加這項計畫，也因此我們敦促不管是原有或新加入
的股東，仔細閱讀年報上有關股東捐贈計畫的詳細內容，

To participate in future programs, you must make sure your

shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the

nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so

registered on August 31, 1995 will be ineligible for the 1995

program.

想要參加這項計畫者，請確定您的股份是登記在自己而非股票經紀人或保管銀行
的名下，同時必須在1995年8月31日之前完成登記，才有權利參與1995年
的捐贈計畫。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We made only one minor acquisition during 1994 - a small

retail shoe chain - but our interest in finding good candidates

remains as keen as ever. The criteria we employ for purchases or

mergers is detailed in the appendix on page 21.

1994年我們只進行了一項小型的購併案-那是一家鞋業的連鎖店，然而對於尋
找好的候選對象，我們的興致與過去一樣熱烈，對於買進與購併標準請參閱附
錄。

Last spring, we offered to merge with a large, family-

controlled business on terms that included a Berkshire convertible

preferred stock. Though we failed to reach an agreement, this

episode made me realize that we needed to ask our shareholders to

authorize preferred shares in case we wanted in the future to move

quickly if a similar acquisition opportunity were to appear.

Accordingly, our proxy presents a proposal that you authorize a

large amount of preferred stock, which will be issuable on terms

set by the Board of Directors. You can be sure that Charlie and I

will not use these shares without being completely satisfied that

we are receiving as much in intrinsic value as we are giving.

去年春天，我們曾經對一家大型的家族企業提出購併的提議，交易的內容包含發
行Berkshire可轉換的特別股，雖然後來雙方未能達成協議，但這次的經驗提醒
我們必須先取得Berkshire股東們的同意，授權董事會發行特別股，好讓我們在
合適的購併機會出現時，可以做出快速的回應，因此，在今年的股東會議案中，
包含了一項授權董事會在適當的時機發行特別股的提案，當然大家可以百分之百
地相信，除非我們認為所得到的實質價值跟我們所付出的相當，否則查理跟我絕
對不會輕易地發行這些股份。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie and I hope you can come to the Annual Meeting - at a

new site. Last year, we slightly overran the Orpheum Theater's

seating capacity of 2,750, and therefore we will assemble at 9:30

a.m. on Monday, May 1, 1995, at the Holiday Convention Centre. The

main ballroom at the Centre can handle 3,300, and if need be, we

will have audio and video equipment in an adjacent room capable of

handling another 1,000 people.

查理跟我很希望各位都能夠來參加今年的股東會，由於去年參加的人數稍微超過
了Orpheum中心2,750的座位容量，因此今年股東會我們決定於1995年5
月1日，星期一早上9點30分在新的場地-Holiday會議中心召開，新場地的
大廳可以容納3,300人，若有必要，藉由視聽器材的輔助，旁邊還有一個可以
容納1,000人的會議室。


Last year we displayed some of Berkshire's products at the

meeting, and as a result sold about 800 pounds of candy, 507 pairs

of shoes, and over $12,000 of World Books and related publications.

All these goods will be available again this year. Though we like

to think of the meeting as a spiritual experience, we must remember

that even the least secular of religions includes the ritual of the

collection plate.

去年我們在會場上展示了一些Berkshire的產品，結果總計賣出了800磅的糖
果、507雙的鞋子以及價值超過12,000美元的世界百科全書與相關出版品，
今年這些商品會再度與會，雖然我們認為這次會議的意義主要在於精神層面，但
我們不要忘記，即使是最神聖的宗教典禮，也包含的奉獻捐獻的儀式。

Of course, what you really should be purchasing is a video

tape of the 1995 Orange Bowl. Your Chairman views this classic

nightly, switching to slow motion for the fourth quarter. Our

cover color this year is a salute to Nebraska's football coach, Tom

Osborne, and his Cornhuskers, the country's top college team. I

urge you to wear Husker red to the annual meeting and promise you

that at least 50% of your managerial duo will be in appropriate

attire.

當然大家絕對不能錯過的是1995年橘子盃的錄影帶，本人利用晚上的時間觀看
這場經典的賽事，甚至還用慢動作播放精彩的第四節，我們以今年封面的顏色表
示對內布拉斯加美式足球隊教練-Tom Osborne以及其所帶領的全美最佳隊伍
-Cornhuskers隊的敬意，我敦促大家一定要穿Huskers隊的紅色出席今年的
股東會，而我也可以向各位保證Berkshire的經營雙人組會有50%以上穿著正
確的服色出席。

We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations for the

meeting, as we expect a large crowd. Those of you who like to be

downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the

Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel or at the

much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of

the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118

rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is

the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from

Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be

buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:45 and 9:00 for the

meeting and return after it ends.

由於預期會有相當多的人與會，我們建議大家最好先預訂房間，想要住在市中心
的人(距離會場約6英哩)可以選擇擁有88個房間的一家小旅館-Radisson-
Redick旅館或是旁邊較大一點的Red Lion旅館，至於會場附近則有Holiday
Inn (403個房間)、Homewood Suites (118個房間)或Hampton Inn (136個
房間)，另一個推薦的旅館是位在奧瑪哈西區的Marriott，離波仙珠寶店約100
公尺，距離會場約10分鐘的車程，屆時在哪裡將會有巴士接送大家往返股東會
會場。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can

obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A

good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who

stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be

able to walk to the meeting.

後面附有股東會開會投票的相關資料，跟各位解釋如何拿到入場所許的識別證，
當天會場有相當大的停車場，住在Holiday Inn 、Homewood Suites或
Hampton Inn的人可以直接走路過來開會。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska

Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you

from there to hotels or the airport later. I hope you make a

special effort to visit the Nebraska Furniture Mart because it has

opened the Mega Mart, a true retailing marvel that sells

electronics, appliances, computers, CD's, cameras and audio

equipment. Sales have been sensational since the opening, and you

will be amazed by both the variety of products available and their

display on the floor.

一如往年，會後我們備有巴士帶大家到內布拉斯加傢具店與波仙珠寶店或是到飯
店與機場，我希望大家特別能到內布拉斯加傢具店參觀，因為今年新開幕的超大
賣場，販賣各式家電、電子資訊、CD唱片、攝影機與視聽產品，自開幕以來，
銷售業績驚人，到了現場之後，你絕對會對產品的多樣與展示方式印象深刻。

The Mega Mart, adjacent to NFM's main store, is on our 64-acre

site about two miles north of the Centre. The stores are open from

10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Fridays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and

noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. When you're there be sure to say hello

to Mrs. B, who, at 101, will be hard at work in our Mrs. B's

Warehouse. She never misses a day at the store - or, for that

matter, an hour.

位於NFM主館旁邊的超級大賣場距離會場約2英哩遠，營業時間平日從早上
10點到下午9點，星期六從早上10點到下午6點，星期日則從中午開到下午
6點，到了那裡記得向高齡101歲的B太太Say hello，她每天都會到B太太倉
庫工作，或者應該說是每個小時。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for

shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday. This

is always a special day, and we will try to have a few surprises.

Usually this is the biggest sales day of the year, so for more

reasons than one Charlie and I hope to see you there.

平時禮拜天不營業的波仙珠寶，在股東會當天會特別為股東與來賓開放，從中午
開到下午6點，這天總是相當的特別，我們會試著讓大家得到一些意外的驚喜，
而通常那天也是該店全年營業額最高的一天，這也是查理跟我希望能在那裡看到
各位的主要原因之一。

On Saturday evening, April 29, there will be a baseball game

at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Buffalo

Bisons. The Buffalo team is owned by my friends, Mindy and Bob

Rich, Jr., and I'm hoping they will attend. If so, I will try to

entice Bob into a one-pitch duel on the mound. Bob is a

capitalist's Randy Johnson - young, strong and athletic - and not

the sort of fellow you want to face early in the season. So I will

need plenty of vocal support.

在前一天4月29日，星期六晚上，Rosenblatt體育館將會有一場奧瑪哈皇家
隊對水牛城水牛隊的比賽，水牛隊的老闆是我的好朋友-Mindy跟Bob，我希望
他們也能參加，若他們真的來了，我會引誘Bob與我在投手丘上來一場對決，
Bob可以稱得上是資本家的強森巨投，年輕、健壯且精力充沛，絕對是你在球季
中不會想要遇到的對手，所以屆時我希望大家都能到場給予我聲援。

The proxy statement will include information about obtaining

tickets to the game. About 1,400 shareholders attended the event

last year. Opening the game that night, I had my stuff and threw a

strike that the scoreboard reported at eight miles per hour. What

many fans missed was that I shook off the catcher's call for my

fast ball and instead delivered my change-up. This year it will be

all smoke.

股東會資料將告訴大家如何取得入場的門票，去年大約有1,400位股東出席這
項盛會，當晚開賽前，我投出一只時速高達8英哩的好球，只是許多球迷在當
場並沒有看到我不顧的捕手要求投出快速球的指示反而祭出我的上飄球，至於今
年我要投出的球路至今仍然是個謎。

Warren E. Buffett

March 7, 1995 Chairman of the Board

華倫．巴菲特

董事會主席

1995年3月7日