BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股東:
Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, whic
increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B
stock by 48.3%. Over the last 34 years (that is, since present
management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to
$37,801, a rate of 24.7% compounded annually.*
1998年本公司的淨值增加了259億美元，每股帳面淨值不管是A級股或B級
股皆成長了48.3%，總計過去34年以來，也就是自從現有經營階層接手之後，
每股淨值由當初的19元成長到現在的37,801美元，年複合成長率約為
24.7%*。
* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only
stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic
interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
*1在年報中所謂的每股數字係以A級普通股約當數為基礎，這是本公司在1996年以前流通在
外唯一的一種股份，B級普通股則擁有A級普通股三十分之一的權利。
Normally, a gain of 48.3% would call for handsprings -- but no
this year. Remember Wagner, whose music has been described as better
than it sounds? Well, Berkshire's progress in 1998 -- though more than
satisfactory -- was not as good as it looks. That's because most of that
48.3% gain came from our issuing shares in acquisitions.
通常當公司的淨值一年能夠成長48.3%時，大家應該要高興的手舞足蹈，不過
今年卻不行，還記得德國音樂天才華格納嗎? 他的音樂曾被形容為沒有想像中好
聽，嗯! 我想Berkshire在1998年的進展，雖然已經相當令人滿意了，但還是
沒有表面上看起來那麼好，主要的原因在於在增加的48.3%淨值當中，有絕大
部份係來自於因購併交易所發行的新股。
To explain: Our stock sells at a large premium over book value
which means that any issuing of shares we do -- whether for cash or as
consideration in a merger -- instantly increases our per-share book-
value figure, even though we've earned not a dime. What happens is that
we get more per-share book value in such transactions than we give up.
These transactions, however, do not deliver us any immediate gain in
per-share intrinsic value, because in this respect what we give and what
we get are roughly equal. And, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice
Chairman and my partner, and I can't tell you too often (though you may
feel that we try), it's the per-share gain in intrinsic value that counts
rather than the per-share gain in book value. Though Berkshire's
intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of
the 48.3% recorded for book value. Nevertheless, intrinsic value still far
exceeds book value. (For a more extensive discussion of these terms,
and other investment and accounting concepts, please refer to our
Owner's Manual, on pages 56-64, in which we set forth our owner-
related business principles. Intrinsic value is discussed on pages 61 and
62.)
再進一步說明，由於我們公司目前的股價遠高於帳面價值，這意思代表每當我們
發行新股，不管是現金增資或者是合併發行新股，都會立即大幅拉高我們每股的
帳面淨值，但實際上我們沒有因此多賺進半毛錢，而真實的情況是，這類交易對
我們每股實質價值並不會產生立即的效果，主要是由於我們所得到的跟我們所付
出的只能算是相當，而就像我與合夥人查理孟格不厭其煩，但卻一再強調的真正
重要的是實質的價值的增加而非帳面淨值的增加，雖然Berkshire 1998年的實
質價值大幅成長，但絕不到帳面淨值增加48.3%的那種幅度，不過儘管如此，
我還是必須強調，目前的實質價值仍遠高於帳面淨值，(有關這些名詞的說明，
請大家參閱股東手冊，在裡頭我們揭示了與股東相關的經營原則)。
We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses an
managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998,
General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way -- more about
both later -- and the performance of our operating businesses last year
exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On
the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major
investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither
they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity
portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The
problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and
Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.
展望1999年，我們擁有有史以來最佳企業與經理人的黃金組合，我們在1998
年買下的兩家公司，分別是通用再保與Executive Jet在各方面的條件皆是一時
之選(後面還會詳加說明)，而原有擁有的企業表現更是超乎我個人的預期，
GEICO保險再一次令人瞠目結舌，當然也有不好的消息，幾家我們擁有大筆投
資的大型上市公司經營紛傳缺失，這也是當初我們沒有預期到的，也因此使得我
們股票投資組合的績效表現低於同期S&P 500指數，還好這些公司所發生的問
題都只是暫時的，查理跟我都相信他們長期發展的遠景還是相當的樂觀。
In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a tablehat we
regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the
updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key
components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if
we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our per-
share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but
excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the
second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's
operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting
adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and
corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest
and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the
first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it
were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and
the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate
costs.
在最近三年的年報中，我們提供了我們認為可以最能夠估計Berkshire實質價值
的一張表，在今年剛剛更新資料的表中，我們以擬制的方式將通用再保的數字加
入其中，也就是假設該公司自年度一開始就為我們所擁有，第一欄的數字代表我
們擁有每股的投資金額(包括現金與約當現金，但扣除財務金融單位持有的證
券)，第二欄則是每股在扣除利息與營業費用之後，Berkshire來自本業的營業利
益(但未扣除所得稅與購買法會計調整數)，當然後者已經扣除了所有來自第一欄
投資所貢獻的股利收入、利息收入與資本利得，事實上，從這張表可以看出若是
把Berkshire分拆成兩部份的話會變成怎樣，其結果就等於是一家持有我們投資
部位的控股公司，以及另一家經營旗下所有事業負擔全部成本盈虧的營利事業。
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股東:
Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, whic
increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B
stock by 48.3%. Over the last 34 years (that is, since present
management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to
$37,801, a rate of 24.7% compounded annually.*
1998年本公司的淨值增加了259億美元，每股帳面淨值不管是A級股或B級
股皆成長了48.3%，總計過去34年以來，也就是自從現有經營階層接手之後，
每股淨值由當初的19元成長到現在的37,801美元，年複合成長率約為
24.7%*。
* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only
stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic
interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
*1在年報中所謂的每股數字係以A級普通股約當數為基礎，這是本公司在1996年以前流通在
外唯一的一種股份，B級普通股則擁有A級普通股三十分之一的權利。
Normally, a gain of 48.3% would call for handsprings -- but no
this year. Remember Wagner, whose music has been described as better
than it sounds? Well, Berkshire's progress in 1998 -- though more than
satisfactory -- was not as good as it looks. That's because most of that
48.3% gain came from our issuing shares in acquisitions.
通常當公司的淨值一年能夠成長48.3%時，大家應該要高興的手舞足蹈，不過
今年卻不行，還記得德國音樂天才華格納嗎? 他的音樂曾被形容為沒有想像中好
聽，嗯! 我想Berkshire在1998年的進展，雖然已經相當令人滿意了，但還是
沒有表面上看起來那麼好，主要的原因在於在增加的48.3%淨值當中，有絕大
部份係來自於因購併交易所發行的新股。
To explain: Our stock sells at a large premium over book value
which means that any issuing of shares we do -- whether for cash or as
consideration in a merger -- instantly increases our per-share book-
value figure, even though we've earned not a dime. What happens is that
we get more per-share book value in such transactions than we give up.
These transactions, however, do not deliver us any immediate gain in
per-share intrinsic value, because in this respect what we give and what
we get are roughly equal. And, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice
Chairman and my partner, and I can't tell you too often (though you may
feel that we try), it's the per-share gain in intrinsic value that counts
rather than the per-share gain in book value. Though Berkshire's
intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of
the 48.3% recorded for book value. Nevertheless, intrinsic value still far
exceeds book value. (For a more extensive discussion of these terms,
and other investment and accounting concepts, please refer to our
Owner's Manual, on pages 56-64, in which we set forth our owner-
related business principles. Intrinsic value is discussed on pages 61 and
62.)
再進一步說明，由於我們公司目前的股價遠高於帳面價值，這意思代表每當我們
發行新股，不管是現金增資或者是合併發行新股，都會立即大幅拉高我們每股的
帳面淨值，但實際上我們沒有因此多賺進半毛錢，而真實的情況是，這類交易對
我們每股實質價值並不會產生立即的效果，主要是由於我們所得到的跟我們所付
出的只能算是相當，而就像我與合夥人查理孟格不厭其煩，但卻一再強調的真正
重要的是實質的價值的增加而非帳面淨值的增加，雖然Berkshire 1998年的實
質價值大幅成長，但絕不到帳面淨值增加48.3%的那種幅度，不過儘管如此，
我還是必須強調，目前的實質價值仍遠高於帳面淨值，(有關這些名詞的說明，
請大家參閱股東手冊，在裡頭我們揭示了與股東相關的經營原則)。
We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses an
managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998,
General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way -- more about
both later -- and the performance of our operating businesses last year
exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On
the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major
investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither
they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity
portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The
problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and
Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.
展望1999年，我們擁有有史以來最佳企業與經理人的黃金組合，我們在1998
年買下的兩家公司，分別是通用再保與Executive Jet在各方面的條件皆是一時
之選(後面還會詳加說明)，而原有擁有的企業表現更是超乎我個人的預期，
GEICO保險再一次令人瞠目結舌，當然也有不好的消息，幾家我們擁有大筆投
資的大型上市公司經營紛傳缺失，這也是當初我們沒有預期到的，也因此使得我
們股票投資組合的績效表現低於同期S&P 500指數，還好這些公司所發生的問
題都只是暫時的，查理跟我都相信他們長期發展的遠景還是相當的樂觀。
In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a tablehat we
regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the
updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key
components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if
we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our per-
share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but
excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the
second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's
operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting
adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and
corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest
and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the
first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it
were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and
the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate
costs.
在最近三年的年報中，我們提供了我們認為可以最能夠估計Berkshire實質價值
的一張表，在今年剛剛更新資料的表中，我們以擬制的方式將通用再保的數字加
入其中，也就是假設該公司自年度一開始就為我們所擁有，第一欄的數字代表我
們擁有每股的投資金額(包括現金與約當現金，但扣除財務金融單位持有的證
券)，第二欄則是每股在扣除利息與營業費用之後，Berkshire來自本業的營業利
益(但未扣除所得稅與購買法會計調整數)，當然後者已經扣除了所有來自第一欄
投資所貢獻的股利收入、利息收入與資本利得，事實上，從這張表可以看出若是
把Berkshire分拆成兩部份的話會變成怎樣，其結果就等於是一家持有我們投資
部位的控股公司，以及另一家經營旗下所有事業負擔全部成本盈虧的營利事業。
網軍霸凌實錄 (1)