麥克風的求生手冊

Warren Buffett's Letters
To Berkshire
Shareholders 2007

巴菲特致股東函

致波克夏集團（Berkshire Hathaway）的全體股東：

波克夏集團在2006年的淨值，增加了169億美元。因此，A股與B股的每股淨值，都較去年成長了18.4%。過去42年（亦即現任管理階層接手以來），每股淨值由 $19成長至 $70,281，平均年複合成長率為21.4%。

我們相信，這169億美元的淨值單年成長金額，除少數企業因合併後淨值爆增的例外（例如美國線上AOL購併時代華納Time Warner），已經締造美國企業史上的新紀錄。當然，艾克索‧美孚石油公司（Exxon Mobil）、及其他的企業獲利金額，還是有超過波克夏者，但其獲利多透過股利發放、及／或股票回購等方式，交還股東，而不是用來累積在淨值的資本上。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

經結算本公司2004年的淨值增加83億美元，A股或B股每股的帳面淨值增加10.5%，累計自現有經營階層接手之後的40年以來，每股淨值由當初的19元成長到目前的55,824美元，年複合成長率約為21.9%。

真正重要的是實質價值，而不是帳面淨值，而好消息是，在1964年到2004年期間，Berkshire已經從一家原本搖搖欲墜的北方紡織公司，蛻變成一個跨足各個產業的大型集團，其實質價值大幅超越帳面淨值，可以這樣說，40年來實質價值的成長率甚至遠超過帳面淨值21.9%的成長率，(想要對實質價值以及本人與查理孟格經營Berkshire的原則有更多的瞭解的人，我建議大家閱讀73頁的股東手冊)。

雖然帳面淨值並非完美，但仍不失為衡量實質價值長期成長率的有效工具，當然單一年度淨值的表現與S&P 500指數的比較(相關比較參閱首頁)，其意義已不若以往，主要原因在於我們股票投資部位，(含可轉換特別股在內)，占我們淨值的比重已大幅下降，從1980年代早期的114%，到近年50%不到，也因此股市波動對於我們淨值影響的程度也大不如前。

致伯克希爾•哈撒韋公司的全體股東：

2009年，公司淨利潤為218億美元，每股賬面價值增長了19.8%。也就是說，自從現任管理層接手公司之後，45年來，每股賬面價值從19美元增長到84，487美元，年復合增長率為20.3%。

我們當前的股東人數大約為500，000名，而最近伯克希爾收購伯林頓北方公司的行為，至少又增加了65000名股東。對我和我長期合作夥伴查理•芒格來說，更重要的是，我們的所有者認同伯克希爾的業務、目標、約束和文化。因此，在每篇報告裡，我們都重述了引導我們的經濟原則。我強烈建議特別是新股東，要認真閱讀這些原則。歷年來伯克希爾一直恪守這些原則，而且將來我離開後也會繼續遵守下去。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司


To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致Berkshire公司全體股東:

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股東:
Our gain in net worth during 1999 was $358 million, which increased
the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 0.5%.
Over the last 35 years (that is, since present management took over)
per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,987, a rate of 24.0%
compounded annually.*
本公司1999年的淨值增加了3.58億美元，每股A股或B股的帳面淨值皆成長
了0.5%，累計過去35年以來，也就是自從現有經營階層接手之後，每股淨值
由當初的19元成長到現在的37,987美元，年複合成長率約為24.0%*。
　
*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that
the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to
1/30th that of the A.
*1在年報中所謂的每股數字係以A級普通股約當數為基礎，這是本公司在1996年以前流通在
外唯一的一種股份，B級普通股則擁有A級普通股三十分之一的權利。
　
The numbers on the facing page show just how poor our 1999 record
was. We had the worst absolute performance of my tenure and,
compared to the S&P, the worst relative performance as well. Relative
results are what concern us: Over time, bad relative numbers will
produce unsatisfactory absolute results.
首頁上的數字完全顯示出我們1999年的成績是如何的不理想，這也是個人歷年
來表現最差的一年，不管從絕對數字或是與S&P 指數比較皆是如此，當然相對
數字是我們比較在意的，只不過時間一久，相對較差的數字其絕對數值肯定也不
會理想到哪裡去。
Even Inspector Clouseau could find last year's guilty party: your
Chairman. My performance reminds me of the quarterback whose
report card showed four Fs and a D but who nonetheless had an
understanding coach. "Son," he drawled, "I think you're spending too
much time on that one subject."
即使是頑皮豹探長也知道誰是去年真正的犯人︰沒錯! 就是我本人，而我個人的
表現讓我想起一位成績單上滿是F跟一個D的四分衛，偏偏又遇到一個體諒人
的教練輕聲說到：「孩子，我想你把太多的時間擺在單一的科目之上了。」
My "one subject" is capital allocation, and my grade for 1999 most
assuredly is a D. What most hurt us during the year was the inferior
performance of Berkshire's equity portfolio -- and responsibility for
that portfolio, leaving aside the small piece of it run by Lou Simpson of
GEICO, is entirely mine. Several of our largest investees badly lagged the
market in 1999 because they've had disappointing operating results. We
still like these businesses and are content to have major investments in
them. But their stumbles damaged our performance last year, and it's no
sure thing that they will quickly regain their stride.
我所指的單一科目就是"資金的分配"，而很顯然的我在1999年所獲得的成績就
只有D，除此之外表現最慘的要算是Berkshire的股票投資組合了，至於該為這
件事負責的，除了少部份的投資是由GEICO公司的Lou Simpson管理外，其
餘全部都要歸咎於我本人，我們幾件大型的投資標的，由於本身1999年的經營
情況不佳，導致公司股價表現遠落後於大盤，不過我們仍然對它們所處的產業情
有獨鍾，同時也願意繼續與它們同在，只是它們的挫敗嚴重影響到我們去年的表
現，而且也不確定何時才能夠回歸正軌。
The fallout from our weak results in 1999 was a more-than-
commensurate drop in our stock price. In 1998, to go back a bit, the
stock outperformed the business. Last year the business did much
better than the stock, a divergence that has continued to the date of this
letter. Over time, of course, the performance of the stock must roughly
match the performance of the business.
Berkshire 1999年積弱不振的表現，更導致公司的股價大幅下滑，相較之下，
1998年的股價反而表現的比本業還好，去年可說是剛好相反，直到年報發佈之
日止仍是如此，當然就長期而言，公司股價的表現大致上還是會與本業的表現相
當。
Despite our poor showing last year, Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice
Chairman and my partner, and I expect that the gain in Berkshire's
intrinsic value over the next decade will modestly exceed the gain from
owning the S&P. We can't guarantee that, of course. But we are willing to
back our conviction with our own money. To repeat a fact you've heard
before, well over 99% of my net worth resides in Berkshire. Neither my
wife nor I have ever sold a share of Berkshire and -- unless our checks
stop clearing -- we have no intention of doing so.
盡管去年表現不佳，不過Berkshire 主要的合夥人-查理孟格，跟我本人仍然預
期Berkshire未來十年實質價值的成長率應該可以略微超越S&P 指數同期的表
現，當然這種事沒人敢打包票，不過我們依舊願意以我們所有的身家作為擔保，
大家應該都知道，我個人的身家有99%以上都擺在Berkshire，我跟我內人從來
就沒有賣過一張Berkshire的股票，而且除非哪一天真的不夠錢花，否則我們永
遠不會考慮出售任何一張股票。
Please note that I spoke of hoping to beat the S&P "modestly." For
Berkshire, truly large superiorities over that index are a thing of the
past. They existed then because we could buy both businesses and
stocks at far more attractive prices than we can now, and also because
we then had a much smaller capital base, a situation that allowed us to
consider a much wider range of investment opportunities than are
available to us today.
請注意我說的是"略微"超越S&P，因為對Berkshire來說，大幅超越S&P指數的
情況已經成為歷史，當初能夠有這樣的成績，主要是因為那時不管企業或是股票
的價格都相當低廉，而我們的資本規模相對也較小，那使得我們比現在有更多的
投資機會可供選擇。
Our optimism about Berkshire's performance is also tempered by the
expectation -- indeed, in our minds, the virtual certainty -- that the S&P
will do far less well in the next decade or two than it has done since
1982. A recent article in Fortune expressed my views as to why this is
inevitable, and I'm enclosing a copy with this report.
此外我之所以對Berkshire未來的表現如此有信心的原因在於，我認為S&P在
未來一、二十年的表現將遠遠不如過去十幾年的表現，在最近的財星雜誌我發表
了一篇文章解釋這種無可避免的緣由，在年報後面我也附了一份供大家參考。
Our goal is to run our present businesses well -- a task made easy
because of the outstanding managers we have in place -- and to acquire
additional businesses having economic characteristics and managers
comparable to those we already own. We made important progress in
this respect during 1999 by acquiring Jordan's Furniture and
contracting to buy a major portion of MidAmerican Energy. We will talk
more about these companies later in the report but let me emphasize
one point here: We bought both for cash, issuing no Berkshire shares.
Deals of that kind aren't always possible, but that is the method of
acquisition that Charlie and I vastly prefer.
我們的目標是把現有的事業給經營好-這點對於現有優秀的經營階層來說是件很
簡單的事，同時再設法取得具有相同競爭優勢與優秀經理人的新事業，去年我們
在這方面大有進展，不但買下了Jordan傢具，同時還簽約買下了MidAmerican
能源大部分的股權，在報告的後段我還會詳加介紹這兩家公司，不過有一點我要
強調的是，這兩項購併案Berkshire全部皆以現金進行交易，沒有發行任何新
股，雖然這樣的交易方式可遇不可求，但卻也是查理跟我比較偏好的。
Guides to Intrinsic Value
實質價值簡介
I often talk in these pages about intrinsic value, a key, though far from
precise, measurement we utilize in our acquisitions of businesses and
common stocks. (For an extensive discussion of this, and other
investment and accounting terms and concepts, please refer to our
Owner's Manual on pages 55 - 62. Intrinsic value is discussed on page
60.)
在接下來的這一段，我要談談常常提到實質價值的觀念，這是一個我們在進行企
業購併與股票投資時，很重要但卻很難明確界定的標準，(有關這個議題的廣泛
討論，也包含其他投資與會計名詞觀念，請參閱股東手冊)。
In our last four reports, we have furnished you a table that we regard as
useful in estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of
that table, which follows, we trace two key components of value. The
first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including
cash and equivalents but excluding assets held in our financial products
operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from
Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting
adjustments (discussed on page 61), but after all interest and corporate
expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and
capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the
first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it
were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and
the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate
costs.
在最近四年的年報中，我們提供了我們認為可以最能夠估計Berkshire實質價值
的一張表，在今年剛剛更新資料的表中，我們以擬制的方式將通用再保的數字加
入其中，也就是假設該公司自年度一開始就為我們所擁有，第一欄的數字代表我
們擁有每股的投資金額(包括現金與約當現金，但扣除財務金融單位持有的證
券)，第二欄則是每股在扣除利息與營業費用之後，Berkshire來自本業的營業利
益(但未扣除所得稅與購買法會計調整數)，當然後者已經扣除了所有來自第一欄
投資所貢獻的股利收入、利息收入與資本利得，事實上，從這張表可以看出若是
把Berkshire分拆成兩部份的話會變成怎樣，其結果就等於是一家持有我們投資
部位的控股公司，以及另一家經營旗下所有事業負擔全部成本盈虧的營利事業。